

**REINTEGRATION OF EX-COMBATANTS AND PEACE BUILDING IN UGANDA:  
A CASE STUDY OF THE UGANDA NATIONAL RESCUE  
FRONT I 1981 – 2008**

**BY**

**MWESIGYE FRED  
(BBA – MAK)  
REG: 2007/HD03/8582U**

**A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT FOR THE  
REQUIREMENTS OF THE AWARD OF A DEGREE OF MASTER OF  
ARTS IN PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES OF  
MAKERERE UNIVERSITY**

**SEPTEMBER 2010**

**DECLARATION**

I, MWESIGYE FRED, do hereby declare that this is my original work and that it has not been submitted to any other University/Institution of higher learning for the award of any academic qualification.

Signed:.....

MWESIGYE FRED

Date: .....

This research dissertation has been submitted with my approval as supervisor.

Signed:.....

DR. P. MUSANA

Date:.....

## **DEDICATION**

This piece of work is dedicated to everybody reading this work. Before you were born, God planned this moment in your life. This work is further dedicated to Enid – the love of my life who believes in me and inspires me to greater things. To Ernest for being an incredible son who amazes me with wisdom and talent. To my daughters; Rhona, Hope, Frida, Faith and Patience who are not only beautiful on the outside but are beautiful inside. To Samantha my little jewel and prayer warrior. You have such a tender heart, filled with kindness and compassion. When you pray, we feel God’s love. Finally, to God who gave me the gift of life and who has sustained and protected me.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

Without the knowledge and inspirations accorded to me by the Almighty God, this book could not have been written. I further owe special gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Musana Paddy for accepting to supervise this study.

My indebtedness further goes to my dear friends, Board members and members of staff of National Enterprise Corporation (NEC) without whose invaluable support, both materially and morally, my endeavors would have been fruitless. My thanks also go to my Lecturers, the Master of Arts in Peace and Conflict Studies class and members of the Faculty of Arts in general for providing an enabling atmosphere to complete the course. I am grateful to the hundreds of writers and teachers, lecturers and professors who have shaped my life and helped me to learn the truth that conflicts damage relationship, tarnish reputation, eat up large sums of money, waste time and talent.

Sincere gratitude and appreciation go to my dear wife and children who tolerated the inconveniences I have caused in one way or another. They contributed enormously to my academic success. May God reward them abundantly.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Declaration .....	ii
Dedication .....	iii
Acknowledgement .....	iv
Table of Contents .....	v
List of Tables .....	viii
List of Figures .....	ix
List of Plates.....	x
Abbreviations .....	xi
Abstract .....	xii
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION .....	1
1.1 Background to the study .....	2
1.2 Statement of the Problem .....	8
1.3 Scope of the study .....	8
1.4 Definition of Key Terms .....	9
1.5 Objective of the study .....	11
1.6 Research Questions .....	11
1.7 Significance of the Study .....	12
1.8 Conceptual model.....	13
1.9 Limitations and delimitations of the Study.....	15
CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF LITERATURE .....	17
2.0 Introduction .....	17
2.1 Peace Agreement between the Government and UNRF 1 .....	17
2.2 Causes of failure to deliver on Commitments in the UNRF Peace Agreement .....	20
2.3 Consequences of failure to deliver on Commitments in the peace Agreement .....	21
2.4 Causes of Emergence of Rebel Movements.....	25
2.5 Reintegration of Ex-combatants in Uganda, the DDR approach and Peace building.....	28

2.6 Conclusion .....	37
CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY.....	38
3.1 Introduction.....	38
3.2 Research Design.....	38
3.3 Area of the Study .....	38
3.4 Target population .....	39
3.5 Sample size .....	39
3.6 Sample selection .....	39
3.7 Methods of Data Collection .....	41
3.8 Validity of Instruments .....	43
3.9 Reliability.....	43
3.10 Data analysis .....	44
3.11 Ethical issues.....	44
CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH FINDINGS, PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS.....	45
4.1 Introduction.....	45
4.2 Background Characteristics of Respondents.....	45
4.2 Understanding between UNRF I and NRM (1981 and 1986) .....	50
4.3 Failure to deliver on Commitments in the Peace Agreement between UNRF 1 and NRM....	61
4.4 The Emergence of new Rebel Movements in West Nile.....	78
4.5 The Process of Reintegration of UNRF 1 ex-combatants.....	82
CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	99
5.1 Introduction.....	99
5.2 Discussion of findings.....	99
5.3 Conclusions .....	114
5.4 Recommendations .....	116
5.5 Areas for Further Research .....	118
REFERENCES.....	121

Appendix I: List of Key Informants .....	i
Appendix II: Interview Guide For Ex-Combatants.....	i
Appendix III: Guiding Questions For Key Informants .....	vii
Appendix IV: Guiding Questions For Key Informants.....	xii
Appendix V: Guiding Questions For Focus Group Discussions with Opinion Leaders .....	xiv
Appendix VI: Observation Guide .....	xv
Appendix VII: A Sample Copy of the Amnesty Certificate .....	xvi
Appendix VIII: Letter of Introduction to Respondents.....	xvii
Appendix IX: Maps .....	xviii
Appendix X: Declaration of formation of a coordinating committee by the Fighting forces	

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1: Respondents selected from Arua, Yumbe and Koboko districts.....	40
Table 4.1: Reintegration status of respondents .....	46
Table 4.2: Respondent views on commitments made by the NRM government to UNRF1 Combatants .....	54
Table 4.3: Respondent views on commitments not fulfilled by the NRM Government.....	57
Table 4.4: UNRF1 ex-combatants not reintegrated and/compensated by November 2008.....	58
Table 4.5: Former UNRF 1 ex-combatants who were offered jobs in the NRM Government.....	59
Table 4.6: UNRF 1 ex-combatants’ view of the Causes of failure to deliver on..... Commitments by NRM.....	61
Table 4.7: Respondent views on the causes of the failure to deliver on commitments by UNRF1.....	63
Table 4.8: Respondent views on negative consequences of the failure of the NRM to fulfill Commitment to the UNRF 1 ex-combatants .....	65
Table 4.9: Respondent views on Negative Consequences to the NRM government.....	70
Table 4.10: Respondent views on Negative Consequences to the Community.....	72
Table 4.11: Rebel Movements that emerged/recruited in West Nile since January 1986 .....	79
Table 4.12: Respondent views on factors that led to emergence of new rebel movements.....	79
Table 4.13: Deployment of UNRF 1 ex-combatants into the NRA in 1986.....	83
Table 4.14: Respondents’ view of the reasons for demobilization of UNRF 1 force.....	86
Table 4.15: Responses on frameworks for reintegration of UNRF 1 ex-combatants .....	87
Table 4.16: Responses on reintegration programmes for UNRF 1 ex-combatants.....	89
Table 4.17: Responses on Social cohesion, Capacity enhancement and Reconciliation .....	94
Table 4.18: The extent to which International Reintegration Standards were observed.....	97



## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1: A conceptual model of the study .....	14
Figure 4.1: Age distribution of respondents.....	47
Figure 4.2: Marital status of respondents.....	47
Figure 4.3: Education levels of respondents .....	48
Figure 4.4: Rank of respondents at the time of reintegration.....	49
Figure 4.5: Number of years of service in UNRF1 .....	50
Figure 4.6: The process of reintegration of UNRF 1 ex-combatants .....	85

## LIST OF PLATES

Plate 4.1: A homestead of a UNRF ex-combatant exhibiting poor living conditions.....	66
Plate 4.2: A mismanaged poultry project owned by ex-combatants in Koboko district.....	67
Plate 4.3: A house of a UNRF 1 ex-combatant not repaired by NRM .....	68
Plate 4.4: Some unemployed ex-combatants.....	69
Plate 4.5: NUSAF funded mechanical workshop for UNRF 1 ex-combatants in Arua town.....	73
Plate 4.6: NUSAF funded metal and fabrication workshop for UNRF 1 ex-combatants .....	74
Plate 4.7: Commercial tree growing ( <i>teak species</i> ) by ex-combatants .....	75
Plate 4.8: A fruit growing project for a UNRF1 ex-combatant in Yumbe town.....	76
Plate 4.9: A maize garden for a UNRF 1 ex-combatant in Koboko District.....	77
Plate 4.10: An ex-combatant practicing carpentry and joinery skills at PRAFORD.....	90
Plate 4.11: Ex-combatants attending a mechanics class at SKIPI project premises. ....	91
Plate 4.12: A hair dressing class attended by ex-combatants at PRAFORD. ....	92
Plate 4.13: Ex-combatants practicing paver-laying skills gained from PRAFORD .....	93

## ABBREVIATIONS

AC:	Amnesty Commission
CSOPNU:	Civil Society Organizations for Peace in Northern Uganda
DDR:	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
FAP:	Formerly Abducted People
FRONASA	Front for National Salvation
KAR	King African Riffle
LRA:	Lord's Resistance Army
MFPEd	Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development
NRM/A:	National Resistance Movement/Army
NUPI:	Northern Uganda Peace Initiative
NURP:	Northern Uganda Reconstruction Programme
NUSAF:	Northern Uganda Social Action Fund
OPM:	Office of the Prime Minister
PRADO:	Programme for Reconciliation and Development
PRDP:	Peace Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda
PRAFORD:	Participatory Rural Action for Development
RDCs	Resident District Commissioners
SKIPI:	Skills for Peace and Income Project
SPSS:	Statistical Package for Social Scientists
TPDF:	Tanzania People Defence Forces
UNRF 1:	Uganda National Rescue Front 1
UN:	United Nations
UNIDO:	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UPDA:	Uganda Peoples Defense Army
UPDF:	Uganda People's Defence Forces
UPDM/A:	Uganda People's Democratic Movement/Army
UVAB:	Uganda Veterans Assistance Board

## **ABSTRACT**

This study set out to examine the relationship between reintegration of ex-combatants and peace building in the West Nile region, taking Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF 1) as a case study. The study was prompted by observation and media reports that the continued armed conflict and low political support for the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government in the West Nile region was partly attributed to failure of the government to fully reintegrate the Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF 1) ex-combatants led by Moses Ali as negotiated in 1986. On this basis, therefore, the study sought to establish the understanding that existed between UNRF I and NRM the war against the governments between 1981 and 1986; the causes and consequences of failure to deliver on commitments in the peace agreement by both parties; factors that led to the emergence of new rebel movements in West Nile and; the extent to which reintegration of UNRF 1 ex-combatants have contributed to peace building and was based on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) processes. The reintegration process was based and emphasized shame and reintegration theory by Braithwaite (1989) which represents alternative dispute resolution.

A cross sectional survey research design was adopted. A total sample of 144 respondents which included UNRF1 ex-combatants, NRM leaders at the time of reintegration, officials from the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), Northern Uganda Social Action Plan (NUSAF) staff, Coordinator of Skills for Peace and Income (SKIPI) Project in Yumbe District, Resident District Commissioners (RDCs), Executive Secretary of Uganda Veterans Assistance Board (UVAB), Amnesty Commission staff and opinion leaders in Arua, Yumbe and Koboko districts were also consulted. The primary data was collected using interview guides; focus group discussion and observation checklists. Consequently, both qualitative and quantitative data were collected.

Research findings revealed that the understanding between UNRF1 and NRM government involved commitments by both parties. Although a significant number of the commitments were met by the NRM government, full reintegration of UNRF1 ex-combatants according to the DDR

procedure of the United Nations was not done. Consequently, this had negative consequences for the NRM government, local community as well as UNRF 1 ex-combatants hence low contribution to peace building in the West Nile region. In order to improve reintegration of UNRF1 ex-combatants and contribute to peace building in the West Nile region, the study recommended instilling mutual trust through quick fulfillment of the agreed commitments by both parties, securing adequate funds for the DDR process, implementation of projects that directly target ex-combatants rather than indirect community projects, appointment of a special government representative for the West Nile region affairs, involvement of the local communities to instill social cohesion and formulation of National Policy on Conflict Resolution and Peace building among others.

## CHAPTER ONE

### 1.0 GENERAL INTRODUCTION

This study set out to examine the relationship between reintegration of ex-combatants and peace building in the West Nile region, taking Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF 1) as a case study. Uganda has experienced a series of violent conflicts since its independence, with each successive regime faced with a wide range of political, social, economic and military issues. Politically the changes came with loss of jobs, income and social security for some sections of society. The absence of political leadership that followed regime changes meant loss of allegiance and direction; loss of recognition of deposed regime and attention to the new regime and its forces starting with the overthrow of the first President Edward Mutesa in 1966 by Milton Obote. Thereafter, Obote was deposed by General Idi Amin in 1971, who was in turn removed from power in 1979 by a combined force of Kikosi Malumu led by Milton Obote and Front for National Salvation (FRONASA) led by Yoweri Museveni (Gersony, (1997). This combined force was supported by Tanzania Peoples' Defence Forces (TPDF). The Obote regime was toppled for the second time in 1985 by a section of disgruntled Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA<sup>1</sup>) forces led by Tito Okello who were mainly Acholis. This period was turbulent, with unstable political systems which resulted in nine changes in government of which four were military regimes. All these resulted in bloodshed, widespread human rights violations and economic destruction that left behind large numbers of un-deployed ex-combatants. Following the contested electoral results in 1980, the Popular Resistance Army (PRA) headed by Yoweri Museveni launched a guerilla struggle on 6<sup>th</sup> February 1981. This struggle culminated into NRM's capture of state power in January 1986. After the capture of power, they faced two formidable challenges. The first was to put in place a functioning state to secure the whole country. The second was to build a disciplined professional national army (Museveni, 1997: 177).

In the following sections, the background to the study, statement of the problem, scope, objectives of the study; main and specific, research questions and significance of the study, conceptual model and delimitations are given.

---

<sup>1</sup> UNLA was composed of elements from Kikosi Malumu, Front for National Salvation (FRONASA) Save Uganda

## **1.1 Background to the study**

Conflicts in Uganda are deeply rooted in inter-ethnic competition for power in both government and military (Mutengesa, 2006). The conditions for this competition were largely set during colonial rule and then manipulated by post-independence governments. The pattern until the NRM came to power in 1986 was one of economic and political division between North and South, with further regional subdivisions, particularly in the North between the Acholi, Langi and the West Nile people (Karugire, 2003). The victory of the NRM - an organization mostly of Southerners, produced new disagreements that have yet to be overcome and are manifested clearly in the armed struggles that have existed since NRM came to power.

Leaders of post-independence governments failed to socialize the different ethno-racial groups into accepting each other as citizens of one country with a common destiny (Mamdani, 1976). The integration deficit derives from several sources, including the pattern of economic and social development. Furthermore, the colonial authorities propounded the “martial tribes thesis” to justify the recruitment of members of the armed forces exclusively from the north, a policy that was further pursued by most of the post-independence government. Besides economic policies of colonialists, military formation also sowed the seeds of a possible conflict. The military in Uganda, like similar forces in other colonies, was originally crafted as a custodian of the interests of the colonizing power (Omara-Otunnu, 1987). Fearing the powerful and decentralized monarchies of Buganda and Bunyoro who had built strong armies, the British started recruiting mainly from south of Sudan and north of Uganda as they descended to Uganda following the River Nile. Consequently, the Acholi and West Nile ethnic groups came to dominate the King African Rifles (KAR) (Amnesty Commission Report, 2000-2003). Colonial recruitment emphasized selective preference for the Luo, Sudanic and Nilo-hamitic sections of the population thus arming northerners against other regions (Karugire, 2003).

The key role of the military in politics and of ethnic competition became evident under the

---

Movement (SUM).

first government of Milton Obote, who used the army to create an atmosphere of terror and eventual overthrow of the Constitution and the first President of Uganda who was also the King of Buganda. In 1966, Prime Minister Milton Obote ordered a military invasion of the Kabaka's palace. The Kabaka fled to exile where he died a few years later. As revealed by Meredith (2006:110), the introduction of military into Ugandan politics was initiated by Milton Obote as early as 1966<sup>2</sup> "when he sent government troops, headed by Idi Amin, into Kabaka's palace, killing a large number of people and forcing the Kabaka into Exile in London where he died mysteriously". The following year, a new constitution declared Uganda a republic and centralized power in an executive president. This resulted in a crisis of legitimacy and heightened conflict in the ethnically fragile state. When Amin overthrew Obote, some prominent Acholi and Langi officers and men fled into exile to join Obote (Gersony, 1997). Amin grew very suspicious and started recruiting from his own Kakwa tribe and from Nubian groups from Sudan and North East Zaire (Meredith, 2006). While he was recruiting his ethnic tribesmen and consolidating his power, he started killing the Langis and the Acholis who had stayed in the forces (Gertzell, 1990, Meredith, 2006). Later on, he started killing people from other tribes.

### **1.1.1 The origin of Uganda National Rescue Front 1 (UNRF 1)**

The Uganda National Rescue Front 1 (UNRF 1) refers to a former armed rebel group in Uganda's West Nile sub-region that first opposed, but later became incorporated into the Ugandan government. The UNRF I was formed by then Brig. Moses Ali to oppose Milton Obote during his second term (1980-1985) as President of Uganda. The reasons for their opposition were mainly tribalism, revenge for the past killings<sup>3</sup>, mistreatment by Obote forces and electoral malpractices.

The Uganda National Rescue Front II on the other hand, was a group that broke from the West Nile Bank Front in 1996, and included members of the original UNRF 1 that did not make peace with Museveni (Northern Uganda Peace Initiative, 2006). It operated mostly in

---

<sup>2</sup> Historically, from the colonial period, the British had always recruited heavily from the Acholi and Langi tribes because of the so called martial tendencies.



Aringa County, Arua District, out of bases in southern Sudan, and received support from the Sudanese government (the National Islamic Front), in retaliation for Ugandan government support for the Sudan People's Liberation Army (Muwonge, 2007). It was led by Major General Ali Bamuze. On December 24, 2002, the UNRF II signed a formal ceasefire with the government in the town of Yumbe in northwestern Uganda. Terms included a battalion of UNRF II soldiers being incorporated in the Ugandan army, and 4.2 billion Shs being distributed to the group (Amnesty Commission Report, 2005).

History reveals that Northerners, more particularly people from West Nile, dominated the majority of the Ugandan Army from independence to 1979 (Gertzel, 1990). But when Idi Amin's government fell in 1979, these soldiers were rendered jobless and took refuge in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (formerly known as Zaire) and the Sudan. As a result, life was never the same for them. In the subsequent years, a succession of fighting groups emerged drawn from the substantial number of soldiers who served in the army during Amin's regime.

In 1980, the regrouped Amin's forces launched attacks on Uganda territory with the aim of driving the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) out of the region. They succeeded in over-running Arua but were later repulsed by the Uganda Army. Following its defeat, the Former Uganda National Army (FUNA) brewed yet other groups of fighters including the Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF) headed by Brigadier Moses Ali and the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF). The emergence of these rebel groups in West Nile caused tremendous armed insurgencies and conflicts in the region (Amnesty Commission Report 2004 – 2005).

In 1986, following the accession to power of the National Resistance Movement (NRM), the UNRF, under Brigadier Moses Ali reached an agreement with the NRM under which a number of officers and men of UNRF were absorbed in NRM, but not all the groups reached similar agreements with the government. The NRA integrated various fighting groups<sup>4</sup> into a

---

<sup>3</sup> For example, Ladong and Ombachi massacres of 1980.

<sup>4</sup> Other fighting groups were Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA), Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM), Former Uganda National Army (FUNA).

new national army, but mainly Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF) (Nsibambi, 1998) which was the largest fighting group after NRA. The reintegration was aimed at a new doctrine of reconciliation, different from the colonial setting that hardly recognized the population and other national interest.

After conclusion of the understanding, about 5000 of the UNRF joined Yoweri Museveni's government (Ali, forthcoming) where Moses Ali held a variety of positions, including Minister of Tourism and Wildlife, and Minister of Youth, Culture and Sports. In April 1990, he was arrested on treason charges, and imprisoned until June 1992, when he was released and acquitted. This did not prevent his later being appointed Minister of Internal Affairs, Minister for Disaster Preparedness, and Deputy Prime Minister.

### **1.1.2 Reintegration of UNRF 1 into the NRA**

This study was conducted among UNRF 1 ex-combatants because it was the first rebel group to enter formal negotiations with NRM government for reintegration of its forces, had a clear leadership and had a force of about 5000 fighters (Refugee Law Project, 2004). The origin of reintegration of UNRF 1 ex-combatants by the National Resistance Army dates back to 1981 when top leaders and Commanders of the three fighting forces that were opposed to the government of Obote met under the sponsorship and Chairmanship of the Libyan Leader; Col. Gaddafi (Moses Ali, forthcoming). Regarding this, Moses Ali noted:

“The three fighting groups that met in Libya and held talks with the Libyan Leader were UNRF 1 represented by me and Major Emilio Mondo, NRM represented by Yusuf Lule its Chairman and Yoweri Museveni the Vice chairman and Field Commander and; UFM represented by Balaki Kirya and Francis Bwengye”.

These talks culminated into the Tripoli Agreement of 1981 where the “Uganda Popular Front” was formed as an umbrella organization that united the three anti-Obote fighting groups (A copy of the declaration has been attached as Appendix X). This attempt however, did not yield results in the desired direction. Hence the three movements opted to maintain good relations in their approach to fighting the Obote regime.

An account of the events that led to the need for integration, immediately after entering Kampala in 1986, is clearly captured by Museveni (1997:177), when he stated:

“...thus we took a positive decision to incorporate soldiers from other forces into NRA. There were two reasons for this. Firstly, these soldiers were already trained, and although they had been widely misused in the country, we saw the problem as one of leadership, not the soldiers themselves. At the same time, we were aware incorporating these young men into our new national army would help build confidence among the population in the regions that they came from”.

The process of reintegration involved reception of the surrendered or captured ex-combatants, documentation and categorization. Those who were unfit or unwilling to join the NRA were separated from those who were fit and willing to join the NRA. However, those who opted to stay in the army received military retraining and political education. The UNRF1 ex-combatants who were reintegrated into the community received a reinsertion package. This partly followed the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) standards that advocate for the signing of a negotiated peace agreement that provides a legal framework for DDR; trust in the peace process; willingness of the parties to the conflict to engage in DDR; and a minimum guarantee of security (United Nations, 2006). The DDR process contributes to security and stability in a post-conflict recovery context by removing weapons from the hands of combatants, taking the combatants out of military structures and helping them to integrate socially and economically into society by finding civilian livelihoods. Therefore, both the DDR and Uganda's National Resistance Government processes emphasized the doctrine of reconciliation, peace building and separating misleaders from the misled and that if there was to be any punishment, it would go to the misleaders. This is further illustrated in Table 4.18 in Chapter four of this report. The Uganda's National Resistance Government reintegration process followed the "*Shame and reintegration*" model by Braithwaite (1989). Shame and reintegration model represents alternative dispute resolution which has its origins in efforts to establish a "restorative" form of justice. The basic idea here is that the best way to deal with much offender/victim crime is to repair as far as possible, or make up for the damage done and the hurt caused by the crime. The emphasis is

restorative, not punitive; on reparation, not retribution; on forgiveness not punishment and; dialogue and reconciliation not revenge (Braithwaite, 1989).

It is important to further note that reintegration of ex-combatants into a national army is part of recruitment. While the recruitment of UNRF 1 was based on willingness of both sides, physical and medical fitness; today's recruitment of armed forces is guided by the Uganda Peoples' Defence Forces Act (2005). The Act provides that "...no person shall be enrolled into the Defence Forces unless he/she is a citizen of Uganda, is of good character, is at least 18 years of age and has attained such level of education as may be prescribed, is medically fit and meets such other conditions as the Defence Forces may prescribe".

Besides, the UN Agenda for Development, as presented by the Secretary-General in May 1994, states: "...the reintegration of combatants is difficult, but it is critically important to stability in the post-conflict period" and "effective reintegration of ex-combatants is also essential to the sustainability of peace" (Butros, 1994:7). As further indicated by the United Nations International Standards of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (2006), the post-conflict environment is often characterized by insecurity and lawlessness, poor or badly functioning economies, lack of social services and social cohesion. In Uganda, Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants was a first step in the transition from war to peace. However, soon after the reintegration of UNRF1, there was heightened dissatisfaction among its ranks that prepared ground for the formation of more rebel movements. In August 1986, barely seven months after the NRA/NRM had captured power, had insurgency broken out in the Acholi sub region (Ondoga, 1998). It was spearheaded by the Uganda People's Democratic Army/Movement (UPDA/UPDM). This was to be followed by other groups in West Nile, Teso and the Rwenzori regions (The Northern Uganda Peace Initiative, 2006). Against this background, the contents of the understanding that existed between UNRFI and NRA (later referred to as the Uganda Peoples' Defence Forces (UPDF), the extent to which these commitments were fulfilled and, causes of the emergence of new rebel movements in West Nile were some of the research gaps that this study attempted to fill.

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

The West Nile region has experienced several conflicts involving counter-attack by the defeated army with the aim of re-capturing power, marginalisation, tribal opportunism, revenge, fear of reprisals from the local civilians due to previous crimes, poverty and competition over scarce resources in a hostile environment. The UNRF 1 led by Moses Ali is one of the rebel groups that negotiated with the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) for reintegration of its combatants into the National Resistance Army as well as civilian life. However, a short time after the reintegration exercise, the NRM government is said to have failed to deliver on all its commitments. Former members and senior commanders of UNRF1 were harassed, arrested and charged in the High Court of Uganda with treason (Meredith, 2006). Meanwhile, armed rebellions continued to recur in the West Nile region and the area remained a source of rebel recruitment. Consequently, peace building efforts in the area have not brought peace to the region (Rubongoya, 2007). Besides, it is not clear which of the commitments were not fulfilled, what caused the failure to fulfill the commitments, what prompted the emergence of new rebel movements in West Nile and the extent to which reintegration of ex-combatants contributed to peace building in West Nile. These unanswered questions prompted this study.

## **1.3 Scope of the study**

The scope of the study covered geographical, content and time scope as presented below:

### *Geographical scope*

The study was conducted among UNRF 1 ex-combatants in three districts of West Nile, including; Arua, Koboko and Yumbe districts (refer to map 1 for location). The districts were considered ideal because they had a big number of UNRF1 ex-combatants who came into an understanding with the NRM government to be reintegrated and have consequently participated in peace building initiatives in the area.

### *Content scope*

In its content scope, the study attempted to establish the understanding that existed between

UNRF I and National Resistance Movement in the war against the governments between 1981 and 1986; the causes and consequences of failure to deliver on commitments in the peace agreement by both parties; factors that led to the emergence of new rebel movements in West Nile and; the extent to which reintegration of UNRF 1 ex-combatants have contributed to peace building and whether it was based on DDR processes.

#### *Time Scope*

The study covered the period 1981 to 2008. The year 1981 marked the beginning of armed rebellion by the UNRF1 and NRA following electoral malpractices that confirmed Milton Obote as the President of Uganda. The rebellion ended in 1986 with NRA taking over state power and eventually negotiating with the UNRF to be reintegrated. The year 2008 on the other hand, was used to evaluate reintegration and the extent to which the commitments made between the UNRF 1 and NRA were fulfilled. While the study had originally proposed to cover the period 1981 to 1992, it was found necessary to extend the time scope to 2008 because reintegration is an ongoing process.

#### **1.4 Definition of Key Terms**

**Amnesty:** In this study, amnesty means forgiveness, mercy or pardoning. It is the act of pardoning Ugandans involved in acts of rebellion in various parts of the country to return and settle in their communities without conviction. The respondents referred to Amnesty in Kiswahili language as “*msamaha wa kivita*”.

**Conflict:** A conflict means a disagreement between parties; a confrontation between one or more parties aspiring towards incompatible or competitive means or ends. In Kiswahili language, respondents referred to conflict as “*uhasama*”

**Reintegration:** Reintegration in this study was taken to refer to a process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. The respondents referred to reintegration in Kiswahili language as “*kiyungo kwenye jamii*”

**Ex-combatants:** Ex-combatants are members of the national army or an irregular military organization who have actively participated in military activities and hostilities and have laid down or surrendered their arms with a view of living civilian lives. Respondents referred to ex-combatants in Kiswahili language as *“wapiganagi wa staafi”*

**DDR process:** Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process is a government process that seeks to contribute to peace building by providing an opportunity for former combatants to move from conflict to civilian life.

**Disarmament:** It is the collection, control and elimination of small arms, ammunition, explosives, light and heavy weapons from the ex-combatants and the civilian population. Respondents referred to disarmament in Kiswahili language as *“ukusanyagi udhibili wa silaha na milipiko”*.

**Demobilization:** Is the process in which armed organizations (which may consist of government or opposition forces or armed factions) decrease in size or are dismantled. Respondents referred to demobilization in Kiswahili language as *“kurudi uraiani”*.

**Peace building:** Peace building refers to activities intended to strengthen structures and processes with the aim of preventing a return to violent conflict. Respondents referred to peace building in Kiswahili language as *“kujenga na kudumisha amani”*

**Reconciliation:** This is a process that attempts to transform conflicts among conflicting parties into feeling of acceptance and forgiveness of past animosities. Respondents referred to reconciliation in Kiswahili language as *“usuluhishiano”*.

**Peace:** A state of affairs where conflicting human needs, desires and interests over scarce resources are fully satisfied. Respondents referred to peace in Kiswahili language as *“amani”*.

**Peace Accord:** A Peace Accord is an agreement intended to end conflicts and significantly

bring about peace. Respondents referred to peace accord in Kiswahili language as “*makubaliano ya amani*”.

**Social cohesion:** The ease between ex-combatants and host community. Respondents referred to social cohesion in Kiswahili language as “*mshikamano wa kijamii*”.

**Commissioned officer:** A soldier issued a rank by the President of Uganda.

**Non-commissioned officer:** A soldier issued a rank by the Commissions Board chaired by the Chief of Defense Forces.

## **1.5 Objectives of the study**

### **1.5.1 Major objective**

The main objective of the study was to examine the relationship between reintegration of ex-combatants and peace building in the West Nile region, taking Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF 1) as a case study.

### **1.5.2 Specific Objectives**

The study was guided by the following objectives:

1. To establish the understanding that existed between UNRF I and National Resistance Movement in the war against the governments between 1981 and 1986.
2. To establish the causes and consequences of failure to deliver on commitments in the peace agreement by both parties.
3. To critically examine any other factors, other than the failure by the government to live up to its commitments that led to the emergence of new rebel movements in West Nile.
4. To examine the extent to which reintegration of UNRF 1 ex-combatants was based on DDR processes and assess its contribution to peace building in West Nile.

## **1.6 Research Questions**

1. What was the understanding that existed between UNRF I and National Resistance



Movement in the war against the governments between 1981 and 1986?

2. What were the causes and consequences of the failure to deliver on commitments in the peace agreement by both parties?
3. What led to the emergence of new rebel movements in West Nile?
4. To what extent did the reintegration of UNRF1 contribute to peace building in the West Nile region?

### **1.7 Significance of the Study**

Much has been written about the northern Uganda conflict (NUPI, 2006; COSPNU, 2008; Museveni, 1997, Refugee Law project (2004) and Muwonge, 2007). Muwonge (1997) for example, examined the community based reintegration of the LRA in Northern Uganda while Refugee Law Project (2004) studied about negotiating peace and resolving conflicts in West Nile. However, these studies failed to examine the relationship between reintegration of UNRF 1 ex-combatants and peace building in the West Nile region. Consequently, there are many gaps not adequately addressed in the West Nile conflict that need to be filled if conflict is to be fully addressed. This is one of the major contributions that this research seeks to fulfill by highlighting the commitments that were never fulfilled by both parties. In addition to covering the knowledge gaps on the subject of reintegration, the study is likely to guide donors and policy makers in finding answers to challenges of the reintegration process.

The study aimed at examining the relationship between reintegration of ex-combatants and peace building in the West Nile region, taking Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF 1) as a case study. A number of scholars, social workers, politicians, religious leaders and international community have taken keen concern in ending the crisis in the northern part of Uganda. As one of the possible strategies towards ending the conflict, the NRM government offered to integrate the UNRF ex-combatants and stimulate the process of social cohesion and reconciliation. This study will be useful to all peace building stakeholders by highlighting the extent to which the reintegration of UNRF 1 ex-combatants contributed to peace building in the West Nile region.


To the West Nile region which has for long been affected by armed conflicts, thus stifling the country's programmes for social, economic and political development, the research serves as an additional green light for resource allocation, distribution and budgetary implications. It is from this research that policy makers in the Ministry of Defence, Internal affairs and Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development are likely to get insight regarding the possible ways of reintegrating ex-combatants into the community.

To the Government, this study has highlighted the causes of the failure to fulfill commitments and the consequences of such a failure on the standard of living of ex-combatants. This study may help political leaders to learn to offer what they promise because failure to do so adversely affects the lives of many people.

### **1.8 Conceptual model**

The study was based on peace building as the independent variable and reintegration as dependent variable. Commitments by both parties are the factors for peace building process and were the intervening variables. The relationship between these variables is diagrammatically illustrated in Figure 1.1.

**Figure 1.1: A conceptual model of the study**



*Source: Formulated by the researcher based on study findings*

The conceptual model shows peace building as the independent variable and reintegration as dependent variable. The model postulates that peace building was based on several commitments by the UNRF 1 and NRM. These commitments included cease fire, recruitment of some UNRF 1 ex-combatants into the army and civil service, security of property and life, pardon and a resettlement package. With an understanding in place, commitments were to be fulfilled otherwise armed rebellion, low political support, low standards of living, language of violence and food shortage (intervening variables) will result. However, fulfillment of commitments by both parties was expected to facilitate peace building (measured by reintegration according to DDR frameworks, social cohesion, capacity enhancement and reconciliation). If the intervening variables are strengthened, the prospects for peace building are enhanced. If they are weak, the prospects are also weakened. The roadblocks to successful reintegration and peace building seem to be inherent in the intervening variables.

### **1.9 Limitations and delimitations of the Study**

The accomplishment of the objectives of this study was not an easy task. The following were limitations and delimitations of the study:

1. Some respondents were suspicious as to why the researcher wanted information related to UNRF ex-combatant reintegration into the community in the West Nile region. This issue made respondents reluctant to fill questionnaires as most of them thought that the researcher being an army officer under the NRM government wanted to help them to get their long awaited resettlement packages. However this limitation was minimized by use of introductory letters by the researcher as well as assuring respondents about the use of the information they provided was for academic purposes only.
2. Given the fact that the topic was a sensitive security and political issue which was negotiated in the aftermath of armed offensive, its contents were not properly documented. In fact, the study found that there was no signed agreement between UNRF 1 and NRM government. Consequently, there was

lack of adequate literature to support the findings. However, the researcher depended a lot on surveyed data (primary data) to overcome this problem.

3. There was also an overlap in advantages and limitations with the methods used for data collection. This relates to the multitude of information generated during the in-depth discussion, the questionnaire, observation and focus group discussions. Analysis of this information was not easy but the researcher tried to minimize these limitations by cross checking the data collected to arrive at appropriate conclusions.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **2.0 REVIEW OF LITERATURE**

#### **2.0 Introduction**

The literature is reviewed according to the study objectives; hence peace agreement between the government and rebel movements, causes of failure to deliver on commitments in the Peace Agreement, consequences of failure to deliver on commitments in the Peace Agreement, causes of emergence of rebel movements and, reintegration of ex-combatants in Uganda, the DDR approach and peace building.

#### **2.1 Peace Agreement between the Government and UNRF 1**

In Africa, peace agreements preceded by reintegration of ex-combatants have been made in many countries including Mozambique in 1992, Sierra Leone between 1998 – 2000, Malawi, Angola, South Africa and Liberia (Civil Society Organizations for Peace in Northern Uganda (CSOPNU, 2008). Batchelor & Kingma (2004) noted that peace agreements are contracts negotiated under very different premises, but generally seek to bring conflict parties and their respective societies out of a situation of conflict and pave the way to a more sustainable peace. They are not democratically legitimized but they are generally more comprehensive than cease-fire agreements as they tend to include political aspects. In some cases, elements of the peace agreement will be integrated into the transitional arrangements and may even end up in the final constitution after a process of adaptation and political legitimization. The authors further revealed that, about half of all peace agreements fail, hence the need to be very clear about the implementation modalities already in the agreement, as well as agreeing on mechanisms to ensure its forceful implementation (for example UN peacekeeping, peace enforcement). A comparison of peace agreements is helpful to provide ideas. However, one idea pulled out of its context is often inadequate in another context. A peace agreement is based on local knowledge, history and customs and these are essential determinants of its effectiveness. In line with the above definition, it is not clear if the UNRF 1 made any peace agreement with the NRM. Consequently, this study attempted to find out the understanding that existed between UNRF I and NRM after it took power in 1986.

Civil Society Organizations for Peace in Northern Uganda (CSOPNU, 2008) further note that, the agreements between the Government of Uganda and various rebel groups have most often depended on the negotiations skills of the rebel groups and are thus quite varied in their scope. For example, the UNRF1 was unable to negotiate a resettlement package, whereas the Uganda National Rescue Front II negotiated an agreement which provided a 4.2 billion Uganda shillings package to be distributed amongst its ex-combatants. In addition, it is indicated by CSOPNU (2008) that where agreements have been made there has been very little coordination with local communities. According to CSOPNU (2008) interviews with government officials from the West Nile area, many communities still felt a lot of resentment and frustration because of the resettlement packages being awarded to ex-combatants only. It is a mix of feeling of being left out, as non-combatants needs for reintegration and resettlement are often very similar to ex-combatants, and feeling that the perpetrators of atrocities are being rewarded (Refugee Law Project, 2004). This implies that if reintegration is not properly handled, it can trigger another conflict.

Following the contested electoral results of 1980, the Popular Resistance Army (PRA) headed by Yoweri Museveni launched a guerilla struggle on 6<sup>th</sup> February 1981. This struggle culminated into NRM's capture of state power in January 1986. After the capture of power, they faced two formidable challenges. The first was to put in place a functioning state to secure the whole country. The second was to build a disciplined professional national army (Museveni, 1997: 177). In the social context each of the pre-Museveni regimes came with new actors with influence over society. Former influential actors had to seek refuge in new communities or those of their origin. Economically, the loss of political and social security caused economic hardships resulting from a mismanaged national economy which increased vulnerability across all groups of people.

Drawing an example from Zimbabwe, Mazarire and Rupiya (2000) note that in all these changes, the ex-combatants were no exception. They had to start new lives with succeeding government armies or in communities. The vulnerability depended on presence or absence of

economic resources and opportunities either with the government or in communities. However, unlike other groups affected by conflict, the ex-combatants had used the gun as a means of causing and resolving conflict. This is the issue that underpinned their centrality in this study.

In order to overcome these challenges, government embarked on reintegrating soldiers from other fighting forces, which were also opposed to the Obote regime into the NRA. Reintegration of these fighting forces had two other contingent goals, which included: (i) reduction of armed opposition to the new government (Ondoga, 1998: 148) and (ii) tapping the trained manpower which these forces already had (Museveni, 1997:177). These factors were partly reiterated by Gersony (1997) that reintegration aimed at:

- i) Consolidating internal and external security,
- ii) Strengthening political institutions and good governance,
- iii) Promoting economic and social rehabilitation and transformation and,
- iv) Creating confidence in the communities.

Therefore, a comprehensive programme for reintegration of ex-combatants was necessary for comprehensive peace building. The process of reintegrating UNRF 1 ex-combatants involved reception of the surrendered or captured ex-combatants, documentation and categorization. Those who were unfit or unwilling to join the NRA were separated from those who were fit and willing to join the NRA. However, those who opted to stay in the army received military retraining and thorough political education. The UNRF1 ex-combatants who were reintegrated into the community, received a reinsertion package. The whole process emphasized the doctrine of forgiveness, reconciliation and the theory of separating misleaders from the misled and that if there was to be any punishment, it would go to the misleaders.

Nonetheless, the policy of reintegrating all the former fighting forces into the National Resistance Army (N.R.A) was consistent with NRA doctrine of maintaining good understanding with other rebel groups that independently fought the government of Obote (Museveni 1997:175-177). The relationship with rebel groups is not the only thing that mattered to the doctrine of NRA, it also strived to promote humane treatment of prisoners of



war it captured from government forces. Also, other rebel movements which launched insurgent campaign against the NRM government were reintegrated after informal negotiations and some of them with no formal agreements. The Uganda National Rescue Front I (UNRF1), led by Brig. Moses Ali, is one of the groups that were reintegrated. It entered formal negotiations with NRM government and agreed that its forces be reintegrated. Negotiations for the reintegration took about three months to conclude (New vision, December 24, 1996). Before that, there was an attempt to unite NRA and UNRF1 at the Unity Conference of Rebel Movements held in Nairobi in 1981. This attempt did not yield good results in the desired direction, hence the two movements opted to maintain good relations in their approach to fighting the Obote regime.

## **2.2 Causes of failure to deliver on Commitments in the UNRF Peace Agreement**

Uganda has experienced a series of violent conflicts since its independence, with each successive regime faced with a wide range of political, social, economic and military issues (Amnesty Commission Report, 2000-2003). Politically the changes came with loss of jobs, income and social security for some sections of society. The absence of political leadership that followed regime changes meant loss of allegiance and direction, loss of recognition of deposed regime and attention to the new regime and its forces starting with the overthrow of the first President Edward Mutesa in 1966 by Milton Obote. Thereafter, frequent changes of government followed. Ondoga (1998:54) noted that:

“Obote was deposed by General Idi Amin in 1971, who was in turn removed from power in 1979 by a combined force of Kikosi Malumu led by Milton Obote and Front for National Salvation (FRONASA) led by Yoweri Museveni. This combined force was supported by Tanzania Peoples’ Defence Forces (TPDF). The Obote regime was toppled for the second time in 1985 by disgruntled Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) forces led by Tito Okello”.

This period was turbulent, with unstable political systems which resulted in nine changes in government of which four were military regimes. All these resulted in bloodshed, widespread human rights violations and economic destruction that left behind large numbers of un-deployed ex-combatants.

The failure of the NRM government to deliver on all its commitments may also be attributed to absence of a formal reintegration agreement with UNRF1. Knight (2008), reflects this view that clearly the reintegration exercises done by the NRM government in 1986 did not follow any known codified DDR to speak about. There was some kind of a unique home-grown mechanism of reintegration done through mutual trust and mutual understanding on adhoc basis. There were not many requirements and conditions for UNRF I to be reintegrated in NRA. The only requirement was for the forces to be under the national command (Museveni, 1997:178). In Uganda the exercise was flexible and done on the basis of blanket amnesty. The uniqueness and flexibility of the exercise provides a clear knowledge gap which this study filled.

While the foregoing analysis may be true in some cases, in others it is not. The example of reintegration exercises conducted in 1986, despite its failures, shows different lessons that constitute yet another knowledge gap the study undertakes to cover. It was done without the massive investment of the international community to speak about. In fact Museveni refers to the model NRA used to incorporate former fighting forces in 1986 as an interesting and unusual model that could be used by other countries facing problems like Uganda faced at the time (Museveni, 1997:198). Existence of the knowledge gaps in the 1986 reintegration is reinforced by the fact that post war Uganda politics did not focus much on examining this model. Studies like Kayunga (2001); Kanyeihamba (2002) and Mudola (1991) simply focus on the integration of the political forces in the NRM broad based government but neglected ex-combatants.

### **2.3 Consequences of failure to deliver on Commitments in the UNRF1 and NRM Peace Agreement**

Insecurity has often been the consequence of failed peace agreements (United Nations, 2000). In South Africa's forces management politics, Matwili (1998) observed that, militaries were critical among public and private sector institutions in determining the initiation of democratic transitions, the shape, aspect, and ultimate sustainability of the democratization processes.

Mazarire and Rupiya (2000) argue that, analytical neglect of the armed forces has to do with the astounding achievements of civil society in pacting a political settlement that the military is seen to be in its corporate interests. They therefore contended that demobilization should take into account socio-economic dynamics, particularly those that would undermine the security imperatives, such as crime related to demobilized soldiers. Mazarire and Rupiya (2000:23) clearly state that:

“Other African states have experienced considerable instability as a result of inadequate support being extended to soldiers cast *out* of the barracks to join the ranks of the poor and unemployed once their severance packages have been exhausted, and former General Meiring has said as much with regard to South Africa's tentative democracy in his assertion that "to leave these individuals in the streets is ... to invite trouble."

They added that examining social and psychological support for those 'unfortunate enough' to be laid off should be established and that the general leadership emphasizes training, as a bridging element, to afford everyone a fair chance to remain in service.

Available evidence (Lawson et al, 2003) suggests that, in conflict situation, sex becomes a commodity and prostitution gains ground for economic gains. Rape is common especially when women and girls are abducted thus increasing the chances of HIV/AIDS and Sexually Transmitted Diseases. It was further noted that where levels of education are low, in part a consequence of the conflict, efforts to communicate to the population about the risks of contracting HIV and ways of reducing such risks are rendered ineffective. With the reintegration of UNRF1 ex-combatants into the community as well as the army and civil service, it has never been documented whether HIV/AIDS poses a major threat to their wellbeing and economic prosperity. This study attempted to investigate the consequences of failure of the government to fulfill its commitments with UNRF 1.

Batchelor and Kingma (2004), described the challenges faced by ex-combatants when reintegrating into civilian society. They noted that ex-combatants lack the necessary skills and education to secure jobs. Thus, they have no source of income, no accommodation, and no guarantee of securing basic necessities such as food and water. Ex-combatants face the after

effects of the physical and psychological trauma sustained during the war and require psychosocial counseling. Consequently, the authors suggested that in order for ex-combatants to reintegrate, they must acclimatize to the new social structure, including the norms, beliefs, and laws of the community. Such acclimatization requires an un-learning of violent behavior and learning how to face difficulties and social conflict in a non-violent manner. Communities are not always willing to allow the return of ex-combatants. Ex-combatants confront disapproval, alienation, being marginalized and being used as scapegoats for the community's ills. Under such conditions, ex-combatants face exclusion from mainstream society. In line with such challenges, this study established that the majority of the UNRF1 ex-combatants were given a warm welcome by their relatives and community members.

Boutros (1995) notes that, the situation of female fighters is usually overlooked. In many regions in Africa, Asia and Latin America, women fight side by side with men in guerrilla wars, thus gaining in apparent equality. After the end of hostilities, however, they are forced back into their traditional and generally subordinate roles. The social reintegration of women combatants receives far less attention, especially from foreign donor organizations. This has also been noted with respect to reintegration programmes in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Heinemann-Grüder and Pietz 2003: 19). Therefore women's organizations have called for measures relating to disarmament, demobilization of combatants and reconstruction to be developed not only at the macro level but more importantly also within the local communities in order to ensure women's participation.

Bath (2003) notes that, a fundamental problem is that normally women are only involved peripherally in decisions concerning reconstruction at the end of hostilities. However, general aid programmes do not address their specific needs. Often women also have little opportunity to express their views for example, they have no access to the media. It is clear from the international debate that programmes to support physical and social reconstruction must develop a methodology for women's empowerment. There is also a need to focus on domestic violence, which is becoming an increasingly prevalent feature of post-war situations. For many women, the end of the public conflict and violence does not herald an end to all

violence. As male ex-combatants return home, their trauma and frustration is often projected onto their wives and families. So the rape and assault of women increases. Often women are the likely targets of looting, attack and 'economic violence' perpetrated by ex-combatants (Anderlini, 2001).

Schroeder (2005), highlights the negative reception given by community members to the ex-combatants. He revealed that communities often see ex-combatants as social and economic burdens, because they lack skills and education, and therefore require assistance in the provision of food, clothing, and housing. Community members may also protect their own jobs and be reluctant to encourage employment of ex-combatants over "good" community members. Hard feelings also arise when ex-combatants are seen to be given economic assistance through resettlement and reintegration programs, when the community receives nothing. The community sees this as rewarding the perpetrators and punishing the victims. In reality, communities do receive funding for community programs, but because this funding is aimed at projects, not individuals, and there are no cash payments, as in the resettlement program, communities do not perceive of these programs as directly beneficial to their well-being, at least not in the same way as the programs for ex-combatants pay and train ex-combatants. This study attempted to find out if such negative relations existed between UNRF1 ex-combatants and the civilian population in West Nile.

While analyzing the effects of failed peace agreements, UNDP (2002) revealed that, there is disintegration of community ties leading to fragmentation. Community members are forced to choose which faction they support and whether they will fight or not. Men often join the ranks of one fighting faction or another. This leads to the loss of fathers, husbands, and community leaders in many villages. Individuals may choose to break these social ties by joining a warring faction, or they may be forced to break these ties through forced recruitment into armed factions. The end result is the same:- alienation from the community and the inability to look to the community for help. Combatants who commit atrocities against members of their communities, strike the most violent blow to social unity and these combatants are quickly ostracized from their communities. These forces divide communities along chosen

allegiances. The author, however, did not address the economic consequences of failure to fulfill commitments in the peace agreements. This information gap was filled by the current study.

#### **2.4 Causes of Emergence of Rebel Movements**

The causes of emergence of rebel movements in developing countries and particularly the West Nile part of Uganda, are synonymous with the causes of conflicts between groups of people. These range from counter-attack by the defeated army with the aim of re-capturing power (Museveni, 1997), marginalisation (NUPI, 2006), tribal opportunism, revenge, fear of reprisals from the local civilians due to previous crimes, poverty and competition over scarce resources in a hostile environment. These are briefly elaborated in the preceding paragraphs of literature review.

According to NUPI (2006), the perception of marginalisation has been a strong catalyst for conflict in Uganda. Regional disparities in terms of socio-economic well being in Uganda can be traced to pre-colonial times (such as labour extraction from northern Uganda), the role played by the colonialists and the fact that the disparities were marginally addressed by subsequent post-colonial regimes. During the colonial era, the exclusion of northern ethnic groups from decision-making positions, and therefore power and control over resources, in favour of southern ethnic groups – who disproportionately benefited in terms of prestigious employment, physical and social infrastructure development and development in general, generated resentment and generated a platform for emergence of rebel movements. However, NUPI did not clearly indicate whether UNRF 1 ex-combatants were fighting against marginalisation of West Nile region. This study provided information for this gap.

Poverty has increased susceptibility to manipulation and recruitment into rebel or criminal activities in Uganda (Muzaale 1997). For example, most members of the Allied Democratic Forces rebel group based in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and western Uganda were poor unemployed men who were promised economic benefits (NUPI, 2006). The demobilisation of the army may have also increased on the number of unemployed leading to

these discontented Ugandans vulnerable for recruitment into rebel movements. High unemployment of demobilised soldiers was also highlighted by Museveni (1997: 179) that:

“...between 1992 to 1995, we were able to retire 50,000 soldiers in circumstances where there was a serious problem of unemployment, and where a discharged soldier might not be able to get another job”.

Although Museveni went on to defend this action that; “we were able to carry out this exercise without any problem”, he does not provide proof to indicate that some of the retired soldiers were not later on recruited into rebel movements. As a consequence, this study attempted to fill this knowledge gap.

Tribal opportunism as noted by Kingma (1996), is another factor that may contribute to emergence of armed rebellions. Prevalent perceptions of inequitable distribution of national resources, the view that being in power is the only means of accessing national resources (often acquired through force) and allegations that the protracted war was deliberately designed to marginalize and impoverish some regions remain threats to peace building. In a related view, however, Museveni (1997), described tribal opportunism in Uganda as being a target of looting and corruption. Thus, Museveni (1997:181) noted that:

“...the whole community in Acholi and Lango had become involved in the plundering of Uganda for themselves. ....the reason why those rebels in the north, organized on a tribal basis, were fighting for control of the national government; was that NRM as a government had stopped them from looting”.

Related to the above, the need for revenge is another factor that commonly motivates emergence of rebel movements (NUPI, 2006). After overthrowing Obote, Idi Amin drew the bulk of the national army from the West Nile region, his home region. A large number of Acholi and Langi soldiers who were accused of supporting Obote were then massacred (*ibid.*). After the overthrow of Idi Amin, Obote’s armed forces (the UNLA soldiers), again largely drawn from the Acholi Lango regions, rebounded and avenged themselves by committing massacres against elements of Amin’s army and people of the West Nile region forcing scores into exile. In the above literature, however, the author did not indicate whether the continuous

emergence of rebel movements after Idi Amin and Obote governments had similar intentions of revenge. This also created a knowledge gap which the current study sought to fill.

The influence of external factors, especially external support from neighbouring states and or groups have also been the cause of emergence of rebel movements in Uganda. Besides, CSOPNU (2008) noted that conflicts in neighbouring regions and countries like the civil war in Sudan, the conflicts in Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Rwanda and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have resulted in their citizens fleeing the fighting and seeking refuge in other countries (spillovers). In these countries, refugees are usually mobilized into rebel groups to fight their home governments. In Uganda's case, however, Museveni (1997:169) attributed the rise of rebel movement to Sudan assistance. Thus he noted;

“...a Sudanese army officer summoned together these Ugandan ex-soldiers who had been staying in camps near Parajok in Southern Sudan and proceeded to re-arm them”.

This implies that external support played a major role in formulation of the rebel organization. However, the current study investigated if the emergence of rebel movements in West Nile from 1986 was also attributed to this factor.

According to Amnesty Commission Report (2000 – 2003), the emergence of new rebel movements in West Nile was facilitated by the dominance of the northerners in the Ugandan army. The report indicated that people from the West Nile dominated the Ugandan army from independence to 1979. “But when Idi Amin's government fell in 1979, these soldiers were rendered jobless and took refuge in the Republic of Congo and the Sudan”. As a result, life was never the same for them. In the subsequent years therefore, a succession of fighting groups emerged drawn from the substantial number of soldiers who served in the army during Amin's regime.

Finally, Ondoga (1998) attributed the emergence of rebel movements in the West Nile region to competition over scarce resources in a hostile environment, fuelled by the proliferation of small arms. The author, however, did not explicitly state whether the rebel movements formed



in the West Nile region after 1986 were a result of proliferation of small arms. This necessitated the need for this study.

Indeed, the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (2004:16) also agreed with most of the above studies that:

“..conflict has been fuelled by a combination of factors including resistance to the NRM government, support from external forces, the proliferation of guns in the region, poverty, imbalances to access in economic opportunities and in Karamoja and the need to accumulate wealth”.

This implies that the reasons for emergence of conflict in northern Uganda are complex and cannot be attributed to a single cause or blamed on the failure of any particular dialogue process.

## **2.5 Reintegration of Ex-combatants in Uganda, the DDR approach and Peace building**

After its introduction in the early 1990s, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) experiences have been widely discussed in the scholarly and policy-oriented literature (Batchelor and Kingma, 2004). It is generally recognized that the reintegration of ex-combatants is a complex process that has political, economic, social and psychological components. It is also recognized that combatants and communities have been transformed by wars, especially in countries where conflicts lasted for many years. In many countries, combatants have no memory of peacetime and sometimes those who committed atrocities in their own communities are unable to return to their areas of origin.

United Nations (2000), indicated that after ex-combatants have been demobilized, their effective and sustainable reintegration into civilian life is necessary to prevent a new escalation of the conflict (Massimo, 2003). In the short term, the United Nations (2000), further noted that ex-combatants who do not find peaceful ways of making a living are likely to return to conflict. In the longer term, disaffected veterans can play an important role in destabilizing the social order and polarizing the political debate, becoming easy targets of populist, reactionary, and extremist movements. In line with the above views, this study

examined the extent to which reintegration of ex-combatants in Uganda was based on DDR processes.

In order to respond to their immediate needs, some cash and in-kind entitlements are usually given to ex-combatants for a period of six to twelve months after demobilization to cover their immediate basic needs (Massimo, 2003). In-kind entitlements vary by country, as well as by recipient (male, female, child). They may include clothing (T-shirt, trousers, underwear, socks, shoes), eating utensils (cups, plates, cooking pots), hygiene materials (toothbrush, toothpaste, soap, plastic buckets), basic household goods (blankets, sleeping mats, jerry cans, bags, plastic tarpaulin for shelter), as well as transport allowance for the journey back home and the first installment of their transitional assistance. Women may also receive wraps, packages of sanitary napkins, and kits with baby supplies. In countries where the large majority of ex-combatants are rural based, reinsertion support may also include an agricultural kit with seeds and basic tools.

Despite the fact that reintegration efforts are usually less visible than the demobilization itself, reintegration generally appears to be the major challenge in the overall process. All the demobilized and their families have to build up a livelihood — often after many years in the military. Former combatants with few skills face large problems in societies where it is difficult to start a small enterprise or to find employment. In addition, the combatants that are released usually have the worst prospects for reintegration, because of the lack of skills and education, or health problems. In most cases, many of them remained under employed for extended periods of time. Research in Eritrea revealed that the vast majority of former fighters had problems in securing a livelihood as well as housing (Klingebl et al, 1995). Generally, the availability and accessibility of agricultural land, housing and business space appear to be critical factors for successful reintegration.

Referring to reintegration of the Lord's Resistance Army rebels, Muwonge (2007) revealed that, the government of Uganda has not come up with a comprehensive plan for reintegration of Formerly Abducted People (FAPs) back into their communities. Few community members

felt that reintegration of FAPs has been satisfactory so far. He further reported that some FAPs have had difficulties for example, to adjust from the power of the gun as a source of self-reliance and the gun being taken away without facilitation for alternative livelihood skills. What exists as reintegration intervention processes by humanitarian agencies and the civil society, are basically adhoc activities implemented and duplicated by the various stakeholders. Nevertheless, the government of Uganda instituted the Amnesty Commission to process blanket amnesty for all the Ex-combatants.

Kingma (1996), noted that, psychological adjustment also appears to be hard — it is usually difficult for former combatants to adjust their attitudes and expectations. Military personnel are trained in top-down methods of management that often contradict the appropriate approaches to successful management and entrepreneurship in the civilian sector. Former combatants go through a personal process of adjustment, after losing a predictable environment with a certain social status. They are forced to rethink their ambitions and capabilities, and consider a non-violent role in society. In addition, large numbers of the demobilized suffer from psycho-social problems due to post-traumatic stress disorder. For example, a very high incidence of this disorder is believed to exist among former combatants in Angola and Mozambique, as well as the South African soldiers that fought in Angola and Namibia (Ibid). Empirical data on this phenomenon is still very limited and the most effective types of counseling or other therapies remain subjects of debate.

Pugh (2000), noted that, most of the reintegration effort rests on the shoulders of former combatants and their families. Assistance in reintegration is required from a general development perspective, with peace and security arguments adding to its importance. This support is costly, but long term costs for society could be even more if former combatants are unable to find livelihoods outside the armed forces. It could lead to increasing unemployment and social deprivation that could again lead to increasing crime rates and political instability. Governments should therefore create an environment that facilitates reintegration, and provide specific services in a responsive and flexible way.

Governments and NGOs are using various instruments to facilitate reintegration, such as counseling, technical and managerial training and advice, provision of tools, credit facilities, construction of houses, improvement of social infrastructure and the creation of employment (Anderlini, 2001). Temporary employment, for example, has been provided in the rehabilitation of infrastructure, mining or in emergency operations. Reintegration programmes generally do not specifically consider female former combatants, their children and the wives of former combatants. Women have usually acquired combat roles during wars, and men often expect them to return to their traditional roles of house keeping, bearing children and cooking. Thus, reintegration creates tensions of spouses failing to agree on their roles. A growing divorce rate has been noted between former fighters in Eritrea, which had 13000 female former fighters (Klingebiel et al, 1995). Special support<sup>5</sup> is also needed for former child soldiers. Many of them have become adults in the meantime, but they still require extra care and assistance like tracing their family members and acquiring land for them. Health care and special assistance to the disabled are also important components of effective reintegration programmes. In order to be responsive to the real needs, assistance programmes could best be designed and amended in a continuing dialogue with former combatants, their families and communities. This study established that the government of Uganda has not initiated dialogue with former combatants, their families and communities.

In their efforts to support reintegration, policy makers face a dilemma on whether or not to treat the former soldiers as a special target group. Support programmes have to strike a balance between dealing with the specific needs of these people and not creating discontent among the rest of their often poor communities, which would actually jeopardize true reintegration. Support for the reintegration of returnees and displaced people faces similar dilemmas. From a short term conflict resolution point of view, the inclination may be to please former combatants to forestall a return to arms. However, special treatment of this group may also affect the morale of soldiers remaining in the army — protests and even mutinies in the new Mozambican army were partially caused by high payments to the

---

<sup>5</sup> Special support includes basic education, skills development and counseling.

demobilized (African Confidential, 1995). From a long term perspective, a consensus appears to be developing that special efforts for former combatants are necessary during demobilization and resettlement. But that support in the reintegration phase should be increasingly community-based and part of general post-conflict rehabilitation efforts.

According to Schroeder (2005), the goals of DDR are both short term and long term. Short-term goals include immediate restoration of security and stability through the disarmament of warring parties. Progressive disarmament reduces the mistrust that fuels a security dilemma between the fighting factions, allows aid workers to intervene more effectively, and allows peaceful social and economic activities to resume.

The long-term goal of DDR is the sustained social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants into a peaceful society. Schroeder further notes that if a DDR program is to be sustainable and successful in the long term, it must be integrated with and supported by interventions for post-conflict reconstruction and social and economic development. Consequently, it was the interest of this study to examine the extent to which reintegration of ex-combatants in Uganda was based on DDR processes.

In his study about DDR processes of Ex-combatants, Massimo (2003), revealed that, five conditions are required before beginning a DDR program, and help to guarantee its success. They included security, inclusion of all warring parties, political agreement, comprehensive approach and sufficient funds. These factors were in turn used to guide this study in determining the extent to which reintegration of ex-combatants in Uganda was based on DDR processes.

- **Security:** According to Massimo (2003), a safe environment is required in order for parties to give up their weapons, and for DDR institutions to operate. Only trust can break the cycle of violence, allowing warring individuals and parties to disarm and resume civilian life. Third parties play an important role in guaranteeing compliance with a ceasefire, respect for public order, the safety of individuals, and equitable implementation of disarmament programs. Peacekeeping forces cannot be expected to

end hostilities, but a credible deterring force is necessary to prevent unilateral violations of agreements, which could jeopardize an entire DDR program (US Department of State, 1994).

- **Inclusion of all Warring Parties:** In order to establish a safe environment and break the security dilemma, it is necessary that all parties be included in the DDR program and disarm at the same time. Otherwise, it is easy for one party to resume fighting, taking advantage of its opponents' disarmament. According to Kingma (1996), it is important that all parties develop ownership of the process and do not feel discriminated against, that different parties feel that they are being treated equitably, and that they are given the same opportunities to reintegrate into society. Institutions implementing DDR should communicate regularly and frequently with each party at the political and military commander level (ibid.). External observers and peacekeepers should be perceived by all sides to be impartial, neutral, and credible.
- **Political Agreement:** Massimo (2003), further revealed that, the conditions of security and inclusion must be integrated into a political agreement defining the end of hostilities and the implementation of DDR. Experience has shown that DDR programs cannot drive a peace process. DDR can only be implemented in the context of a negotiated settlement, a ceasefire, or a peace agreement (United Nations, 2000). It can reinforce the agreement, as a form of security guarantee and a confidence-building measure, but it cannot precede the agreement. Shared political will, and a policy of amnesty and reconciliation, create the best conditions for successful implementation of a DDR program. Specific issues must be directly addressed by the peace process and integrated into the political agreement, including: clear eligibility criteria for participation in the program; creation of credible responsible institutions; definition of realistic goals and a timetable for implementation. Finally, Massimo (2003) advised that political agreements should take into account the practical realities of disarmament and demobilization, in order to set realistic goals that will support the sustainability of the peace accord.

- **Comprehensive approach:** Massimo (2003) further notes that, DDR programs cannot succeed without careful coordination of the phases of DDR by the different actors at the local and national levels. Disarmament without reintegration; and demobilization without previous disarmament and planned economic and social reintegration are short-lived efforts. Necessary ingredients include: a) a credible and authoritative national institution to plan, implement, and oversee the program at the national level; b) peacekeeping forces and military personnel to implement disarmament; c) civilian organizations and institutions to provide food, education, and health care to demobilized ex-combatants and; d) local communities which are sensitized and directly involved in the social and economic integration of demobilized ex-combatants (ibid). This study found out that the necessary ingredients for DDR programs were generally lacking at the time when UNRF I ex-combatants were demobilized; for example Amnesty Commission which is in charge of reinserting ex-combatants was only established in 2000, four years after UNRF I soldiers had been demobilized. Few civilian organizations and institutions to provide food, education, and health care to demobilized ex-combatants have been set up and worse still under-funded. Local communities were not sensitized on how to live in harmony with ex-combatants.
- **Sufficient funds:** DDR programs must have sufficient funding to complete their implementation, and to provide for contingencies in a flexible way. Failure to complete a DDR program can jeopardize the entire peace process and obstruct economic recovery. Ex-combatants who are not successfully demobilized and reintegrated can easily fuel new violence, and may return to conflict as the only possible way to make a living. Indeed, this study found out that due to discontent of UNRF I ex-combatants resulting from failure of the government to pay their resettlement packages, a new rebel movement UNRF II led by Ali Bamuze<sup>6</sup> had emerged. A new escalation in violence is likely to have destroyed the results of piecemeal interventions and partial implementation of DDR.

---

<sup>6</sup> Maj. Gen. Ali Bamuze was the Patron of UNRF II which signed a peace deal with the Government of Uganda on 24<sup>th</sup> December 2004 at Yumbe grounds.

In a related study, UNDP (2002), revealed that, a successful reintegration programme requires several integrated actions: (a) classifying ex-combatants according to need, skill level, and their desired mode of subsistence, (b) offering a basic transitional assistance package (safety net), (c) finding a way to deliver assistance simply, minimizing transition costs while maximizing benefits to ex-combatants, (d) sensitizing communities and building on existing social capital, (e) coordinating centrally yet decentralizing implementation authority to districts, and (f) connecting the DRP to ongoing development efforts by retargeting and restructuring existing portfolios. Against these guidelines, the current study examined the extent to which they were fulfilled by the NRM government.

### **2.5.1 The role of the Amnesty Commission in Reintegration of Ex-combatants in Uganda**

As a response to the persistent insurgency in Uganda, the government enacted the Amnesty Act in the year 2000 (Muwonge, 2007). This move was to pardon, exempt and discharge former rebels who voluntarily gave up fighting the government through military means from criminal prosecution or any form of punishment from the state. The blanket amnesty that the government offered to all people engaged in rebellions against the government of Uganda, covers all rebel movements since the 26th day of January 1986 when the NRM government took state power. For the UNRF1 ex combatants interviewed in the process of data collection, the greatest significance of the amnesty law was that it conferred upon them as beneficiaries of amnesty, an irrevocable legal immunity from prosecution or punishment.

CSOPNU (2008) listed the specific objectives of the Amnesty Commission to include; promote the Amnesty Act, sensitize the public about the Amnesty Law, promote dialogue and reconciliation in war affected areas, carry out demobilization and disarmament of reporters, grant Amnesty to reporters, reintegrate and resettle reporters in their communities and monitor and evaluate Commission activities. This implies therefore, that reintegration of former UNRF1 combatants should have been carried out by the Amnesty Commission. However, as previously stated, the government enacted the Amnesty Act in the year 2000; several years after the reinsertion of UNRF1 ex-combatants. Consequently, the UNRF1 ex-combatants may not have gone through the DDR process of reintegration. It was the purpose of this study to investigate this knowledge gap.



There is a general consensus within the war affected communities to grant full amnesty to the ex-combatants especially those who were in the lower ranks of the rebel movements because most of them were victims of abduction against their will. It is imperative to note that, “the Amnesty Act 2000 of Uganda empowers the Amnesty Commission (AC) to promote appropriate mechanisms of reconciliation in the affected communities” (Section 9 C of the Uganda Amnesty Act 2000). The AC can provide amnesty certificates and a send off resettlement package in their regional Offices.

The purpose of the Amnesty, adopted by the GoU in 2000, is to ensure peace and security by adopting a policy of reconciliation aimed at pacifying rebel groups. The AC works in partnership with NGOs, traditional leaders, religious groups and the communities, and the World Bank. Interventions by the AC have yielded positive results. By 2003, 9,718 persons had reported from the various rebel groups: 3,848 from LRA, 2,902 from UNRF II and 1,990 from West Nile Bank Front and other rebel groups (Lomo et al, 2005).

NUPI (2006), indicated that, the AC’s approach to resettlement of ex-combatants was skewed towards the perpetrator with minimal consideration of victims and the relevant communities. Material and financial aspects of the package received more attention at the expense of the psychosocial aspects of reintegration. Some communities felt that ex-combatants were being unduly “rewarded.” Restorative justice had not been adequately considered as the amnesty did not automatically mean forgiveness and acceptance at community level. Anger and anguish over perpetrated crimes still persisted.

Some of the key challenges faced by the AC include: inadequate funding, inability of offices in the district to be able to give referrals that are meaningful; lack of market survey to know what types of skills are in demand; need to conduct more sensitization and dialogue to prepare communities to receive reporters; difficult to make people in the communities feel that they are part of the process; limited skilled personnel to carry out the Commission’s mandate and; delay in processing applications of reporters in custody (Amnesty Commission Report, 2000 – 2003).

## **2.6 Conclusion**

From the foregoing literature, it has been made clear that no study has been conducted to examine the underlying factors that undermined the reintegration process of UNRF 1 ex-combatants and its relationship with peace building in the West Nile region. Therefore, a research gap was evident in investigating whether the commitments made by UNRF1 and NRM were fulfilled, what caused the failure to fulfill the commitments, what prompted the emergence of new rebel movements in West Nile and the extent to which reintegration of ex-combatants had contributed to peace building in the West Nile region. This study investigated and provided information to close these research gaps.

## CHAPTER THREE

### 3.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

#### 3.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the methodology that was used in the study. This includes research design, area of study and target population, sample selection and size, data collection methods, data quality control, data analysis and ethical issues.

#### 3.2 Research Design

The study adopted a cross-sectional survey research design where different subjects of a population in different areas were studied at one point in time (Amin, 2005). The cross-sectional survey method was selected for use due to its ability to gather different views about reintegration of UNRF 1 ex-combatants and peace building in the West Nile region. The study used both qualitative and quantitative approaches to collect primary data. Strass et al (1990) states that qualitative approach is ideal method when a holistic and in-depth investigation is needed. On the other hand, quantitative approach was applied in order to describe current conditions or to investigate relationships including effects. Primary data was based on a randomly selected sample of UNRF1 ex-combatants, local leaders, former NRM leaders and Officials from the OPM, NUSAF and AC.

#### 3.3 Area of the Study

Although conflicts have been prevalent in all regions of Uganda (see Uganda regions conflict map), this particular study was conducted in the West Nile region<sup>7</sup> (refer to Map 1). This area suffered insurgency for a long time but was currently undergoing post conflict reconstruction. In addition, the area was considered ideal because it had a big number of UNRF1 ex-combatants who had come into an understanding with the NRM government, reintegrated and consequently participated in peace building initiatives in the area.

---

<sup>7</sup> The West Nile region comprises of Yumbe, Moyo, Nyadri, Nebbi, Maracha -Terego, Arua, Koboko and Adjumani districts.

### **3.4 Target population**

The study was conducted among UNRF1 ex-combatants, local and district leaders in Arua, Yumbe and Koboko districts (see Maps 2, 3, and 4 respectively for location of these districts) in the West Nile region. In addition, the study consulted former NRM (NRA Commander and NRA Reintegration Commander) and UNRF 1 leaders (Chairman of UNRF 1) at the time of reintegration, officials from the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), NUSAF staff in West Nile region, Coordinator of Skills for Peace and Income (SKIPI) Project in Yumbe District, Resident District Commissioners (RDCs), Executive Secretary of Uganda Veterans Assistance Board (UVAB) and Amnesty Commission staff.

### **3.5 Sample size**

A total of 144 persons participated in the study. They included 103 UNRF1 ex-combatant respondents for general interviews, 17 key informants for in-depth interviews and 24 participants for focus group discussions.

### **3.6 Sample selection**

Due to constraints especially time limit coupled with the scattered nature of UNRF 1 ex-combatants, the study adopted snowball sampling. This is supported by Amin (2005), that, snowball is usually ideal for locating individuals for the study where the researcher begins with few respondents who are difficult to locate using other means. The districts of Arua, Yumbe and Koboko (see Map 3.2) were purposively sampled because they had the highest concentration of UNRF 1 ex-combatants (AC records). Therefore purposive sampling was used to select respondents who are knowledgeable about the problem under investigation.

Using snowball sampling, the starting respondents were located at Ex-combatant Association office- PRADO<sup>8</sup> (on Yumbe road in Arua town) and asked for assistance to locate others. This system is supported by Creswell (2003), that, when the researcher has found a few of the individuals with the needed criteria, then these individuals are asked for assistance to locate others with similar characteristics. Since UNRF 1 ex-combatants had been reintegrated into

---

<sup>8</sup> PRADO means Programme for Reconciliation and Development Organization.

the community over 20 years ago<sup>9</sup>, the only reliable record about their location and existence was got from their association - PRADO. Therefore, only those UNRF 1 ex-combatants who were registered by PRADO as members formed the target population. In this way, 40 respondents were selected from registered members of PRADO from Yumbe district, 35 from Arua district and 25 from Koboko district. The target population as well as sample size are shown in Table 3.1.

**Table 3.1: Respondents selected from Arua, Yumbe and Koboko districts**

<b>District</b>	<b>Total population of UNRF I ex-combatants registered by PRADO</b>	<b>Count</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Yumbe	45	40	34.5
Arua	41	35	30.1
Koboko	30	28	24.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>116</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>88.7</b>

Table 3.1 indicates that because of the difficulty to locate scattered UNRF 1 ex-combatants, the researcher relied on PRADO membership records to select respondents from three districts of West Nile. These included Yumbe district (34.5% of the respondents), Arua district (30.1% of the respondents) and Koboko district (24.1% of the respondents). A total of 103 respondents<sup>10</sup> representing 88.7% of UNRF 1 ex-combatants registered with PRADO participated in general interviews.

The key informants like former NRM (NRA Commander and NRA Reintegration Commander) and UNRF 1 leaders (Chairman of UNRF 1) at the time of reintegration, officials from the OPM, NUSAF staff in West Nile region, Coordinator of Skills for Peace and Income (SKIPI) Project in Yumbe District, Resident District Commissioners (RDCs), Executive Secretary of UVAB and Amnesty Commission staff were purposively selected.

<sup>9</sup> UNRF I ex-combatants were reintegrated between July to September 1986.

<sup>10</sup> Although 120 respondents had been previously proposed to participate in general interviews, only 103 returned the questionnaires because it was difficult to trace all UNRF1 ex-combatants since several of them were reportedly dead, others

This is because some of them had participated in the negotiations between UNRF1 and NRM government while others had taken part in reintegration of the UNRF 1 forces. Therefore, two former NRM and four UNRF 1 leaders at the time of reintegration, three District Resident Commissioners, one official from the OPM, one NUSAF staff in West Nile region, three RDCs, one Executive Secretary of UVAB, one coordinator for Skills for Peace and Income (SKIPI) Project in Yumbe District and one Amnesty Commission staff participated in the study. In all, 17 key informants who participated in in-depth interviews.

Finally, local council leaders, opinion and religious leaders were also purposively selected from the three districts to participate in focus group discussions. One focus group discussion composed of 8 persons was held for each district. Therefore, 24 persons participated in focus group discussions.

### **3.7 Methods of Data Collection**

Both primary and secondary data were collected using a number of methods. Primary data was collected among others by general interviews using an interview guide, in depth interviews using a key informant guide, focus group discussions with key informants using a focus group discussion checklist and observation using an observation checklist.

- ***General interview***

An interview guide was the major instrument used in general interview. The choice of this instrument was because it helped in producing data which dealt with the topic in depth and detail (Amin, 2005). Interview guide was administered to 103 UNRF1 ex-combatants. This helped to gather quantitative information regarding the understanding that existed between UNRF I and NRM; causes and consequences of failure to deliver on commitments in the peace agreement by both parties and; the extent to which reintegration of UNRF 1 ex-combatants had contributed to peace building in West Nile. The interview guide comprised of both closed and open-ended questions formulated by the researcher. A sample interview guide is attached to this study as appendix I.

---

didn't want to reveal their true identity while others had traveled to far distances to seek employment.

- ***Indepth Interviews***

Indepth interviews were used because they facilitated face to face verbal responses which helped to obtain reliable and valid information behind participants' experiences (Amin, 2005; Katebire, 2007). The key informants for in depth interviews were 17 in number and included former NRM (NRA Commander and NRA Reintegration Commander) and UNRF 1 leaders (Chairman of UNRF 1) at the time of reintegration (see key informant guide in appendix III), officials from the OPM, NUSAF staff in West Nile region, Coordinator of Skills for Peace and Income (SKIPI) Project in Yumbe District, Resident District Commissioners (RDCs), Executive Secretary of UVAB and Amnesty Commission staff in Arua office. (A sample interview guide is attached to this study as appendix III). This was purposely intended to capture qualitative information and compare it with that given by ex-combatants.

- ***Focus Group Discussion***

Focus group discussion method was used because it allowed flexibility of the members to discuss freely on issues concerning them which provided first hand information (Amin, 2005). Three focus group discussions were conducted in the three districts studied using a focus group discussion checklist to capture views of local leaders regarding reintegration of ex-combatants in the community and how they have contributed to peace building in the region. Focus group discussions comprised of male and female local council leaders, opinion and religious leaders from the three districts. Each focus group discussion conducted in a district composed of 8 persons. Therefore, 24 persons participated in focus group discussions. A sample focus group discussion checklist is attached to this study as appendix IV.

- ***Observation***

An observation checklist was formulated to guide field observation. The choice of this method was because it helped to examine what was happening in real-life situation, classify and record pertinent happenings related to the study (Creswell, 2003). Besides, some aspects of the study required the researcher's observation in order to explain the occurrence of phenomena. These aspects included conditions of the ex-combatants, such as the state of their health, housing conditions of their families and economic activities which they engage in for

their daily survival. These were captured using camera photography and presented in findings to confirm on-ground assessment of ex-combatants conditions as well as peace building and reintegration initiatives in the area. A sample observation checklist is attached to this study as appendix V.

### **Documentary Review**

The main sources of secondary data included the following: the 1985 UNLA – NRA Peace Accord, Ministry of Defence records, AC and UVAB records, NUSAF reports, government policy papers, library sources like online journals, newspapers, reports and publications, public records and statistics.

### **3.8 Validity of Instruments**

Validity is the extent to which the instruments used during the study measure the issues they are intended to measure (Amin, 2005). To ensure validity of instruments, the instruments were developed under close guidance of the supervisor. After the questions were designed, they were pre-tested to a tenth (10 ex-combatants) of the UNRF 1 ex-combatants in the sample. This helped to identify ambiguous questions in the instruments and be able to re-align them to the objectives.

### **3.9 Reliability**

Reliability is the extent to which the measuring instruments will produce consistent scores when the same groups of individuals are repeatedly measured under the same conditions (Amin, 2005). The study administered one type of questionnaire to UNRF 1 ex-combatants and using Cronbach reliability test; Alpha values of 0.753 were attained implying that the tool was suitable for examining the underlying factors that have undermined the reintegration process and its relationship in peace building process in West Nile.

### **3.10 Procedure**

The researcher prepared questions of investigation in relation to the objectives of the study



after which the instruments of the study were constructed. The researcher sought permission from the Faculty of Arts which he presented to relevant Resident District Commissioners of the districts studied. The Resident District Commissioners then introduced the researcher to respondents for cooperation and interview. In addition, they fixed dates for interviews. After permission was granted, all sampled individuals were approached and interviewed through use of research assistants; however the choice to participate in the study was purely voluntary.

### **3.11 Data analysis**

Data from the field was entered in a computer and Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS) programme used to analyze it. The percentage number of respondents according to variables such as; sex, age, education level, marital among others were computed and presented using tables. Qualitative data was organized according to themes identified from research questions and analyzed using content analysis. Data from focus group discussions were recorded, organized, interpreted and presented and discussed.

### **3.12 Ethical issues**

At the onset of data collection, the researcher sought authority letter from Makerere University (attached to this study as appendix VII). The letter was then used to seek permission from chairpersons of security committees (RDCs) in Yumbe, Arua and Kiboko districts. Each interview guide contained an opening introductory letter requesting for the respondents cooperation in providing the required information for the study. The respondents were further assured of confidentiality of the information provided and that the study findings were to be used for academic purposes only. Respondents were further assured of their personal protection and that they had authority to refuse or accept to be interviewed.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **4.0 RESEARCH FINDINGS, PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

This chapter presents analyses of data and interprets the results of the study. The presentation and analysis are in line with the objectives that guided this study, namely;

1. To establish the understanding that existed between UNRF I and National Resistance Movement in the war against the governments between 1981 and 1986.
2. To establish the causes and consequences of failure to deliver on commitments in the peace agreement by both parties.
3. To critically examine any other factors, other than the failure by the government to live up to its commitments that led to the emergence of new rebel movements in West Nile.
4. To examine the extent to which reintegration of UNRF 1 ex-combatants was based on DDR processes and assess its frameworks, programs as well as contribution to peace building in West Nile.

However, background characteristics of the respondents are presented first to give a clear picture of the nature of respondents that participated in the study. The possible implication of the various background characteristics on peace building was also highlighted.

#### **4.2 Background Characteristics of Respondents**

Information about background characteristics of respondents is presented in this section.

These characteristics include; district of permanent residence, nature of reintegration undergone, year in which reintegration took place, gender of respondents, age, marital status, education level, rank and experience of ex-combatants at the time of reintegration.

In the first instance, respondents were selected from three districts of West Nile. These included Yumbe district (41.7% of the respondents), Arua district (34.0% of the respondents)

and Koboko district (24.3% of the respondents). All the respondents were UNRF1 ex-combatants because they had personal experience of events that followed their reintegration under the NRM government.

Therefore, the analysis presented in this chapter was based on 103 UNRF 1 ex-combatants who participated in questionnaire exercise. Additional qualitative and quantitative data was also got from key informants, focus group discussion participants, personal observation and available literature.

Regarding the reintegration status of the respondents, the study was conducted among the majority of the UNRF1 ex-combatants who had been reintegrated into civilian life. This is presented in Table 4.1.

**Table 4.1: Reintegration status of respondents**


<b>Reintegration status</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Reintegrated into the community	95	92.2
Reintegrated into UPDF	5	4.9
Reintegrated into the Civil service	3	2.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>100.0</b>

*Source: Field data (Nov. 2008)*

Table 4.1 indicates that 92.2% of the UNRF1 ex-combatants were reintegrated into the community. A further 4.9% had been reintegrated into the UPDF and 2.9% into the civil service. This implies that the majority of the UNRF1 former combatants were demobilized and reintegrated into their communities.

Regarding the year in which reintegration of UNRF1 ex-combatants took place, all the respondents indicated that they were reintegrated in 1986. In addition, all the UNRF1 ex-combatants who participated in general interviews were male. This probably implies that few females had been recruited.


**Figure 4.1: Age distribution of respondents**



*Source: Generated from field data (Nov. 2008)*

Figure 4.1 shows that the majority of the ex-combatants (71.6%) were above 41 years of age. This implies that the majority of the respondents were in the prime age that wishes to settle down and engage in economic activities.


**Figure 4.2: Marital status of respondents**



*Source: Generated from field data (Nov. 2008)*

Figure 4.2 indicates that 95% of the respondents were married. This implies that the majority of the UNRF1 ex-combatants were responsible to their families who may have wished to settle down instead of fighting. Only 3% were single while 2% were widowed.


**Figure 4.3: Education levels of respondents**



*Source: Generated from field data (Nov. 2008)*

Figure 4.3 shows that 59.3% of the respondents had completed ordinary level of education. A further 24.1% revealed that they had completed primary school level while 9.3% had no formal education. This implies that the majority of the UNRF1 ex-combatants had acquired basic education.

**Figure 4.4: Rank of respondents at the time of reintegration**



*Source: Generated from field data (Nov. 2008)*

From Figure 4.4, the majority of the UNRF1 ex-combatants who participated in the study (50.6%) were Commissioned Officers<sup>11</sup> at the time of reintegration. However, 49.4% of the respondents were Non Commissioned Officers<sup>12</sup>. This implies that the majority of the ex-combatants had made significant contributions in the UNRF 1 struggle. This further indicates that such people were capable of making significant peace building contributions in the communities where they were reintegrated.


Finally, the study investigated the number of years which ex-combatants had served in the UNRF1. The findings are presented in Figure 4.5 below.

---

<sup>11</sup> A Commissioned officer is a soldier issued a rank by the President of Uganda. Commissioned officers range from 2<sup>nd</sup> lieutenant to General and above.

<sup>12</sup> A non-Commissioned officer is a soldier issued a rank by the Commissions Board chaired by the Chief of Defense Forces. Non-commissioned officers range from private to warrant officer to senior sergeant major

**Figure 4.5: Number of years of service in UNRF1**



*Source: Generated from field data (Nov. 2008)*

According to Figure 4.5, the majority of the respondents (55.9%) had served over six years in UNRF1. A further 28% had served 5 – 6 years while 8.6% had served 3 - 4 years. Only 7.5% had served 1 – 2 years. This implies that the study participants had served a significant period of time in UNRF1 and therefore deserved sufficient reintegration package due to their contribution to the struggle.

#### **4.2 Understanding between UNRF I and NRM (1981 and 1986)**

The first objective of the study was to “*establish the understanding that existed between UNRF I and National Resistance Movement, in the war against the government between 1981 and 1986*”. Information relating to the above was derived from indepth interviews with former Commanders of UNRF1 and NRA during the period 1981 to 1986, some UNRF1 ex-combatants and the available literature. Consequently, research findings revealed that the origin of the relationship between UNRF1 and NRA was prompted by the contested electoral results of 1980 that were angrily opposed by many Ugandans. This situation led to the emergence of several fighting groups against the government of Milton Obote. This was revealed during an interview with the former Chairman of UNRF1 that:

“...and, as other opposition groups sprang up to fight Obote, I

made all possible efforts to liaise with their top leaders and Commanders, for, I knew joining hands with those groups would make our task a lot easier”<sup>13</sup> (Chairman, UNRF1)

This implies that leaders of anti-Obote fighting groups realized the need to cooperate and develop an understanding in order to quickly and easily defeat their common enemy. The need for unity was also encouraged by some foreign leaders as further revealed by the former Chairman of UNRF1 that:

“...we were greatly encouraged by the Libyan leader-Col. Gaddafi in this endeavor. He willingly sponsored all the groups, brought us together and stressed to us the need for unity, as we were fighting a common enemy and had similar goals”. (Chairman, UNRF1)

This further revealed that the origin of the understanding between UNRF 1 ex-combatants and National Resistance Army dates back in 1981 when top leaders and Commanders of fighting forces that were opposed to the government of Obote met under the sponsorship and Chairmanship of the Libyan Leader Col. Gaddafi (Moses Ali, forthcoming). This was further agreed by the NRA Commander<sup>14</sup> who said:

“the three fighting groups that met in Libya and held talks with the Libyan Leader were UNRF 1 represented by Brigadier Moses Ali and Major Emilio Mondo, NRM represented by Yusuf Lule its Chairman and Yoweri Museveni the Vice chairman and Field Commander and; UFM represented by Balaki Kirya and Francis Bwengye”.

Museveni (1997) confirmed this that, these talks culminated into the Tripoli Agreement of 1981 where the “Uganda Popular Front” was formed as an umbrella organization that united the three anti-Obote fighting groups. This unity of purpose was commended by some of the UNRF1 ex-combatants who were interviewed during the study. One of them revealed that:

“...though we were operating in separate regions of Uganda, we had no coordination at all. The understanding brought new support from the population. In fact, it had been very unrealistic for us to wage a war against Obote in total isolation of other groups when

---

<sup>13</sup> Brigadier Moses Ali, Chairman of the defunct UNRF1

<sup>14</sup> Major General Elly Tumwine was the NRA Commander from 1981 to 1987)



we were all fighting a common enemy”<sup>15</sup> (UNRF1 ex-combatant)

This attempt however, did not yield results in the desired direction<sup>16</sup> hence the three movements opted to maintain good relations in their approach to fighting the Obote regime (Moses Ali, forthcoming).

Further research findings indicated that when the Milton Obote government was toppled by Tito Okello on 27 July, 1985, UNRF1 joined Tito Okello government (Refugee Law Project, 2004). By joining Tito Okello government, UNRF 1 became part of the armed coalition which fought to prevent the NRA from capturing state power in late 1985 and early 1986 (Museveni, 1997). Although the Nairobi Peace Accord of 17<sup>th</sup> December 1985 offered a power sharing deal between Tito Okello and Yoweri Museveni factions, fighting for power between the two groups did not stop. The final agreement signed in Nairobi, called for a ceasefire, demilitarization of Kampala, integration of the NRA and government forces, and absorption of the NRA leadership into the Military Council. These conditions were never met. The prospects of a lasting agreement were further limited by several factors, including the Kenyan team’s lack of an in-depth knowledge of the situation in Uganda and the exclusion of relevant Ugandan and international actors from the talks (Makumi, 1994). In the end, Museveni and his allies refused to share power with Generals they did not respect, not least while the NRA had the capacity to achieve an outright military victory (Gertzel, 1990). Consequently, Museveni led NRA captured power in Kampala on 26<sup>th</sup> January, 1986.

When the NRA took over power in 1986, the government prioritized security as a prerequisite for the success of the reconstitution process (Museveni, 1997), with the integration of various fighting groups into a new national army, based on the NRA. Among those reintegrated were the Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF1) combatants. This was confirmed by MFPED (2004) that the UNRF High Command then operating from West Nile, negotiated and willingly accepted to join NRM/A leading to the 1986 peace talks that sealed their

---

<sup>15</sup> Major Bruhan Abiriga; a former UNRF1 combatant was reintegrated into the NRA and by the time of data collection (November 2008), he was the Resident District Commissioner for Arua District.

<sup>16</sup> The fighting groups did not form one popular front and did not co-ordinate their operations.

relationship. An interview with NRA Commander confirmed the above that:

“...the NRA found it easy to reintegrate UNRF1 ex-combatants into the army as well as into civilian life in 1986 because most of them lacked motivation to continue fighting due to lack of political ideology; had similar objectives with the NRA; others lacked resilience and resources to sustain the struggle while others thought that the long time relationship they had with the NRA would guarantee them economic survival and security in civilian life<sup>17</sup>.

This further corroborates the Amnesty Commission Report (2000 – 2003) findings that:

“..in 1986, following the accession to power of the NRM, the UNRF 1, under Brigadier Moses Ali reached an agreement with the NRM under which a number of officers of UNRF 1 were absorbed in NRA and others resettled in civilian life”.

In an interview with the Chairman of UNRF1, it was indicated that the peace talks between the NRM government and UNRF1 combatants were held at Entebbe State Lodge. Although, the contents of the peace talks as well as the commitments by both sides were scanty, this study relied on information given by eye witnesses<sup>18</sup> who participated in the dialogue between the two parties and a press release that was issued by the NRM government that an understanding had been reached.

Besides, the majority of the respondents (composed of UNRF1 ex-combatants) indicated that they could still recall the commitments made by the NRM government to UNRF1 combatants. One respondent revealed that “*ruimijo azii ngajo asialusi*” literary translated into English to mean that “there are many commitments that were made”. According to the Executive Secretary of Uganda Veterans Assistance Board (UVAB)<sup>19</sup> commitments made between government and rebel groups were meant to build confidence between the two parties, tap skills of ex-combatants and provide a safety net for reintegrated soldiers. These factors were partly reiterated by Gersony (1997) that reintegration aimed at consolidating internal and external security, strengthening political institutions and good governance, promoting

---

<sup>17</sup> General Elly Tumwine was the Army Commander of the NRA from 1983 to 1989.

<sup>18</sup> The eye witnesses included Moses Ali, General Elly Tumwine, General Ali Bamuze, Major Abiriga.

<sup>19</sup> Emilio Mondo, a former UNRF 1 ex-combatant the Executive Secretary of UVAB

economic and social rehabilitation and transformation and, creating confidence in the communities.

The commitments made by the NRM government to UNRF1 ex-combatants are presented in Table 4.2.

**Table 4.2: Respondent views on commitments made by the NRM government to UNRF1**

**Combatants**

<b>Commitments</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Integrate selected UNRF fighters into the NRA	19	18.5
UNRF1 ex-combatants were promised Uganda shs. 8 billion	31	30.1
Ceasefire and disarmament of UNRFI forces	7	6.8
Education scholarship for Ex-combatants and their children	12	11.6
Ministerial posts to be given to selected Ex-combatants	27	26.2
Ambassadorial and civil service jobs were to be given to Ex-combatants	5	4.8
Release of imprisoned Ex-combatants	7	6.8
Reintegration of Ex-combatants to civilian life	21	20.3
Provide security to Ex-combatants	12	11.6
Some ex-combatants to be selected to the National Resistance Council (NRC)	7	6.8
<i>Total response</i>	<i>148</i>	<i>143.7</i>
<b>Valid response</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>100.0</b>

# Multiple response

Source: Field data (Nov. 2008)

Table 4.2 shows respondent views on the various commitments made by the NRM government to UNRF1 combatants in 1986. Respondents were able to provide more than one response (multiple response) depending on the knowledge they had regarding the peace deal. Consequently, the majority of the respondents (30.1%) indicated that UNRF1 ex-combatants were promised Uganda shs. 8 billion as a reintegration package. A further 26.2% of the

respondents revealed that UNRF1 ex-combatants were promised Ministerial posts in the NRM government. The issue of Ministerial posts in the NRM government was confirmed by the press release by State House Entebbe of 27 July, 1986 which stated:

“...in a bid to strengthen national unity and following discussions between the NRM government and a delegation of UNRF, the NRM has offered to absorb some UNRF combatants into the government. In this regard, the President will appoint one Cabinet Minister and Deputy Ministers from UNRF”.

The above statements indicate that the NRM government had committed itself to share political leadership of Uganda with its former allies during the struggle against the Obote government.

Other commitments indicated by respondents included reintegration of UNRF combatants to civilian life (20.3%); reintegrating selected UNRF fighters into the NRA (18.5%); providing education scholarships for selected ex-combatants and their children (11.6%) and providing security to ex-combatants (11.6%). The commitment to integrate selected UNRF fighters into the NRA was further confirmed by the press release by State House Entebbe of 27 July, 1986 that;

“the NRM government has agreed to incorporate selected fighting members of the UNRF into NRA in the process of forming the National Army. In addition, the President has appointed a military committee to implement the decisions to be headed by the Minister of State for Defence, Ronald Batta. The membership of the committee includes members from NRA and UNRF”.

This indicates that the NRM government was committed to tapping the skills of UNRF fighters which would help to facilitate reconciliation and peace building in the community.

Other commitments made by the NRM government to the UNRF were selecting some ex-combatants to the National Resistance Council (NRC) (6.8%), ceasefire and disarmament of UNRF fighters (6.8%), provision of ambassador and civil service jobs to ex-combatants (4.8%) and release of imprisoned ex-combatants (6.8%). Therefore, the understanding that

existed between UNRF and the NRM in the war against the governments between 1981 and 1986 contained many commitments.

Although many of the commitments were made by the NRM government, the UNRF1 leadership also committed itself to fulfill certain things. In an interview with one of the UNRF ex-combatants, it was revealed that the UNRF1 leadership committed itself to organizing all UNRF 1 ex-combatants into an umbrella association, compiling a comprehensive list of names of UNRF ex-combatants who survived the struggle, died, were injured or contributed materials to the struggle. In addition, the UNRF1 leadership was to ensure that all its soldiers assembled in Arua for disarmament and demobilization, and above all, abandon fighting. This implies that both parties committed themselves to fulfillment of certain things which were necessary for peace building in West Nile region in particular and Uganda in general.

Regarding the fulfillment of the above commitments by both parties, information from focus group discussions in the area of study indicated that the UNRF 1 leadership had fulfilled many of its commitments but the NRM government had failed to fulfill many of its commitments. To prove that the UNRF1 leadership had attempted to fulfill its commitments, the Chairman of UNRF1 displayed a list of 5,994 UNRF1 ex-combatants who included those that had survived the struggle, died or injured in the struggle compiled as part of their commitments. Although some UNRF1 ex-combatants previously interviewed in Arua district had claimed that the list of UNRF1 ex-combatants compiled and submitted to the government had many persons who were not involved in the struggle, it was not possible for this study to verify the authenticity of these allegations. What is certain, however, is that a breakdown list of UNRF ex-combatants was observed by the researcher. In addition, an association for all ex-combatants known as Programme for Reconciliation and Development Organization (PRADO) had been formed and its office is located in Arua town on Yumbe road. Indeed, the leadership of this association helped to mobilize ex-combatants to participate in interviews for this study.

On the other hand, respondents identified commitments that had not been fulfilled by the

NRM as shown in Table 4.3.

**Table 4.3: Respondent views on commitments not fulfilled by the NRM Government**

<b>Commitments</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Failed to pay and support them financially	18	17.5
Failed to provide education scholarships for ex-combatants	12	11.6
Failed to provide settlement packages	17	16.5
Failed to give Ministerial and Ambassador posts	18	17.5
Failed to provide better social services like roads, schools	17	16.5
Failed to reintegrate ex-combatants to UPDF or to civil life	21	20.3
<i>Non response</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>19.4</i>
<b>Total</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>100.0</b>

*Source: Field data (Nov. 2008)*

Results from Table 4.3 indicate that 20.3% of the respondents revealed that the NRM government failed to reintegrate UNRF ex-combatants into UPDF or to civil life. This was one of the major failures of the NRM government in its commitments with the UNRF1 fighters. Failure to reintegrate ex-combatants may have undermined the achievements of the disarmament and demobilization phase, placing the DDR programme at a risk and causing increased instability in the area. A further 17.5% of the respondents revealed that the NRM government failed to give ministerial and ambassador posts to selected UNRF1 fighters. In fact, some respondents revealed that even those who had been given jobs were later arrested and imprisoned. Other commitments that were not fulfilled included failure to provide better social services like roads, schools (16.5% of the respondents), failure to pay and support them financially (17.5%), failure to provide education scholarships for ex-combatants (11.6%) and, failure to provide settlement packages (16.5%) among others. The above results were supplemented by information from one of the focus group discussions held in Yumbe town where one participant revealed that:

“...the NRM government has failed to honor the pledges it made with the UNRF1 which included payment of Ug. Shs 8 billion resettlement package, providing adequate security to lives of ex-combatants, offering jobs and education

scholarships, rehabilitation of houses destroyed by foreign armies and ministerial appointments” (*Butiga Yahaya, FGD member*).

Records provided by the Chairman of the Defunct UNRF1 revealed that a total of 5,994 ex-combatants were not reintegrated either into the community, civil service, army or compensated. A further 1,861 (23.7%) material contributors to the struggle had not been compensated. A summary of UNRF1 ex-combatants not yet reintegrated/compensated is presented in Table 4.4.

**Table 4.4: UNRF1 ex-combatants not reintegrated and/compensated by November 2008**

Category of ex-combatants	Number of persons	Percentage
Ex-combatants who survived the struggle	5,257	66.9
Ex-combatants who died in the struggle	534	6.8
Ex-combatants who were injured in the struggle	203	2.6
Material contributors in the struggle	1,861	23.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,855</b>	<b>100.0</b>

*Source: Ali (forthcoming). Breakdown list of ex-combatants*

Although the above information revealed that the NRM government failed to fulfill most of the commitments, interviews with UNRF 1 ex-combatants who had been reintegrated into the army and civil service<sup>20</sup> revealed that:

“...several UNRF 1 ex-combatants like Kania Obiga, Dr. Ajeri, Agunda, Hajati Amina, Adriko and Kamya had been reintegrated into the civil service. Major General Emilo Mondo, a UNRF 1 ex-combatants formerly worked with the Ministry of Defence and by the time of data collection, he was the Chairman Uganda Veterans Assistance Board”.

<sup>20</sup> Amb. Lit. Col. (Rtd) Obitre Gama, Chairperson Amnesty Commission Arua and Major Abiriga, Resident District Commissioner Arua (Nov. 2008)

In addition, a press release by the Principal Private Secretary to the President (late Serwanga Lwanga) dated 27 July 1986 indicated that President Yoweri Museveni had appointed Brigadier Moses Ali as a Minister of Tourism and Wildlife. Besides, Amin Onzi and Agardi Didi were also later appointed Cabinet Ministers in the NRM government.

During data collection, however, the issue of ministerial appointments featured prominently during an interview with the former Chairman of UNRF 1. He revealed that having served as a Cabinet Minister in the NRM government for over 20 years, he did not know why this time he had been dropped in the last Cabinet reshuffle yet, it had been previously agreed that as a Chairman of former UNRF1, he was to remain Cabinet Minister in order to keep serving his people. Due to the busy schedule of the President (appointing authority), however, this study failed to get an appropriate answer as to why the Chairman of former UNRF1 was no longer a Cabinet Minister under the NRM government. Table 4.5 shows a list of former UNRF 1 ex-combatants offered jobs in the NRM government.

**Table 4.5: Former UNRF 1 ex-combatants who were offered jobs in the NRM Government**

<b>Names of former UNRF 1 ex-combatants</b>	<b>Position offered</b>
1. Moses Ali	Prime Minister
2. Amin Onzi	Minister
3. Obiga Kania	Manager TUMPECO and later a Director in the Movement Secretariat
4. Eric Adriko	Minister
5. Agardi Didi	Minister
6. Emilio Mondo	Ambassador, Permanent secretary and Executive secretary of UVAB
7. Lt Col. Ona	Ambassador
8. Bruhan Abiriga	Battalion Commander, Resident District Commissioner

*Source: In-depth interview data*

Regarding security and protection of ex-combatants, the Chairperson AC in Arua was of the



view that since the Amnesty Act<sup>21</sup> had not been enacted in 1986 when the UNRF forces were demobilized, the Presidential pardon offered them protection in their communities. This was confirmed by one of the key informants who said that “*truta drile cari niri ba ndra nyafe kopi ase telea adi dipi ri truzoa*” literary meaning that “the President forgave them because they had been misled by other people” However, the study noted that with the establishment of the Amnesty Commission Office in Arua, many of the UNRF 1 ex-combatants had been issued with Amnesty Certificates (a sample of the Amnesty Certificate is attached to this study as Appendix VII). With all this done, therefore, it is fair to say that the NRM government fulfilled a significant portion of the commitments although it failed to deliver on all of them.

Basing on the study findings, therefore, it can be concluded that the understanding between UNRF1 and NRM was prompted by the need to strengthen their offensive against the Obote government since both of them were fighting a common enemy and had similar goals. It dates back in 1981 when top leaders and Commanders of fighting forces that were opposed to the government of Obote met under the sponsorship and Chairmanship of the Libyan Leader Colonel Gaddafi. Among the commitments made by the NRM government to UNRF1 fighters, were Ug. Shs 8 billion reintegration package, ministerial, ambassador and civil service jobs, release of jailed ex-combatants and education scholarships for selected ex-combatants and their children. On the side of UNRF1 leadership, however, all UNRF 1 ex-combatants were to form an umbrella association to champion their interests, compile a comprehensive list of names of UNRF ex-combatants who had survived the struggle, died, injured or contributed materials to the struggle, ensure that all its soldiers assembled in Arua for disarmament and demobilization, and above all, abandon fighting. This implies that both parties committed themselves to fulfill certain things which were necessary for peace building in West Nile region. Although the time frame for fulfilling many of these commitments was never stated, both parties have fulfilled a significant portion of the commitments although they are still far from delivering on all of them.

---

<sup>21</sup> The Amnesty Act was enacted in 2000. It grants amnesty to Ugandans involved in acts of rebellion in various parts of the country.

### 4.3 Failure to deliver on Commitments in the Peace Agreement between UNRF 1 and NRM

Another objective of the study was to “*establish the causes and consequences of failure to deliver on commitments in the peace agreement by both parties*”. In order to treat the causes and consequences separately, this section is divided into two sub sections. In the first sub-section, the study addressed the causes of the failure to deliver on commitments in the peace agreement by both parties while the consequences are presented in the second sub-section.

#### 4.3.1 Causes of the Failure to deliver on Commitments

Having noted in the previous objective that both the NRM government and UNRF1 leadership failed to deliver on all commitments in the peace agreement concluded in 1986 at State House in Entebbe, it is fair to present the causes of this failure as found out by this study. Information was drawn from UNRF ex-combatants, government officials especially in the Office of the Prime Minister, Officials of Amnesty Commission, local leaders as well as the leadership of both parties.

Respondents (largely UNRF ex-combatants) attributed the failure of the NRM government to fulfill its commitments on the following causes (see Table 4.6).

**Table 4.6: UNRF 1 ex-combatants’ view of the Causes of failure to deliver on Commitments by NRM**

<b>Causes</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Deceitfulness of NRM leaders	17	16.5
Government's poor planning policy	13	12.6
Lack of follow-up by concerned leaders	12	11.6
Corrupt government officers	10	9.7
No comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) was signed	14	13.6
Marginalization of ex-combatants by NRM	11	10.7
Bureaucracy	13	12.6
Continuous fighting by former UNRF1 forces against the government	11	10.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>100.0</b>

*Source: Field data (Nov. 2008)*

From Table 4.6, it can be seen that 16.5% of the respondents attributed the failure of the NRM

government to deliver on commitments in the peace agreement to the deceitful nature of NRM leaders, failure to sign a comprehensive peace agreement (13.6%), governments' poor planning policy (12.6%), lack of follow-up by concerned local leaders (11.6%) and the high level of bureaucracy involved in pursuing the peace agreement commitments. Contrary to these findings, however, an interview with the NRA Commander<sup>22</sup> indicated that the dishonesty of UNRF leaders was the major factor that discouraged the government from fulfilling its commitments. He said:

“...the UNRF 1 leaders were not honest to what was agreed in the peace agreement. While they had agreed with the NRM government that they were to stop rebel activities, some of their leaders like General Bamuze and others went back to the bush and started destabilizing peace in the North. A list of the UNRF1 ex-combatants submitted to the government is also still being contested from within the defunct UNRF1 members that many of the fighters included for resettlement and compensation are not Ugandans”.

In addition, research findings revealed that the issue of the NRM government's failure to pay Ug. Shs 8 billion resettlement package to the UNRF forces was due to continuous budget deficits in the country. Indeed, the leader of UNRF 1 ex-combatants also expressed adequate knowledge of this but hastened to add that the finances had improved since the war against the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Northern Uganda had subsided. In his words, he said:

“...previously, the President of Uganda used to tell me that the government was incurring high expenses in fighting the war with the LRA as I used to agree with him. But now that the LRA has been weakened and sent out of Uganda, finances should have improved and therefore, the issue of funds no longer holds water”. (Chairman UNRF 1)

Other factors revealed by respondents as being responsible for the failure of the NRM government to deliver on commitments in the peace agreement were continuous fighting by former UNRF1 forces in other rebel groups against the government (10.7%), marginalization of ex-combatants (10.7%) and the corrupt nature of government officers (9.5%). This implies that the causes of the failure to deliver on commitments by the NRM were attributed to its

---

<sup>22</sup> General Elly Tumwine

internal weaknesses but also the realization that UNRF1 ex-combatants had not fulfilled the commitments on their side.

Regarding the causes of the failure of UNRF 1 to deliver on its commitments, respondents were of the view that various factors as shown in Table 4.7.

**Table 4.7: Respondent views on the causes of the failure to deliver on commitments on the side of UNRF 1**

<b>Causes</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Registration of “ghost ex-combatants”	12	11.6
UNRF1 felt that they had not got a fair deal	16	15.5
Poor leadership and lack of transparency among their leaders	27	26.2
Loss of trust in NRM government	13	12.6
Greed and selfishness of ex-combatant’s leaders	12	11.6
Failure to reach a comprehensive peace agreement (CPA)	11	10.7
Poor communication among ex-combatants	12	11.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>100.0</b>

*Source: Field data (Nov. 2008)*

It can be seen from Table 4.7 that the causes of the failure of the UNRF 1 to deliver on its commitments were poor leadership and lack of transparency among their leaders (revealed by 26.2% of the respondents), the feeling among UNRF 1 fighters that they hadn’t got a fair deal from the peace agreement (15.5%), loss of trust in NRM government (12.6%) and greed and selfishness of ex-combatant’s leaders (11.6%). Other causes revealed by respondents included communication breakdown among ex-combatants (11.6%), continuous registration of ghost UNRF ex-combatants (11.6%) and failure to reach a comprehensive peace agreement with the NRM (10.7%). The issue of poor leadership and lack of transparency among UNRF 1 leaders was further highlighted in one of the focus group discussions held in Koboko district where one participant revealed that:

“..the UNRF 1 leadership became inefficient when most leaders were given government posts and they forgot to fulfill the commitments in the peace agreement. Besides, they lacked

transparency and failed to keep in contact with the rest of the ex-combatants who had been sent to their communities”.

This implies that UNRF 1 leadership did do its best to fulfill its commitments with the NRM government. Consequently, this may have contributed to discontent among the UNRF 1 ex-combatants thus leading to taking up of arms to fight the NRM government again. The rebel groups which emerged after 1986 have been discussed in section 4.5. Before that, however, the consequences of the failure to deliver on the commitments are presented.

#### **4.3.2 Consequences of the failure to deliver on Commitments**

Various consequences of the failure to deliver on the commitments by both parties were found out during the study. Interviews and field observations revealed both negative and positive consequences to the UNRF 1 ex-combatants, NRM government and the West Nile local community members.

##### **4.3.2.1 Negative consequences**

The negative consequences on the welfare of UNRF 1 ex-combatants are presented in Table 4.8.

**Table 4.8: Respondent views on negative consequences of the failure of the NRM to fulfill Commitment to the UNRF 1 ex-combatants**

<b>Negative consequences</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Persistent poverty	34	33.0
Failed to come to reach a comprehensive agreement with NRM	9	8.7
Increase of rebel activities	12	11.6
Food shortage	11	10.7
Lack of agricultural equipments	9	8.7
Poor housing	5	4.8
Poor relationship with community members	15	14.5
Unemployment	15	14.5
High levels of illiteracy	14	13.6
Lack of land for farming	11	10.7
<b>Total response</b>	<b>135</b>	<b>131.1</b>
<b>Valid response</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>100.0</b>

# Non-response

Source: Field data (Nov. 2008)

Table 4.8 reveals that persistent poverty among UNRF 1 ex-combatants was the major negative consequence of the failure to deliver on the commitments by both parties. This was revealed by 33% of the respondents and confirmed through field observations of poor housing conditions of ex-combatants (see plate 4.1), lack of household assets and food shortage in Odravu Sub County in Yumbe district.

**Plate 4.1: A homestead of a UNRF ex-combatant exhibiting poor housing and hygiene  
Conditions**



Source: Photograph was taken in Odravu Sub County in Yumbe district (Nov. 2008) by Fred Mwesigye

*This is one of the failure stories of reintegrated ex-combatants. Poverty among ex-combatants forced them to build mud and wattle houses which are grass thatched. Grass is free and abundant in the area. Otherwise, many of them expressed the wish to have brick iron sheet roofed houses. The state of hygiene and clothing of children as seen in the photograph is no better. Probably, if the ex-combatants had been given adequate resettlement packages, the conditions of housing and wellbeing of children would have been better.*

**Plate 4.2: A mismanaged poultry project owned by ex-combatants in Koboko district:**



Source: Photograph was taken in Kuluba sub county in Koboko district (Nov. 2008) by Fred Mwesigye

*This is another failure story of reintegrated ex-combatants. Respondents reported that this poultry project was started by a group of 6 ex-combatants who secured 3 million Ug. Shs from NUSAF. A total of 100 chicks were procured but died within the first 3 months due to lack of appropriate care and feeds. One respondent revealed that the problem originated from mismanagement of funds that had been set aside to purchase drugs and chicken feeds. The owners of the project divided the remaining funds among themselves and left nothing for management of the project. Lack of supervision and monitoring of such projects by the government contributed to the situation.*

Other photographs showing failure stories of ex-combatants to live better standards of living, get employment and consequently, income are also presented. A dilapidated house of one former leader of UNRF1 which was supposed to be reconstructed by the NRM was observed in Yumbe district (Plate 4.3). Such poor conditions may be attributed to failure of both parties to meet their commitments and the consequent failure of the reintegration exercise.



**Plate 4.3: A house of a UNRF 1 ex-combatant that has not been reconstructed since the 1979 war in Yumbe district**



Source: Photograph was taken in Kuru sub county in Yumbe district (Nov. 2008) by Fred Mwesigye

*This is another failure story of a reintegrated UNRF 1 ex-combatant<sup>23</sup>. The study established that like similar houses in the area, the above house was destroyed by the TPDF in 1979. When the NRM accepted to reintegrate UNRF 1 ex-combatants in 1986, President Museveni promised to reconstruct it and compensate the owner. Although the researcher observed a State House communication approving the bill of quantities for renovation of the above house, the UNRF1 ex-combatant revealed that the process had taken so long to materialize. The respondent called upon State House to come to his rescue.*

Another negative consequence on the welfare of UNRF 1 ex-combatants revealed by 11.6% was increased support for rebel activities in the area. Indeed, this was echoed in another focus group discussion where one participant noted that:

“...failure of the NRM government to fulfill its commitments especially deploying young ex-combatants or facilitating their

---

<sup>23</sup> Brig. Nasur Ezaga who was a former UNRF1 combatant who joined UNRF II and became its first Chairman before Ali Bamuze.

reintegration into the community sparked off rebel groups especially the one led by General Bamuze and the West Nile Bank Front”.

Other negative consequences included unemployment of majority of the ex-combatants (evidenced by majority of the ex-combatants who were found loitering in Arua town as shown in Plate 4.4), high illiteracy rates (13.6%), food shortage (10.7%), poor relationship with the community (14.5%), lack of agricultural equipment as well as lack of land for farming among others.

**Plate 4.4 : Some ex-combatants at PRADO office in Arua town that were reportedly unemployed**



Source: Photograph was taken at PRADO office in Arua town (Nov. 2008) by Fred Mwesigye

*Few days before data collection, the RDC for Arua had announced on the local radio that ex-combatants were to be paid their long awaited resettlement packages. Therefore, many of the ex-combatants kept hanging around Arua town in anticipation of the same. This made it easy for the researcher to mobilize them to participate in the focus group discussion. It further implies that many of the ex-combatants were not gainfully employed and could be mobilized for any activity at short notice.*

The negative consequences to the NRM government are presented in table 4.9.

**Table 4.9: Respondent views on Negative Consequences to the NRM government**

Negative consequences	Frequency	Percent
Lack of knowledge about government policies by ex-combatants	4	3.9
Insecurity leading to poor political atmosphere	22	21.4
Loss of trust in the government by ex-combatants	36	34.9
Lack of political support for NRM government in the area	41	39.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: Field data (Nov. 2008)

Table 4.9 indicates that the majority of the respondents (39.8%) were of the view that lack of political support for NRM government in the area was the major negative consequence of the NRM government's failure to fulfill its commitments with the UNRF 1 ex-combatants. Findings FGD held in the three districts of study confirmed this consequence. The FGD participants revealed that the NRM candidates got very little support during the previous Presidential and Parliamentary elections because majority of the voters in the area were unhappy with the governments' persistence failure to fulfill its promises. The issue of low political support was further reiterated by one Resident District Commissioner<sup>24</sup> in the area that:

“During the 2007 Presidential and Parliamentary elections, the NRM party was defeated in this area because we have a big number of ex-combatants and ex-soldiers who were disgruntled with the NRM because their resettlement packages have never been paid”.

In addition, the former Chairman of UNRF 1 said:

“The constant loss of political support evidenced by political defeats in the area are an indication that people are not happy with what the NRM government is doing, most especially its failure to reintegrate ex-combatants and soldiers who were not absorbed in the UPDF”.

<sup>24</sup> Major Bruhan Abiriga – the Resident District Commissioner for Arua

The above findings agree with 34.9% of the respondents who indicated that they had lost trust in the NRM government because of its failure to deliver on its commitments with the UNRF 1 ex-combatants.

Other negative consequences of the NRM's failure to meet its commitments was insecurity leading to poor political atmosphere (21.4%) and lack of knowledge about government policies by ex-combatants (3.9%). Although, the issue of insecurity was generally disputed by most of the key informants during the study, one official from the RDC's office in Yumbe district<sup>25</sup> reported isolated incidences of insecurity attributed to ex-combatants in the district. He noted:

“Although the general security situation in the District can be described as peaceful, I must say that our office has been getting reports of isolated pockets of insecurity in Lower Odravu and Kulu Sub County. One primary school teacher was gunned down in Romogi Sub County and also, reports that groups of three or four people travel with guns in evenings have reached our office”.

From his information, security groups in the area should strengthen their patrols to curb the few cases of insecurity and establish a peace environment for development.

To the local community, the study established that failure to fulfill commitments by both parties had consequences as shown in Table 4.10.

---

<sup>25</sup> Joyce Ayikoru, Yumbe district

**Table 4.10: Respondent views on Negative Consequences to the Community**

<b>Consequences</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
High levels of illiteracy	8	7.8
Loss of land and destruction of property	12	11.6
Insecurity due to armed civilians	33	32.0
Displacement of community members	13	12.6
Poverty hence poor standards of living	27	26.2
Poor infrastructures like schools, water	17	16.5
Poor relationship between ex-combatants and the community	5	4.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>100.0</b>

*Source: Field data (Nov. 2008)*

Table 4.10 shows the respondent views on the negative consequences to the community. They include insecurity due to armed civilians as revealed by 32% of respondents, poverty hence poor standards of living (26.2%), poor infrastructures like schools, water (16.2%), loss of land and destruction of property (11.6%), high levels of illiteracy (7.8%) and poor relationship between some ex-combatants and the community (4.8%).

#### **4.3.2.2 Positive consequences**

On the positive side, success stories of reintegration of ex-combatants were also noted. The study found that some UNRF 1 ex-combatants had started income generating projects as they waited for the NRM government to deliver on its promises. Some of the income generating activities were started with assistance from the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF) while others were started from the ex-combatants savings. Records from the NUSAF Coordinating Office in Arua district revealed that ex-combatants in Arua District received a special fund to start income generating projects in 2008. Ex-combatants in other districts in West Nile region did not benefit from this NUSAF assistance because it was reported that this was a special arrangement made by the AC Office to help ex-combatants in

Arua district. Whether ex-combatants in other districts of West Nile were to benefit from other arrangements made by the AC was not made clear during this study. However, a NUSAF disbursement report for August 2008 for Arua district revealed that 32 sub-projects for ex-combatants had been financed with 16,209,173,757= Uganda Shs. (NUSAF Disbursements Report for August 2008). Ex-combatants engaged in projects like cattle and sheep rearing, goat restocking, carpentry and joinery, tailoring, metal works and fabrication, vehicle mechanics and apiary. During the study, ex-combatants sub projects in vehicle mechanics (see plate 4.5) and metal work and fabrication (plate 4.6) were observed as success stories in Tanganyika ward in Arua town.

**Plate 4.5: NUSAF funded mechanical workshop for UNRF 1 ex-combatants in Arua town**



Source: Photograph was taken in Arua town (Nov. 2008) by Fred Mwesigye

*This is a success story of reintegrated ex-combatants. The workshop was owned by a group of 10 ex-combatants. 6 of them had skills in vehicle mechanics while others were still learning from the already experienced ones. Records seen by the researcher indicated that an average of 14 vehicles were repaired in this workshop weekly, giving an average weekly income of 100,000=.* Although the funds were got from the government through NUSAF, respondents reported lack of government supervision which had led other ex-combatants to misuse the funds.



**Plate 4.6: NUSAF funded metal and fabrication workshop for UNRF 1 ex-combatants in Arua Town**



Source: Photograph was taken in Arua town (Nov. 2008) by Fred Mwesigye

*This is another success story of reintegrated ex-combatants. The workshop was owned by a group of 4 ex-combatants. It was reported that the workshop was able to make an average of 10 doors a week. Considering that each door was sold at an average price of 150,000= Ug. shs, it implies that the workshop had an average weekly sales turnover of 1.5m shs. Respondents revealed that doors and windows fabricated in this workshop were sold locally but were exported to Southern Sudan. Materials were bought from local hardware shops that reportedly purchased metals from Roofings Ltd in Kampala. One major problem identified was that of the rising prices of materials due to competition for them with traders from Southern Sudan.*

Therefore, the study noted lack of monitoring and supervision of NUSAF funded ex-combatant sub-projects in Arua district as a major limitation. According to the RDC for Arua district, many ex-combatants with sub-projects in villages had failed to manage them and needed a strong supervision team (especially containing some army officials since they were dealing with ex-combatants) to put them back on track. Inadequate funds for monitoring and supervision were reported the major problem in the district. Poor management of sub projects

by ex-combatants was also confirmed by one local council leader who participated in a FGD of Arua district that:

“...right from the time receiving this money, some ex-combatants started to spend it lavishly in bars, hotels and buying clothes for their spouses. Even some of those who started sub projects, lacked professional advice and are consequently performing poorly”.

Finally, success stories of income generating projects for UNRF 1 ex-combatants who used their personal savings included commercial tree growing especially in Yumbe district (see Plate 4.7), fruit growing (see Plate 4.8), apiary and maize growing (see plate 4.9).

**Plate 4.7: Commercial tree growing (*teak species*) by ex-combatants in Kuru sub county, Yumbe district**



Source: Photograph was taken in Kuru sub county, Yumbe district (Nov. 2008) by Fred Mwesigye

*This is another success story of reintegrated UNRF 1 ex-combatants. Respondents revealed that as a result of indiscriminate cutting of trees for timber, charcoal and firewood in the early 1980s, the President of Uganda advised ex-combatants to plant trees in the area. Therefore, in the period 1986 – 1992, people started planting trees like the one shown above. It was further established that the size of tree plantations in Yumbe district alone was about 120 acres extending even to Moyo district. Although, the tree plantation was still young for*



harvesting, the owner indicated that it was already giving him an average monthly income of 70,000= from the sale of seedlings, building poles and firewood.

**Plate 4.8: A fruit growing project for a UNRF1 ex-combatant in Yumbe town<sup>26</sup>**



Source: Photograph was taken in Yumbe town (Nov. 2008) by Fred Mwesigye

*This is another success story of a reintegrated UNRF 1 ex-combatant. The foreground shows a pineapple garden while the background shows an orange field. The owner of the fruit garden<sup>27</sup> revealed that fruits were sold to traders who took them to Kampala while others were sold to Southern Sudan. Besides, more fruits were used as food for the local people. The ripening season for oranges was between September to December every year. The producer price for a sack of oranges was 10,000 Ug.shs. For this particular farmer, the orange garden used to earn an average of 700,000Ug. Shs per year.*

---

<sup>26</sup> This particular ground in Yumbe town has a historic significance because it is where the UNRF II under Gen. Bamuze signed a peace agreement with the NRM government on 24<sup>th</sup> December 2002.

<sup>27</sup> Mr. Yassin Ari.

**Plate 4.9: A maize garden for a UNRF 1 ex-combatant in Lobule sub county, Koboko District**



Source: Photograph was taken in Lobule sub county, Koboko district (Nov. 2008) by Fred Mwesigye

*This is another success story of a reintegrated UNRF 1 ex-combatant. The respondent revealed that the maize garden covered 2 acres of land. The expected yield was at least 2 tonnes. Market for maize was available in Koboko at 550= per kilogram. He revealed that the major problems faced were drought, diseases and lack of funds to pay garden workers. He requested for hand tractors to facilitate commercial cultivation of crops.*

Therefore, the success stories presented above like establishment of mechanical, metal work and fabrication workshops by ex-combatants in the area, commercial tree planting, fruit growing and maize growing by ex-combatants are a result of NRM's efforts to integrate UNRF 1 but the failure stories like poor housing, lack of family assets, shortage of food, mismanagement of community projects, failure of the government to honor its pledges and unemployment among ex-combatants can be attributed to lack of follow up by local leaders, limited involvement of beneficiary ex-combatants and lack of transparency by both NRM and UNRF 1 leaders.

In the final analysis therefore, it is fair to conclude that the failure of the NRM government to deliver on commitments in the peace agreement was largely attributed to dishonesty of UNRF 1 leaders and shortage of funds due to other national priorities. To the UNRF 1, however, it was due to lack of political support and follow-up especially by concerned local leaders and the high degree of bureaucracy involved in pursuing the peace agreement commitments. Consequently, this resulted into persistent poverty by ex-combatants, increased support for rebel activities in the area, unemployment, high illiteracy and food shortage. On the NRM government side, it led to loss of political support during elections due to low trust in the NRM. On the positive side, however, the study found that few UNRF 1 ex-combatants had started income generating projects from their personal savings and NUSAF assistance as they waited for the NRM government to deliver on its promises. Lack of monitoring and supervision of NUSAF funded ex-combatant sub-projects, however, was found to be a major limitation to this initiative.

#### **4.4 The Emergence of new Rebel Movements in West Nile**

Another objective of the study was to critically examine any other factors, other than the failure by the government to live up to its commitments that led to the emergence of new rebel movements in West Nile. Indeed, NUPI (2006) noted that, following the overthrow of Okello-Lutwa by the NRA in January 1986, a number of rebel movements broke out virtually throughout the country. Some of these rebel movements had been defeated by the government forces while others destabilized the country and had been or were responsible for much of the insecurity that affected different parts of the country.

Consequently, the study identified various rebel movements that emerged after 26 January 1986. They are presented in Table 4.11.

**Table 4.11: Rebel Movements that emerged/recruited in West Nile since January 1986**

Main Rebel group	Period of operation
1. Uganda Peoples Democratic Army (UPDA) **	March 1986 – July 1988
2. Holy Spirit Movement headed by Alice Lakwena ***	Late 1986 – end of 1987
3. Uganda National Rescue front II under General Bamuze	Mid 1996 – December 2002
4. West Nile Bank Front led by Juma Oris	1994 – 2003
5. Peoples Redemption Army	February 2000 – September 2006
6. Lords Resistance Army	March 1994 – present

*Source: Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (2004) and Field interviews (Nov. 2008)*

\*\* UPDA operated in the Acholi land but recruited most of its forces from the West Nile region.

\*\*\* Holy Spirit Movement largely operated in the Acholi land, Teso and Lango but recruited some of its forces from the West Nile region

According to respondents, the factors that led to emergence of new rebel movements in West Nile after UNRF 1 are varied. Table 4.12 presents the factors.

**Table 4.12: Respondent views on factors that led to emergence of new rebel movements in West Nile**

Causes	Frequency	Percent
Poverty	25	24.3
Continued government intimidation of former rebels	14	13.6
Imprisonment of some ex-combatants by government	15	14.6
Unemployment	11	10.6
Poor relationship between ex-combatants and the community	7	6.8
Absence of social services like good roads, power	8	7.8
Differences in political ideologies	16	15.5
Food scarcity	2	1.9
Marginalization of the region in terms of development	2	1.9
Ignorance among members of the community	3	2.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>100.0</b>

*Source: Field data (Nov. 2008)*

It can be observed from Table 4.12 that 24.3% of the respondents revealed that poverty was the major factor that led to emergence of rebel movements in West Nile since 1986. Other factors included differences in political ideologies (15.5%) and imprisonment of some ex-combatants by government (14.6%). In agreement with these factors, one key informant from Yumbe District revealed that he had to go back to the bush to fight the NRM government because it had started imprisoning some of his colleagues for no justifiable reasons. In his words, he intimated that:

“..the reintegration of UNRF 1 forces into the NRA in 1986 was limited to soldiers with the rank of Captain and below but not the ranks above. As if that was not enough, the unconsidered army officers were not deployed anywhere. But around 1987, government arrested my colleagues like Rajab Rembe, Lt. Col. Isa, Lt. John Ona, Major Aridiga, Major Nooh, Lt. Col. Tabu and Musa Kyabo and I felt insecure when information reached me that I was to be arrested also. Consequently, I teamed up with Ali Bamuze and late Juma Iga to form UNRF II”<sup>28</sup>

Similar sentiments were also revealed during an indepth interview with General Ali Bamuze that:

“...reintegrated ex-combatants were left unattended to for too long without duties/assignments or retraining to suit new conditions; promises and pledges were not fulfilled, security of wanainchi’s life and property not guaranteed, biting poverty and desperation for survival as well as political propaganda and anti-government sentiments” (*Ali Bamuze, Chairman of UNRF II*)

The above implies that lack of immediate deployment instructions, poverty and imprisonment of people considered not to have cases to answer were factors that led to emergence of new rebel movements in the West Nile region.

Continued government intimidation of former rebels was identified by 13.6% of the respondents as yet another cause of emergence of new rebel movements in the West Nile

---

<sup>28</sup> Interview with Brig. Nasur Ezaga

region. Use of threats by government officials was emphasized by one former UNRF1 combatant who joined the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) that:

“...we have been hearing words of intimidation from government officials that because WNBF did not come into a formal agreement with the NRM, they were not going to be compensated and were going to be imprisoned if they continued to demand for resettlement packages”.

Such language of violence may have derailed the peace building process and further encouraged people to form or join other rebel groups.

Unemployment of ex-combatants was another cause of emergence of rebel groups in West Nile. Respondents revealed that due to lack of reintegration of ex-combatants, many of them failed to secure gainful employment. Absence of skills and a negative attitude towards work were also reported as some of the contributing factors to unemployment. Consequently, emerging rebel groups would find it easy to recruit the various unemployed able bodied ex-combatants in the area. As a matter of fact, some respondents revealed that they were motivated to join UNRF II because they were unemployed and had waited for fulfillment of government commitments for a long time and had lost hope in finding themselves an appropriate way of survival.

Other causes were absence of social services like good roads, power (7.8%), poor relationship between ex-combatants and the community (6.8%), ignorance among members of the community (2.9%), food scarcity (1.9%) and marginalization of the region in terms of development (1.9%) among others.

In conclusion therefore, various rebel movements emerged immediately after the overthrow of Okello-Lutwa by the NRA in January 1986. Poverty, differences in political ideologies, imprisonment of some ex-combatants by government were the major factors that led to emergence of new rebel movements in West Nile. Continued government intimidation of former rebels, unemployment of ex-combatants absence of social services like good roads, power, poor relationship between ex-combatants and the community, food scarcity, and

marginalization of the region in terms of development were also revealed by respondents as having contributed to emergence of new rebel movements.

#### **4.5 The Process of Reintegration of UNRF 1 ex-combatants and its contribution to Peace building in West Nile**

The final objective of the study was “*to examine the extent to which reintegration of UNRF 1 ex-combatants was based on DDR processes and assess its contribution to peace building in West Nile*”. The United Nations (2006) defines DDR as a process that contributes to security and stability in a post-conflict recovery context by removing weapons from the hands of combatants, taking the combatants out of military structures and helping them to integrate socially and economically into society by finding civilian livelihoods. In line with this definition, the study investigated if the UNRF1 ex-combatants had been Disarmed, Demobilized and Reintegrated (DDR) by the NRM government.

In the first case, the study established that UNRF1 ex-combatants assembled in Arua grounds in July 1986 and surrendered their arms and ammunitions to the NRM government. At the time of talks, UNRF troops had been camped at Kerila Air field in Yumbe with over 10,000 officers and men. This was in fulfillment of the first process of the DDR-Disarmament. According to Ali (forthcoming), UNRF High Command willingly agreed to join NRM/NRA and by 29<sup>th</sup> July 1986 NRM/NRA government and UNRF implemented an accord.

“A Military Integration Committee was appointed by H.E President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, headed by then Minister of State for Defence Dr. Ronald Bata (RIP). Membership of this Committee included members from NRM/NRA and UNRF team was headed by Maj. Gen. Rajab Lembe (Pol) RIP, Lt. Col. A.M Tabu and Capt. Twalib among others”<sup>29</sup>.

According to the Reintegration Commander of the NRA, ex-combatants who qualified to join the national army were absorbed into the NRA, others joined the civil service while the rest were resettled in their homes. Records available in the Ministry of Defense revealed that a

---

<sup>29</sup> Interview findings with General Elly Tumwine who was the NRA Commander in 1986 when the UNRF 1 ex-combatants were reintegrated into the NRA

total number of 10,000 UNRF1 ex-combatants were presented to the NRM government for reintegration. The records further indicate that only 5,000 UNRF 1 ex-combatants were deployed into the NRA while the rest were demobilized and returned to their communities for civilian lives. Table 4.13 shows the details of deployment of 5,000 ex-combatants into the NRA.

**Table 4.13: Deployment of UNRF 1 ex-combatants into the NRA in 1986**

<b>Number of UNRF 1 that joined the NRA</b>	<b>Area of deployment</b>	<b>Assigned activities</b>
400 officers and men	Hima in Kasese district	To start and work in a Production Unit
300 Officers and men	Deployed to 151 brigade in Mbale	Operated in areas of Moroto and Soroti to counter insurgency
370 Officers and men	Formed 73 <sup>rd</sup> Battalion <sup>30</sup>	Deployed to stop the insurgency of UPDA that had developed in the north eastern parts of Uganda
185 Officers and men	Formed a half of the 71 <sup>st</sup> battalion	Deployed to stop the insurgency of UPDA
185 Officers and men	Formed a half of the 93 <sup>rd</sup> battalion	Deployed to stop the insurgency of UPDA
185 Officers and men	Formed a half of the 85 <sup>th</sup> battalion	Deployed to stop the insurgency of UPDA
1000 Officers and men	Fort Portal and later to Kibubura	Military and political training before deployment into various units of NRA
1265 Officers and men	Deployed in all parts of Uganda	Deployed according to their professions and trades into the Air force, Artillery, Medical, Training schools, education and others

*Source: Ministry of Defense records*

<sup>30</sup> A Battalion is composed of 32 officers and 338 other ranks.




A presidential pardon was extended all ex-combatants for whatever crimes they had committed because the Amnesty Act of 2000 had not been formulated and passed into Act of Parliament. As opposed to United Nations demobilization standards, however, the ex-combatants who were resettled into the community did not receive sufficient assistance to meet basic needs and also take some time at designated encampment locations for psychosocial support. Information from respondents indicated that ex-combatants were given 500,000 Ug. shs (equivalent of 270 US dollars) to facilitate their transport back home as they awaited their reinsertion and reintegration packages. Since then, respondents revealed that they had never been reintegrated fully (enabled to acquire gainful employment and income) into their communities. Despite this, information the AC regional office in Arua revealed that the majority of ex-combatants (60%) received demobilization certificates (see Appendix VII for a sample) as soon as the Amnesty Act 2000 was passed. An interview with the Reorganization Commander of the Army revealed a related process of reintegration. He indicated that

“...the process of reintegration involved reception of the surrendered or captured ex-combatants, documentation and categorization, military retraining and political education and eventually deployment in the NRA. Those who were unfit or unwilling to join the NRA were separated from those who were fit and willing to join the NRA”.

Figure 4.6 shows a flow diagram illustrating the process of reintegration of UNRF 1 ex-combatants.

**Figure 4.6: The process of reintegration of UNRF 1 ex-combatants**



*Source: Field interviews (Nov. 2008)*

Although neither the NRA Statute nor the Uganda People’s Defence Forces Act (2005) had been made, several guidelines were followed in the recruitment of the UNRF 1 ex-combatants into the NRA. According to the Commander of the NRA<sup>31</sup>, the UNRF 1 ex-combatants who were recruited into the NRA had to be medically and physically fit and above all self motivated to join the NRA. There were no budgetary considerations because the main purpose was to recruit as many trained personnel as possible to complete the war and build peace.

During the study, respondents revealed the various reasons for demobilization. They are presented in Table 4.14.

<sup>31</sup> General Elly Tumwine

**Table 4.14: Respondents' view of the reasons for demobilization of UNRF 1 force**

<b>Reasons</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Defeated	17	16.5
Protection and security purposes	13	12.6
Old age	3	2.9
Desire for peace	33	33.0
Fear of death	2	1.9
Injured while fighting	3	2.9
<i>Non response</i>	<i>31</i>	<i>30.1</i>
<b>Total</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>100.0</b>

*Source: Field data (Nov. 2008)*

Table 4.14 indicates that the majority of the respondents (33%) agreed to demobilization because of the desire for peace in the West Nile region and Uganda in general. This implies the majority of the respondents were peace loving and voluntarily offered to stop rebellion and be reintegrated into the community. A further 16.5% of the respondents revealed that they had been defeated and hence had to surrender to the government in power. Since this category of respondents appeared not to have been contented with the end to UNRF rebellion, it is possible that they were easy targets for recruitment into other rebel movements that later emerged in the region. A further 12.6% revealed that they were demobilized because they needed protection and security from the government. Indeed, previous AC reports (2000 – 2005) indicated that a Presidential Pardon was extended to such UNRF 1 ex-combatants. However, other respondents indicated that they accepted to be demobilized because of their old age (2.9%), fear of death (1.9%) and some had been injured during fighting (2.9%).

This implies that the majority of the UNRF 1 force wasn't ready to sustain the armed rebellion. This was further acknowledged by the Chairman of UNRF 1 who said:

“...it was wise to stop the armed struggle and join hands with the NRM government because their objectives were similar to ours. If we had continued fighting, I don't think, West Nile would be enjoying the peace dividends like the tarmac road from Karuma to Arua, free primary and secondary education available today”.

Therefore, it can be realized that the decision by the UNRF 1 to join hands with the NRM government was not forced but out of the wish of the majority of the UNRF 1 members to take part in the peace building initiatives of the government.

However, violent conflicts do not always completely stop when a political settlement is reached or a peace agreement is signed. The common process in such settlement is the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of the former fighters. The settlement of such ex-combatants is paramount to resolve and terminate the conflict and thereby discourage re-insurrection of the conflict.

In order to assess the extent to which the reintegration of UNRF 1 ex-combatants was based on DDR processes, this study investigated the frameworks and programs of reintegration of ex-combatants as proposed by the United Nations Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (2006). Table 4.15 presents respondents' views regarding the same.

**Table 4.15: Responses on frameworks for reintegration of UNRF 1 ex-combatants**

i) Reintegration framework	Response		
	Yes	No	Undecided
1. The objective of integration of ex-combatants was well known to me	67 (72.8%)	18 (19.6%)	7 (7.6%)
2. Stakeholder involvement was adequate	36 (38.3%)	52 (55.5%)	6 (6.4%)
3. Government communicated policy regarding reintegration	50 (53.2%)	37 (39.4%)	7 (7.4%)
4. Assessments of local conditions and economic opportunities were made before reintegration efforts	38 (41.3%)	51 (55.4%)	3 (3.3%)
5. The political environment in which ex-combatants were reintegrated created confidence	48 (51.6%)	41 (44.1%)	4 (4.3%)
6. Speed of handling reintegration exercise was fast.	42 (44.7%)	49 (52.1%)	3 (3.2%)
7. Identification procedure for the beneficiaries of reintegration was clear	21 (22.8%)	67 (72.8%)	4 (4.3%)
8. Reintegration supported the process of turning combatants into productive citizens	23 (26.4%)	60 (69.0%)	4 (4.6%)

According to Table 4.15, the majority of the respondents agreed that the following reintegration framework existed at the time of their reintegration:

- a) 72.8% of the respondents agreed that the objective of integration of ex-combatants was well known to them while,
- b) 53.2% of the respondents revealed that the Government communicated policy regarding reintegration to them and that;
- c) The political environment in which ex-combatants were reintegrated created confidence (51.6%).

The above findings implied that, to a big extent, the reintegration of the UNRF 1 ex-combatants did not fulfill the reintegration framework adopted from the DDR processes. This was further confirmed by the following reintegration frameworks that were not provided for by the NRM government as revealed by respondents:

- a) That identification procedure for the beneficiaries of reintegration was not clear (revealed by 72.8% of the respondents),
- b) that reintegration did not support the process of turning combatants into productive citizens (69% of the respondents)
- c) Stakeholder involvement was inadequate (55.5%) and that;
- d) The speed of handling reintegration exercise was not fast (52.1%).

The study also investigated the reintegration programmes of UNRF 1 ex-combatants and the findings are shown in table 4.16.

**Table 4.16: Responses on reintegration programmes for UNRF 1 ex-combatants**

Programmes	Response		
	Yes	No	Undecided
1. A longer term disarmament and weapons management project was put in place	56 (60.9%)	33 (35.9%)	3 (3.3%)
2. The hopes and expectations of the ex-combatants were taken care of.	4 (4.3%)	85 (91.4%)	4 (4.3%)
3. Ex-combatants who couldn't read and write were offered pre-vocational skills	1 (1.1%)	93 (98.9%)	0
4. Employment opportunities were created for ex-combatants in the community	0	103 (100%)	0
5. Micro-credit and local NGOs were established to help ex-combatants to become productive members of their communities	18 (19.6%)	67 (72.8%)	7 (7.6%)
6. Ex-combatants were assisted to acquire agriculture inputs to enable them start farming	67 (72.8%)	21 (22.8%)	4 (4.3%)

*Source: Field data (Nov.2003)*

From Table 4.16, all the respondents (100%) revealed that the NRM government did not create employment opportunities for ex-combatants in the community. This implies that since ex-combatants did not gain sustainable employment and income, full reintegration into the community did not take place. A further 98.9% of the respondents indicated that ex-combatants who couldn't read and write were not offered pre-vocational skills; further implying that the DDR approach which advocates for skills training of ex-combatants was never followed by the NRM government. In addition, 91.4% of the respondents indicated that the hopes and expectations of the ex-combatants were not taken care of while 72.8% of the respondents disagreed to the statement that micro-credit and local NGOs were established to help ex-combatants to become productive members of their communities.

However, 60.9% of the respondents agreed that the NRM provided a longer term disarmament and weapons management project and that ex-combatants were assisted to acquire agriculture inputs to enable them start farming (72.8%). Regarding establishment of local NGOs to help ex-combatants to become productive members of their communities, the study found that one such a project had been started in Yumbe District in 2006. The project titled "Skills for Peace and Income (SKIPI) Project" was funded by United Nations Industrial Development

Organization (UNIDO) in partnership with the Uganda Veterans Assistance Board (UVAB) as a national counterpart and Participatory Rural Action for Development (PRAFORD) as a local implementing partner. Its overall objective was to contribute to social and economic reintegration of veterans, former rebels and their families into civilian life and eradication of poverty particularly in rural communities. This was done through skills training in carpentry and joinery (see Plate 4.10), mechanics (Plate 4.11), business studies (see Plate 4.12 for a hairdressing class), brick and paver laying (Plate 4.13), blacksmith, welding and fabrication. Information from the SKIPI project office in Yumbe district revealed that 1,892 persons (veterans, former rebels and their families) had benefited from the skills training offered by the project.

**Plate 4.10: An ex-combatant practicing carpentry and joinery skills at PRAFORD**



Source: Photograph taken at Yumbe SKIPI project in Nov. 2008 by Fred Mwesigye

*This is a UNIDO project carried out in Yumbe district through PRAFORD, a local NGO to impart skills to local people including ex-combatants. 153 people had been trained in carpentry and joinery. Of the 153 beneficiaries, 34 were UNRF 1 ex-combatants. Products of the carpentry workshop were sold to district offices, schools and households. On completion of the training course, beneficiaries were given free toolkits to enable them get immediate income from carpentry. Respondents revealed that the training course was free of charge and that beneficiaries were identified through local council*

leaders. The continuity of this project by the time of data collection, was uncertain because project managers revealed that UNIDO funding was due to end in March 2009 and there hadn't been any other source of funding identified.

**Plate 4.11: Ex-combatants attending a mechanics class at SKIPI project premises**



Source: Photograph was taken at Yumbe SKIPI project in Nov. 2008 by Fred Mwesigye

*This is another UNIDO project for training mechanics carried out in Yumbe district through PRAFORD. By the time of data collection, 67 people had been trained in mechanics. Of the 67 beneficiaries, 12 were UNRF 1 ex-combatants. Mechanics training was for motorcycles, electricity generators and vehicles. Like carpentry and joinery project, beneficiaries were given free toolkits on completion to enable them get immediate income from mechanics. Respondents revealed that the training course was free of charge and that beneficiaries were identified through local council leaders.*



**Plate 4.12: A hair dressing class attended by ex-combatants at PRAFORD**



Source: Photograph taken at Yumbe SKIPI project by Fred Mwesigye (Nov. 2008)

*This is another UNIDO project carried out in Yumbe district through PRAFORD. The hair dressing project trained both male and female beneficiaries identified through local council leaders. 81 people had been trained in hair dressing by November 2008. Of the 81 beneficiaries, 9 were UNRF 1 ex-combatants. Trained hairdressers were able to work in women and men salons. On completion of the training course, beneficiaries were given free toolkits to enable them get immediate income. Like other UNIDO projects under PRAFORD, the continuity of this project by the time of data collection, was uncertain due to lack of another donor to fund the project.*

**Plate 4.13: Ex-combatants practicing paver-laying skills gained from PRAFORD**



Source: Photograph was taken at Yumbe SKIPI project in Nov. 2008 by Fred Mwesigye

*This is another UNIDO project for brick/paver laying and concrete practice carried out in Yumbe district through PRAFORD. By the time of data collection, 169 people had been trained. Of the 169 beneficiaries, 23 were UNRF 1 ex-combatants. Beneficiaries revealed that they were able to get employment in towns around especially Arua where there were many buildings under construction. Others were employed by schools and individuals who wished to construct permanent buildings.*

The information presented above therefore, indicates that the international community and Government of Uganda in collaboration with local NGOs attempted to start projects that help to contribute to social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants and their families into civilian life and eradication of poverty particularly in rural communities. Despite these initiatives, however, information from focus group discussions held in the area revealed UNRF 1 ex-combatants still faced various problems in adapting to civilian livelihoods. These problems included poverty, loss of ownership of land, lack of shelter, lack of education for ex-combatants and their children, famine and high costs of living, insecurity due to intimidation by government officials, unemployment, segregation by members of the

community and poor leadership among ex-combatants among others. Therefore, it is fair to note that the reintegration of the UNRF 1 ex-combatants was not based on the reintegration framework and programmes adopted from the DDR processes.

Although DDR processes were designed to achieve sustainable reintegration, they cannot do this without being linked with the broader processes of national reconstruction and development. Reintegration can restore social cohesion, strengthen community capacities, and establish the basis for local reconciliation and peace building so that people can look forward rather than being engrossed in the pain of the past. In order to establish the contribution of reintegration of UNRF 1 ex-combatants to peace building in the West Nile region, the major variables of peace building (social cohesion, capacity enhancement and reconciliation) were examined. The findings are presented in Table 4.17.

**Table 4.17: Responses on Social cohesion, Capacity enhancement and Reconciliation as a result of the Reintegration process of UNRF1 force in West Nile**

<b>Social Cohesion</b>	<b>Response</b>		
	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Undecided</b>
a) Reintegration opportunities for ex-combatants were equitable and sustainable	25 (26.3%)	68 (71.6%)	2 (2.1%)
b) Ex-combatants were safe in host communities	56 (58.9%)	39 (41.1%)	0
c) The perception of ex-combatants by host community was positive.	85 (89.5%)	10 (10.5%)	0
d) Reporting ex-combatants were received with welcome.	89 (96.7%)	3 (3.3%)	0
e) Many ex-combatants saw themselves as social rejects.	31 (33.0%)	60 (63.8%)	3 (3.2%)
<b>Capacity Enhancement</b>			
f) Insecurity and lawlessness have reduced in the last 20 years	88 (94.6%)	5 (5.4%)	0
g) Social services to ex-combatants are available	15 (15.6%)	79 (82.3%)	2 (2.1%)
h) Assistance strategies are beneficial to ex-combatants and host communities	23 (24.2%)	65 (68.4%)	7 (7.4%)
i) Transparency in reintegration efforts prevailed.	27 (28.1%)	64 (66.7%)	5 (5.2%)
j) The specific needs of women and child	13	81	2 (2.1%)

combatants were addressed.	(13.5%)	(84.4%)	
k) Reintegration courses were conducted.	11 (11.6%)	81 (85.3%)	3 (3.2%)
l) The course content was designed to the interest of the ex-combatants.	17 (17.7%)	69 (71.9%)	10 (10.4%)
m) Ex-combatants got some employment.	6 (6.3%)	86 (89.6%)	4 (4.2%)
n) The implementers of the programs knew the local language.	57 (59.4%)	21 (21.9%)	18 (18.8%)
o) Reintegration was designed to reduce armed violence.	71 (75.5%)	16 (17.0%)	7 (7.4%)
<b>Reconciliation</b>			
p) Reintegration assisted in restoring the rule of law, improving human security and achieving reconciliation	89 (92.7%)	6 (6.3%)	1 (1.0%)
q) There was broad representation of stakeholders to peace negotiations.	62 (64.4%)	23 (24.0%)	11 (11.5%)
r) Ex-combatants' wishes were taken care of.	13 (13.5%)	75 (78.1%)	8 (8.3%)
s) Impartiality by programme implementers was guaranteed.	9 (9.5%)	66 (69.5%)	20 (21.1%)
t) The identification procedure for beneficiaries of reintegration was clear.	36 (38.3%)	41 (43.6%)	17 (18.1%)
u) The entitlements to beneficiaries were made known to the public.	53 (56.4%)	24 (25.5%)	17 (18.1%)

Source: Field data

According to Table 4.17, respondents revealed that social cohesion was exhibited by the high degree of happiness portrayed by ex-combatant families on receiving ex-combatants (indicated by 96.7% of the respondents), the positive perception of the host community to ex-combatants (89.5%) and the fact that ex-combatants were safe in host communities (58.9%). The study revealed that ex-combatants were generally received with ambivalence by their families. It was easier for ex-combatants whose extended family was receptive, showed sympathy, provided basic services like food, shelter and took care of the sick. However, in some cases, many ex-combatants had lost their entire family, had their houses burned down, and their economic base destroyed during the civil war and, thus, had no place to return to. Members of the focus group discussions revealed that in some areas, ex-combatants were referred to as:

“our children, good or bad, they are welcome to stay, this is their home”. *On the other hand, they were described as “thieves”, “beggars”, “Museveni’s brothers” (meaning that they were not yet*

*belonging to the community but to the regime) “murderers and carriers of diseases”*

Despite this, respondents disagreed with the existence of social cohesion in the community because reintegration opportunities for ex-combatants were equitable and sustainable (71.6%) and that many ex-combatants saw themselves as social rejects (63.8%). This implies that there was high social cohesion among ex-combatants and community members in the region; hence peace building was in progress.

On capacity enhancement as an indicator of peace in West Nile, respondents disagreed with most of the variables; implying that capacity enhancement wasn't done as a result of reintegration or UNRF 1 ex-combatants. For example 82.3% of the respondents indicated that social services to ex-combatants were not availed, reintegration courses were not conducted (85.3%), ex-combatants did not get some employment (89.6%) and that the specific needs of women and child combatants were not addressed (84.4%). Despite this however, 94.6% of the respondents revealed that insecurity and lawlessness had reduced in the last 20 years and that reintegration was designed to reduce armed violence (75.5%). This implies that there was limited capacity enhancement as a result of reintegration of ex-combatants hence limited peace building in the region.

Regarding reconciliation, 92.7% of the respondents agreed that reintegration assisted in restoring the rule of law, improving human security and achieving reconciliation while 64.4% of the respondents agreed that there was broad representation of stakeholders to peace negotiations. A further 56.4% of the respondents agreed that by making the entitlements to ex-combatants known to the public, facilitated reconciliation. Despite this, 78.1% of the respondents indicated that ex-combatants' wishes were not taken care of and that there was no impartiality by programme implementers (69.5%). In addition, 43.6% of the respondents revealed that the identification procedure for beneficiaries of reintegration was unclear. These mixed responses imply that reconciliation hadn't taken a strong root to ensure peace in the region. If DDR had been observed, it could have created an environment that encouraged national dialogue and reconciliation and supported local capacities to manage the interactions

and relations between receiving communities and ex-combatants.

In the final analysis, an attempt was made to investigate the extent to which International Reintegration Standards provided by the UN were followed in Uganda. The findings from key informant interviews are presented in Table 4.18.

**Table 4.18: The extent to which International Reintegration Standards were observed**

<b>International Reintegration Standards</b>	<b>Field findings</b>
1. A credible and authoritative national institution to plan, implement, and oversee the program at the national level	The NRA Reorganization Unit was responsible for receiving, categorization, retraining and deployment
2. Peacekeeping forces and military personnel to implement disarmament	There was no peace keeping force but the NRA Reorganization Unit implemented disarmament
3. Civilian organizations and institutions to provide food, education, and health care to demobilized ex-combatants	There were no organizations but civilian volunteers who provided food. In addition, the UN assisted government departments to provide education and health
4. Sensitization and directly involving local communities in the social and economic integration of demobilized ex-combatants	There was a lot of sensitization. The emphasis was restorative, not punitive; reparation, not retribution; forgiveness not punishment and; dialogue and reconciliation not revenge. The departments responsible for this were the Reorganization Unit and Political Commissariat of the NRM/A
5. Accountability and transparency to ensure legitimacy of the reintegration exercise	The High Command checked on the accountability using political commissars, intelligence officers and public barazas or “ <i>mikutano ya hathala</i> ” which encouraged freedom of expression, free criticism or guidance.
6. Inclusivity: ex-combatants should not be discriminated on the basis of sex, age, race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political opinion.	In order to build confidence of the ex-combatants and the local communities, the exercise was non-discriminatory and transparent

Source: *International Reintegration Standards were derived from United Nations (2006) while field findings contained information from key informant interviews (Nov. 2008)*

In conclusion, therefore, it is fair to note that reintegration of the UNRF 1 ex-combatants was

not based on the reintegration framework and programmes adopted from the DDR processes. Although capacity enhancement and reconciliation had not taken a strong root in the region, there was high social cohesion among ex-combatants and community members in the region which contributed to peace building in the West Nile region. Further, there were great hopes for the PRDP (2007 -2010) because of the emphasis it had put on peace building and reconciliation in northern Uganda<sup>32</sup>.

---

<sup>32</sup> Peace building and Reconciliation is the 4<sup>th</sup> strategic objective for the PRDP.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### 5.0 DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the discussion, conclusion and recommendations, which are based on the findings of the study. The discussion presents implications and relationship of the findings with other studies while conclusions involve salient issues found out in the study. The recommendations are proposed purposely for improving reintegration of ex-combatants as well as peace building in the West Nile region.

#### 5.2 Discussion of findings

The following section discusses the findings of the study according to objectives, namely:

1. The Understanding that existed between UNRF I and NRM, in the war against the Government between 1981 and 1986
2. Causes and Consequences of failure to deliver on Commitments in the Peace Agreement by both Parties
3. Factors that led to the emergence of new rebel movements in West Nile
4. The extent to which Reintegration of UNRF 1 ex-combatants was based on DDR processes and its contribution to peace building in West Nile

##### 5.2.1 The Understanding between UNRF I and NRM (1981 and 1986)

The first research question stated: “*What was the understanding that existed between UNRF I and National Resistance Movement in the war against the governments between 1981 and 1986?*”. In a bid to get answers to this research question, there are a number of questions that were explored to find out the contents of the understanding between the two parties. From the results obtained, it was concluded that both parties committed themselves to fulfill certain things which were necessary for peace building in the West Nile region. Although there was no signed agreement between the parties; at the time of this study, both parties had fulfilled a significant portion of the commitments although they hadn’t delivered on all of them. The findings partly corroborate CSOPNU (2008) observations that, the UNRF1 was unable to



negotiate a resettlement package, whereas the Uganda National Rescue Front II negotiated an agreement which provided a 4.2 billion U shillings package to be distributed amongst the ex-combatants.

The results of the study further revealed that the origin of the relationship between UNRF1 and NRA was prompted by the contested electoral results of 1980 that were angrily opposed by many Ugandans. This situation led to the emergence of several fighting groups against the government of Milton Obote. This implies that leaders of anti-Obote fighting groups realized the need to cooperate and develop an understanding in order to quickly and easily defeat their common enemy. The need for unity was also encouraged by some foreign leaders as further revealed by the former Chairman of UNRF1 that:

“...we were greatly encouraged by the Libyan leader-Col. Gaddafi in this endeavor. He willingly sponsored all the groups, brought us together and stressed to us the need for unity, as we were fighting a common enemy and had similar goals”.

Therefore, the origin of the understanding between UNRF 1 ex-combatants and National Resistance Army dates back in 1981 when top leaders and Commanders of fighting forces that were opposed to the government of Obote met under the sponsorship and Chairmanship of the Libyan Leader; Col. Gaddafi (Moses Ali, forthcoming). According to Museveni (1997), these talks culminated into the Tripoli Agreement of 1981 where the “Uganda Popular Front” was formed as an umbrella organization that united the three anti-Obote fighting groups. Although this attempt did not yield results in the desired direction, the unity of purpose was necessary for the success of their common goal.

According to the Refugee Law Project (2004), when Tito Okello toppled the Milton Obote government on 27 July, 1985, UNRF1 joined Tito Okello government. Museveni (1997) indicates that by joining Tito Okello government, UNRF 1 became part of the armed coalition which fought to prevent the NRA from capturing state power in late 1985 and early 1986. Although the Nairobi Peace Accord of 17<sup>th</sup> December 1985 offered a power sharing deal between Tito Okello and Yoweri Museveni factions, fighting for power between the two groups did not stop. The final agreement signed in Nairobi, called for a ceasefire, de-

millitarization of Kampala, integration of the NRA and government forces, and absorption of the NRA leadership into the Military Council. These conditions were never met. Makumi (1994) noted that the prospects of a lasting agreement were further limited by several factors, including the Kenyan team's lack of an in-depth knowledge of the situation in Uganda and the exclusion of relevant Ugandan and international actors from the talks. Gertzel (1990) further indicated that Museveni and his allies refused to share power with Generals they did not respect, not least while the NRA had the capacity to achieve an outright military victory.

When the NRA took over power in 1986, the government prioritized security as a prerequisite for the success of the reconstitution process (Museveni, 1997), with the integration of various fighting groups into a new national army, based on the NRA. Among those reintegrated were the Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF1) combatants. This was confirmed by MFPED (2004) that the UNRF High Command then operating from West Nile, negotiated and willingly accepted to join NRM/A leading to the 1986 peace talks that sealed their relationship. This is further corroborated by the Amnesty Commission Report (2000 – 2003:15) findings that: “..in 1986, following the accession to power of the NRM, the UNRF 1, under Brigadier Moses Ali reached an agreement with the NRM under which a number of officers of UNRF 1 were absorbed in NRM”.

Although, the contents of the peace talks as well as the commitments by both sides were scanty, this study relied on information given by eye witnesses, respondents as well as few documents still available. Consequently, the majority of the respondents indicated that UNRF1 ex-combatants were promised Uganda shs. 8 billion as a resettlement package and Ministerial posts in the NRM government. The issue of Ministerial posts in the NRM government was confirmed by one press release by State House Entebbe of 27 July, 1986 which stated:

“...in a bid to strengthen national unity and following discussions between the NRM government and a delegation of UNRF, the NRM has offered to absorb some UNRF combatants into the government. In this regard, the President will appoint one Cabinet Minister and Deputy Ministers from UNRF”.

This indicated that the NRM government had committed itself to share political leadership of Uganda with its former allies during the struggle against the Obote government.

Other commitments revealed by the study included reintegration of UNRF combatants to civilian life; reintegrating selected UNRF fighters into the NRA; providing education scholarships for selected ex-combatants and their children and providing security to ex-combatants. The commitment to integrate selected UNRF fighters into the NRA was further confirmed by another press release by State House Entebbe implying that the NRM government was committed to tapping the skills of UNRF fighters which would help to facilitate reconciliation and peace building in the community. Further in support of reintegrating UNRF fighters into the NRA, Gersony (1997) noted that Museveni proffered an integrated disciplined force to meet the challenges cited as; dealing with the urgent security epitomized by the rebellion and lawlessness in the north, deal with the perennial problem of Karamojong cattle rustling in north eastern Uganda and secure the entire countryside to enable planning and implementation of the development programmes.

More commitments made by the NRM government to the UNRF were selecting some ex-combatants to the National Resistance Council (NRC), ceasefire and disarmament of UNRF fighters, provision of ambassadorial and civil service jobs to ex-combatants and release of imprisoned ex-combatants. Therefore, the understanding that existed between UNRF and the NRM in the war against the governments between 1981 and 1986 contained many commitments.

Although many of the commitments were made by the NRM government, the UNRF1 leadership also committed itself to fulfill certain things. In an interview with several UNRF ex-combatants, it was revealed that the UNRF1 leadership committed itself to organizing all UNRF 1 ex-combatants into an umbrella association, compiling a comprehensive list of names of UNRF ex-combatants who survived the struggle, died, were injured or contributed materials to the struggle. In addition, the UNRF1 leadership was to ensure that all its soldiers

assembled in Arua for disarmament and demobilization, and above all, abandon fighting. This implies that both parties committed themselves to fulfillment of certain things which were necessary for peace building in West Nile region.

Regarding the fulfillment of the above commitments by both parties, the results of study indicated that the UNRF 1 leadership had fulfilled many of its commitments but the NRM government had failed to fulfill many of its commitments. To prove that the UNRF1 leadership had attempted to fulfill its commitments, the Chairman of UNRF1 displayed a list of 5,994 UNRF1 ex-combatants who included those that had survived the struggle, died or injured in the struggle compiled as part of their commitments. On the other hand, respondents identified commitments that had not been fulfilled by the NRM as failure to reintegrate UNRF 1 ex-combatants into UPDF or to civil life. This was one of the major failures of the NRM government in its commitments with the UNRF1 fighters. Failure to reintegrate ex-combatants may have undermined the achievements of the disarmament and demobilization phase, placing the DDR programme at a risk and causing increased instability in the area.

On security and protection of ex-combatants, the Chairperson Amnesty Commission in Arua revealed that since the Amnesty Act had not been enacted in 1986 when the UNRF forces were demobilized, the Presidential pardon offered them protection in their communities. However, the study noted that with the establishment of the Amnesty Commission Office in Arua, many of the UNRF 1 ex-combatants had been issued with Amnesty Certificates. This was further supported by the Amnesty Commission Report (2000 – 2003) that while the objectives for the Amnesty Commission are broad and include many of the elements in DDR, the main focus thus far has been on the granting of Amnesty certificates and the provision of reinsertion packages to ex-combatants. With all this done, therefore, it is fair to say that the NRM government has fulfilled a significant portion of the commitments although it failed to deliver on all of them.

### **5.2.2 Failure to deliver on Commitments in the Peace Agreement between UNRF 1 and NRM**

In this section, the study sought to answer research question: “*What were the consequences of the failure to deliver on commitments in the peace agreement by both parties?*”. Having noted in the previous section that both the NRM government and UNRF1 leadership failed to deliver on all commitments in the peace agreement concluded in 1986 at State House in Entebbe, it is fair to discuss the causes of this failure as found out by this study. The majority of the UNRF 1 ex-combatants attributed the failure of the NRM government to deliver on commitments in the peace agreement to the deceitful nature of NRM leaders, failure to sign a comprehensive peace agreement, governments’ poor planning policy, lack of political follow-up by local leaders and the high level of bureaucracy involved in pursuing the peace agreement commitments. Contrary to these findings, however, information gathered from the NRM side revealed that the UNRF 1 leaders were not honest to what was agreed in the peace agreement and later became impatient.

In addition, research findings revealed that the issue of the NRM government’s failure to pay Ug. Shs 8 billion resettlement package to the UNRF 1 forces was due to continuous budget deficits in the country. Indeed, the leader of UNRF 1 ex-combatants also expressed adequate knowledge of this but hastened to add that the finances had improved since the war against the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Northern Uganda had subsided. Other factors revealed by respondents as being responsible for the failure of the NRM government to deliver on commitments in the peace agreement were continuous fighting by former UNRF1 forces in other rebel groups against the government, marginalization of ex-combatants and the corrupt nature of government officers. This implies that the causes of the failure to deliver on commitments by the NRM were attributed to its internal weaknesses but also the realization that UNRF1 ex-combatants had not fulfilled the commitments on their side.

Regarding the causes of the failure of UNRF 1 to deliver on its commitments, the study established that there was poor leadership and lack of transparency among their leaders the feeling among UNRF 1 fighters and greed and selfishness of ex-combatant’s leaders. Other

causes revealed by respondents included communication breakdown among ex-combatants, continuous registration of ghost UNRF ex-combatants and failure to reach a comprehensive peace agreement with the NRM. This implies that UNRF 1 leadership did not do its best to fulfill its commitments with the NRM government. Consequently, this contributed to disgruntlement among the UNRF 1 ex-combatants thus leading to taking up of arms to fight the NRM government again.

Various consequences of the failure to deliver on the commitments by both parties were found out during the study. These included persistent poverty among UNRF 1 ex-combatants and increased support for rebel activities in the area. Indeed, this was echoed in another focus group discussion where one participant noted that:

“...failure of the NRM government to fulfill its commitments especially giving jobs able-bodied and young ex-combatants as well as facilitating their reintegration into the community sparked off rebel groups especially the one led by General Bamuze and the West Nile Bank Front”.

Other negative consequences included unemployment of majority of the ex-combatants, high illiteracy rates, food shortage, poor relationship with the community, lack of agricultural equipment as well as lack of land for farming among others. This implies that the welfare of ex-combatants was greatly affected by the failure of the NRM government to fulfill its commitments. The findings partly agree with Batchelor and Kingma (2004) who noted that ex-combatants integrating into the community often lack the necessary skills and education to secure jobs. Thus, they have no source of income, no accommodations, and no guarantee of securing basic necessities such as food and water. Ex-combatants face the after effects of the physical and psychological trauma sustained during the war and require psychosocial counseling.

The actual process of reinsertion of ex-combatants into their communities of origin, or their insertion into new ones, was fraught with problems. Obviously, their personalities and experiences influenced differently the capability of ex-combatants to integrate into communities they earlier belonged. They had undergone decisive significant changes in life and values. To some ex-combatants, success in military life was not their achievement in

civilian life. Aggression, subservience, and mobility are important elements of a soldier's behavior but are contrary to traditional peaceful life as a civilian. Moreover, over the years, most ex-combatants had acquired a notion that '*Serikari Enapanga*' literally meaning 'the Government is planning'. The import here was that the State would provide for their social security or would take care of them, since the soldiers were used to free services such as clothes, education for children, food and medical care.

The negative consequences to the NRM government lack of political support for NRM government in the area. The results revealed that the NRM candidates got very little support during the previous Presidential and Parliamentary elections because majority of the voters in the area were unhappy with the governments' persistence failure to fulfill its promises. These findings agree some other respondents who indicated that they had lost trust in the NRM government because of its failure to deliver on its commitments with the UNRF 1 ex-combatants. Other negative consequences of the NRM failure to meet its commitments were insecurity leading to poor political atmosphere and lack of knowledge about government policies by ex-combatants. Although, the issue of insecurity was generally disputed by most of the key informants during the study, one official from the RDC's office in Yumbe district reported isolated incidences of insecurity attributed to ex-combatants in the district. This implies that security groups in the area should strengthen their patrols to curb the few cases of insecurity and establish a peace environment for development. Even, in such circumstances, it is fair to say that, the area is peaceful bearing in mind that a significant number of people have previously been engaged in use of the gun.

On the positive side, the study found that few UNRF 1 ex-combatants had started income generating projects as they waited for the NRM government to deliver more on its promises. Some of the income generating activities were started with assistance from the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF) while others were started from the ex-combatants savings. Records from the NUSAF Coordinating Office in Arua district revealed that ex-combatants in Arua District received a special fund to start income generating projects in 2008. Ex-combatants in other districts in West Nile region did not benefit from this NUSAF

assistance because it was reported that this was a special arrangement made by the Amnesty Commission (AC) Office to help ex-combatants in Arua district. Indeed, the difficulty of securing this assistance was noted by CSOPNU (2008) that Amnesty Commission has previously experienced difficulties accessing the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF) funding for ex-combatants. Funding for 110 projects in West Nile area were granted in early 2008, including piggery, goat rearing, cattle restocking, metal fabrication and more. However, the study noted lack of monitoring and supervision of NUSAF funded ex-combatant sub-projects in Arua district as a major limitation.

In the final analysis therefore, it is fair to conclude that the failure of the NRM government to deliver on commitments in the peace agreement was largely attributed to dishonesty and impatience of UNRF 1 leaders and shortage of funds due to other national priorities.

### **5.2.3 The Emergence of new Rebel Movements in West Nile**

Under this objective, research question answered by the study were “*What led to the emergence of new rebel movements in West Nile?*” Indeed, NUPI (2006) noted that following the overthrow of Okello-Lutwa by the NRA in January 1986, a number of rebel movements broke out virtually throughout the country. In agreement with the above observations, the study identified the rebel movements that emerged after 26 January 1986 as Uganda Peoples Democratic Army, Holy Spirit Movement headed by Alice Lakwena, Uganda National Rescue front II under General Bamuze, West Nile Bank Front led by Juma Oris, Peoples Redemption Army and Lords Resistance Army under Joseph Kony.

NUPI (2006:3) also documented these rebel groups as having broken out after the National Resistance Army/Movement (NRA/NRM) took power in 1986. They include:

“the Holy Spirit Mobile Forces (HSMF) of Alice Lakwena, Uganda People’s Army (UPA) led by Peter Otai, Force Obote Back (FOBA) led by Obote, David Anyoti and others, Ninth October Movement (NOM), National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU) led by Amon Bazira, Uganda National Rescue Front II (UNRF II) led by Ali Bamuze, West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) led by Juma Oris, Federal Democratic Army (FDA), Uganda Salvation Front (USF) led by Sera Muwanga, Uganda Restoration Front (URF) of Lukwira, Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) led by Jamil Mukulu, Lord’s Resistance



Army (LRA) of Joseph Kony, and the most recent, the People's Redemption Army (PRA)"

These groups have been the cause of violent conflicts, insecurity and war that has hampered the development of West Nile and Uganda in general. Although most of these groups have been defeated by the government forces, other conflict resolution methods like peace talks with rebel groups, community mobilization, political education, disarmament and amnesty have been employed. Indeed, the exercise has been very costly in terms of material and human costs (MFPED, 2004). The economic costs of conflicts in Uganda take on several dimensions, including loss of property, opportunities, production capacity, as well as military, humanitarian expenditures and resources allocated to rehabilitation and reintegration.

The results further indicate that the factors that led to emergence of new rebel movements in West Nile after UNRF 1 included poverty of the masses, differences in political ideologies and imprisonment of some ex-combatants by government. In agreement with these factors, Muzaale (1997) noted that poverty has increased susceptibility to manipulation and recruitment into rebel or criminal activities in Uganda. For example, most members of the Allied Democratic Forces rebel group based in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and western Uganda were poor unemployed men who were promised economic benefits (NUPI, 2006).

Continued government intimidation of former rebels was yet another cause of emergence of new rebel movements in the West Nile region. The issue of intimidation of former rebels by the government was emphasized by one former UNRF1 combatant who joined the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) that:

“...we have been hearing words of intimidation from government officials that because WNBF did not come into a formal agreement with the NRM, they were not going to be compensated and were going to be imprisoned if they continued to demand for resettlement packages”.

Similar observations were made by Museveni (1997:215) while explaining the low popularity he had in the West Nile region in 1996 Presidential elections. He said

“when I asked my campaign managers about the few votes in West Nile, they told me that there had been intimidation. That could have been the case but I also suspected that, owing to the history of this part of the country, there may have been genuine anti-NRM feeling in some of those areas of West Nile”

Such statements may have derailed the peace building process and further encouraged people to form or join other rebel groups.

Unemployment of ex-combatants was another cause of emergence of rebel groups in West Nile. Respondents revealed that due to lack of reintegration of ex-combatants, many of them failed to secure gainful employment. Absence of skills and a negative attitude towards work were also reported as some of the contributing factors to unemployment. Research in Eritrea also revealed that the vast majority of former fighters had problems in securing a livelihood as well as housing (Klingebiel et al, 1995). Consequently, emerging rebel groups would find it easy to recruit the various unemployed able bodied ex-combatants in the area. As a matter of fact, some respondents revealed that they were motivated to join UNRF II because they were unemployed and had waited for fulfillment of government commitments for a long time and had lost hope in finding themselves an appropriate way of survival.

The finding above corroborates the United Nations (2006) that unsupported former combatants can be a major threat to the community’s capacity to recover because of their lack of skills or assets, their tendency to rely on violence to get what they want, and their ignorance of or disrespect for local cultures, leaders and social habits. To reduce their capacity for destabilization, ex-combatants specifically designed, sustainable support to help them with their transition from military to civilian life.

Indeed, the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (2004: 21) also agreed with most of the findings that:

“..conflict has been fuelled by a combination of factors including resistance to the NRM government, support from external forces, the proliferation of guns in the region, poverty, imbalances to access in economic opportunities and in Karamoja and the need to accumulate wealth”.

This implies that the reasons for emergence of conflict in the West Nile region are complex and cannot be attributed to a single cause or blamed on the failure of any particular dialogue process.

#### **5.2.4 The Process of Reintegration of UNRF 1 ex-combatants and its contribution to Peace building in West Nile**

The final research question answered by the study was *“To what extent did the reintegration of UNRF1 contribute to peace building in the West Nile region?”* In the first case, the study investigated if the UNRF1 ex-combatants had been Disarmed, Demobilized and Reintegrated (DDR) by the NRM government. It was established that UNRF1 ex-combatants assembled in Arua grounds in May 1986 and surrendered their ammunitions to the NRM government. This was in fulfillment of the first process of the DDR-Disarmament.

According to the Reintegration Commander in the NRM government, ex-combatants who qualified to join the national army were absorbed into the NRA, others joined the civil service while the rest were resettled in their homes. A presidential pardon was extended all ex-combatants for whatever crimes they had committed because the Amnesty Act of 2000 had not been formulated and passed into Act of Parliament. As opposed to UN demobilization standards, however, the ex-combatants who were resettled into the community did not receive sufficient assistance to meet basic needs and take some time at designated encampment locations for psychosocial support.

As noted by the United Nations (2006), violent conflicts do not always completely stop when a political settlement is reached or a peace agreement is signed. Without reintegration of the ex-combatants, there remains a real danger that violence will flare up again during the immediate post-conflict period. Force management is vital because it precedes economic activities. The armed forces management entails both quantitative and qualitative measures aimed at drawing an optimum strength and capability to combat forces, to match or supersede threat levels, potential or real, in a military campaign. Therefore it is only those that are

capable to handle combat and combat support requirements that are retained. The others are demobilized and reintegrated into the community for civilian livelihood. The common process in such settlement is the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of the former fighters. The settlement of such ex-combatants is paramount to resolve and terminate the conflict and thereby discourage re-insurrection of the conflict. The United Nations (UN) also recognizes the reintegration of former combatants as critical parts of post-conflict peace building, and has made it part of its agenda. The UN Agenda for Development, as presented by the Secretary-General in May 1994, stated:

“...the reintegration of combatants is difficult, but it is critically important to stability in the post-conflict period” and “effective reintegration of ex-combatants is also essential to the sustainability of peace”.

In order to assess the extent to which the reintegration of UNRF 1 ex-combatants was based on DDR processes, this study investigated the frameworks and programs of reintegration of ex-combatants as proposed by the United Nations Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (2006). Regarding the reintegration framework, it was found that the objective of integration of ex-combatants was well known to ex-combatants, that the NRM government communicated policy regarding reintegration to them and that; the economic environment in which ex-combatants were reintegrated created confidence to them. These findings implied that, to a big extent, the reintegration of the UNRF 1 ex-combatants did not fulfill the reintegration framework adopted from the DDR processes. This was further confirmed by reintegration frameworks that were not provided for by the NRM government. For example, the identification procedure for the beneficiaries of reintegration was not clear, that reintegration did not support the process of turning combatants into productive citizens, stakeholder involvement was inadequate and that; the speed of handling reintegration exercise was not fast. These findings contradict the United Nations DDR standards as noted by Kingma (2001) that a strong relationship and the good will of the community is a vital “entry point” for any post-conflict reintegration activity, whichever group it is aimed primarily to assist.

Regarding the reintegration programmes of UNRF 1 ex-combatants, findings revealed that the NRM government did not create employment opportunities for ex-combatants in the community. This implies that since ex-combatants did not gain sustainable employment and income, full reintegration into the community hadn't taken place. Besides, CSOPNU (2008) indicated that where the NRM government has made agreements with rebels, there has been very little coordination with local communities. In addition, ex-combatants who couldn't read and write were not offered pre-vocational skills; further implying that the DDR approach which advocates for skills training of ex-combatants was never followed by the NRM government. Besides, the respondents indicated that the hopes and expectations of the ex-combatants were not taken care of and that micro-credit and local NGOs were not established to help ex-combatants to become productive members of their communities.

In addition to the above, information from focus group discussions held in the area revealed UNRF 1 ex-combatants still faced various problems in adapting to civilian livelihoods. These problems included poverty, loss of ownership of land, lack of shelter, lack of education for both ex-combatants and their children, famine and high costs of living, insecurity due to intimidation by government officials, unemployment, segregation by members of the community and poor leadership among ex-combatants among others. Therefore, it is fair to note that the reintegration of the UNRF 1 ex-combatants was not based on the reintegration framework and programmes adopted from the DDR processes.

As far as the extent to which reintegration of UNRF 1 ex-combatants had contributed to peace building, peace variables like social cohesion, capacity enhancement and reconciliation were examined. It was revealed that social cohesion was exhibited by the high degree of happiness portrayed by ex-combatant families on receiving ex-combatants, the positive perception of the host community to ex-combatants and the fact that ex-combatants were safe in host communities.

Despite this, respondents disagreed with the existence of social cohesion in the community that reintegration opportunities for ex-combatants were equitable and sustainable and that

many ex-combatants saw themselves as social rejects. This situation is similar to CSOPNU (2008) findings from interviews with government officials from the West Nile area that, many communities still felt a lot of resentment and frustration due to resettlement packages being awarded to ex-combatants only. Supported by the Refugee Law Project (2004), it was noted that it is a mix of feeling left out, as non-combatants needs for reintegration and resettlement are often very similar to ex-combatants, and feeling that the perpetrators of atrocities are being rewarded.

Schroeder (2005) also highlighted the negative reception given by community members to the ex-combatants. He revealed that communities often see ex-combatants as social and economic burdens because they lack skills and education, and therefore require assistance in the provision of food, clothing, and housing. Community members may also protect their own jobs and be reluctant to encourage employment of ex-combatants over “good” community members. Hard feelings also arise when ex-combatants are seen to be given economic assistance through resettlement and reintegration programs, when the community receives nothing. The community sees this as rewarding the perpetrators and punishing the victims.

On capacity enhancement as an indicator of peace in West Nile, respondents disagreed with most of the variables; implying that capacity enhancement wasn't done as a result of reintegration or UNRF 1 ex-combatants. For example, respondents indicated that social services to ex-combatants were not availed, reintegration courses were not conducted, ex-combatants did not get employment and that the specific needs of women and child combatants were not addressed. Despite this however, it was revealed that insecurity and lawlessness had reduced in the last 20 years and that reintegration was designed to reduce armed violence. This implies that there was limited capacity enhancement as a result of reintegration of ex-combatants hence limited peace building in the region.

Regarding reconciliation, it was found that reintegration assisted in restoring the rule of law, improving human security and achieving reconciliation and that there was broad representation of stakeholders to peace negotiations. In addition, it was established that by

making the entitlements to ex-combatants known to the public, it facilitated reconciliation. Despite this, however, results revealed that ex-combatants' wishes were not taken care of and that there was no impartiality by programme implementers. These mixed responses imply that reconciliation hadn't taken a strong root to ensure peace in the region.

Peace building after conflict is, therefore, a challenging task, because requisite pillars, such as security for stability, law, order, governance and administration systems and resources may not be in place. In such post conflict situations, the war may not be over, as was the case in Uganda after 1986 where many rebel movements were emerging. Common characteristics in this case include broken down civil society, disorder, extremism, lack of essential products and black markets, and inadequate or lack of social services, poverty, refugees and internally displaced persons and weak borders. There are also groups, in such anarchy, who work to retain the confusion and disorder of conflict in order to continue profiting from them. This sometimes led to militarization of politics by Heads of State to get rid of the perceived bad elements. This is revealed by Meredith (2006) that introduction of military into politics in Uganda was initiated by Milton Obote as early as 1966 "when he sent government troops, headed by Idi Amin, into Kabaka's palace, killing a large number of people and forcing the Kabaka into Exile in London where he died mysteriously".

In conclusion, therefore, it is fair to note that reintegration of the UNRF 1 ex-combatants was not based on the reintegration framework and programmes adopted from the DDR processes and consequently, contributed little to peace building in the West Nile region.

### **5.3 Conclusions**

Drawing from the findings and discussion, the following conclusions were arrived at;

- 1) The understanding between UNRF1 and NRM was prompted by the need to strengthen their offensive since both of them were fighting a common enemy and had similar goals. Among the commitments made by the NRM government to UNRF1 combatants in 1986, were Ug. Shs 8 billion resettlement package, public service jobs, release of jailed ex-combatants and education scholarships for selected ex-combatants and their children. On the side of UNRF1 leadership, all ex-combatants were to form

an umbrella association, compile a comprehensive list of names of UNRF ex-combatants, ensure that all its soldiers assembled in Arua for disarmament and demobilization, and above all, abandon fighting. A significant portion of these commitments were fulfilled although others are still undelivered.

- 2) The failure of the NRM government to deliver on commitments in the peace agreement was largely attributed to dishonesty and impatience of UNRF 1 leaders, mutual suspicion and shortage of funds due to other national priorities. Consequently, this resulted into persistent poverty by ex-combatants, increased support for rebel activities in the area, unemployment, high illiteracy and food shortage on the UNRF 1 ex-combatants side. On the NRM government side, it led to progressive loss of political support during elections due to low trust in the NRM. On the positive side, however, few UNRF 1 ex-combatants had started income generating projects from their personal savings and NUSAF assistance as they waited for the NRM government to deliver on its promises. Lack of monitoring and supervision of NUSAF funded ex-combatant sub-projects, however, was found to be a major limitation to this initiative.
- 3) Various rebel movements emerged immediately after the overthrow of Okello-Lutwa by the NRA in January 1986. Poverty, differences in political ideologies, lack of deployment and imprisonment of some ex-combatants by government were the major factors that led to emergence of new rebel movements in West Nile. Continued government intimidation of former rebels, unemployment of ex-combatants absence of social services like good roads, power, poor relationship between ex-combatants and the community, food scarcity, and marginalization of the region in terms of development were also revealed by respondents as having contributed to emergence of new rebel movements in the West Nile region.
- 4) Reintegration of the UNRF 1 ex-combatants was not based on the reintegration framework and programmes adopted from the DDR processes and consequently, contributed little to peace building in the West Nile region. However, there were great



hopes for the PRDP (2007 -2010) because of the emphasis it had put on peace building and reconciliation in northern Uganda.

#### **5.4 Recommendations**

Basing on the research findings, the study recommended the following for improving reintegration of ex-combatants as well as peace building in the West Nile region:

1. In order to build mutual trust among UNRF1 ex-combatants, there is need for the NRM to quickly fulfill the agreed commitments. This will facilitate economic reintegration of ex-combatants, create confidence between UNRF and Uganda government and further help the UNRF 1 ex-combatants to acquire sustainable employment and income thus minimizing the suffering being faced. The reintegration process should be owned by all stakeholders if it is to address their needs and foster community reconciliation. On the side of the NRM government, it will boost its political support in the West Nile region thus helping to create peace between UNRF 1 ex-combatants and Uganda government.
2. In order to minimize the number of unemployed ex-combatants, it is important to follow them up to ensure that they get access to training, education and also to make sure that those who need access to further psychosocial counseling receive it. Besides, government should initiate public-private ventures in the area to provide jobs to ex-combatants. This will enable them to gain employment and consequently income. All ex-combatants need to be followed up to ensure that they are reintegrating well. If they are having problems they need to be connected to services which are able to help them. It is best if such services can be found within the community, for example help from a community leader in case there are family problems or stigmatization issues. It is therefore, necessary to promote activities that rebuild the wider community and fosters community reconciliation.
3. There should be adequate funds for the DDR programmes, sufficient to complete their implementation, and to provide for contingencies in a flexible way. Failure to logically complete a DDR programme significantly jeopardised the DDR process. There is still outstanding money accrued to the credit of UNRF 1 ex-combatants and others that

followed, some of whom have either died or have taken up arms against the government. This setback is likely to have contributed to new waves of violence, return to conflict as the only possible way to make a living.

4. There is need for projects that directly target ex-combatants rather than indirect community projects. Besides, there is need to speed up implementation of poverty eradication programmes to rehabilitate war affected areas of northern Uganda. Programmes like Peace Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) for Northern Uganda<sup>33</sup> should be implemented as a matter of urgency since it one of its strategic objectives of tackling peace building and reconciliation in the area. The issue becomes more urgent especially that NUSAF is about to wind up in 2009.
5. The reported lack of political follow up by concerned local leaders, deceitful nature of NRM leaders and bureaucracy may be minimized if the government appoints a special political representative for the West Nile region to attend to ex-combatant issues. Such a representative should involve the local people and ex-combatants in planning and implementing practical welfare programmes, provide technical advice on management of income generating projects by ex-combatants, retrain the untrained ex-combatants in vocational skills and also pursue the governments' pledges to ex-combatants in the region.
6. In order to minimize the negative attitude of some community members towards ex-combatants who have returned to their communities, programmes for reintegration should be developed and implemented with close involvement by local communities in order to instill social cohesion. Very often ex-combatants who have committed human rights violations remain at liberty and so it seems that they are actually being rewarded after the event through their eligibility for support programmes; in other words, their crimes have paid. In such a case, communities need to be psychologically and emotionally prepared for the return of ex-combatants.
7. There is need for a National Policy on Conflict Resolution and Peace building to minimize the emergence of rebel movements due to conflict. The general view is that

---

<sup>33</sup> Mugerwa, Yassin, a Daily Monitor reporter (Friday, January 2009) reported that the President of Uganda had suspended implementation of the Shs. 1.1 trillion PRDP for northern Uganda.

managing and resolving conflict through peace-building measures, as opposed to singularly military means, can provide more long-lasting conflict resolution results. Other conflict resolution methods like peace talks with rebel groups, community mobilization, political education, disarmament and amnesty should be employed.

8. Finally, to achieve a successful DDR programme, the following necessary ingredients should be in place: a) a credible and authoritative national institution to plan, implement, and oversee the program at the national level; b) peacekeeping forces and military personnel to implement disarmament; c) civilian organizations and institutions to provide food, education, and health care to demobilized ex-combatants and; d) local communities which are sensitized and directly involved in the social and economic integration of demobilized ex-combatants. With these ingredients in place, reintegration of ex-combatants will greatly contribute to peace building.

### **5.5 Areas for Further Research**

The results of the study have revealed the failure of the NRM government to fulfill political commitments, which has sparked off conflict, hindered reintegration of ex-combatants and peace building in northern Uganda. However, a more rigorous study, using a bigger sample and probably at national level should be carried out to assess the extent to which the NRM government has fulfilled its commitments in other development fields. This will help to identify the gaps needed to be filled if the NRM party is to continue in leadership in order to cause the fundamental change promised by the President in 1986.

## **LIST OF RESPONDENTS**

### **NAMES OF KEY INFORMANTS**

Yassin Aarii	Director Participatory Rural Action for Development
Abdullah Latiff	UVAB, Arua
Judith Apio	NUSAF Coordinator for Ex-combatant Projects, Arua
Lt.Col. Obitre Gama	Amnesty Commission Arua
Major Abiriga, Bruhan	RDC Arua and former Battalion Commander in NRA
Brig. Moses Ali	Chairman of UNRF 1 ex-combatants and former Deputy Prime Minister in the NRM government. Currently, he is the Vice Chairman for NRM party for Northern Uganda.
Captain Kamara	RDC public relations office Arua
Brig. Nasur Ezaga	UNRF 1 ex-combatant
Nasur Ondoga	UNRF 1
Obiga Kania	UNRF 1 leader and former Director in the NRM secretariat
Flavia Waduwa	Prime Ministers office
Timothy Lubanga	Office of the Prime Minister
Joyce Ayikoru	SKIPI, Yumbe district
General Elly Tumwine	Former NRA Commander (1981 – 1987)
Mwesigye Fred	NRA Reorganization Commander
Major Ramanthan	UNRF 1
Ali Bamuze	Former UNRF1 member and leader of UNRF 11
Emilio Mondo	Executive Secretary of UVAB

### **FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION PARTICIPANTS**

#### **A. ARUA DISTRICT**

1. Bachu Bayi Opinion leader at the district level
2. Sadik Mohammad Opinion leader at the district level
3. Tom Aluonzi Opinion leader at the district level
4. Efrem Nyakuni Local council I leader

- |                   |                          |
|-------------------|--------------------------|
| 5. Aliansi Obitu  | Local council I leader   |
| 6. Juspín Adukule | Local council I leader   |
| 7. Onama Abdullah | Local Council III leader |
| 8. Gladys Safi    | Local council III leader |

#### B. KOBOKO DISTRICT

- |                    |  |
|--------------------|--|
| 1. Kassim Ondoga   | Opinion leader at the sub county level |
| 2. Aliga Yahaya    | Opinion leader at the village level    |
| 3. Adam Kujo       | Opinion leader at the parish level     |
| 4. Moreen Ajaga    | Opinion leader at the sub county level |
| 5. Juma Aligo      | Local council I leader                 |
| 6. Nasur Kemji     | Local council III leader               |
| 7. Mzee Amin Opigo | Opinion leader at the district level   |
| 8. Aseni Salim     | Local council I leader                 |

#### C. YUMBE DISTRICT

- |                    |  |
|--------------------|--|
| 1. Baduru Aganansi | Opinion leader at the district level   |
| 2. Akasa Aligo     | Opinion leader at the village level    |
| 3. Okaya Abukari   | Opinion leader at the sub county level |
| 4. Noah Kemis      | Opinion leader at the district level   |
| 5. Mustafa Musa    | Local council I leader                 |
| 6. Butiga Yahaya   | Local council I leader                 |
| 7. Iddi Safi       | Opinion leader at the district level   |
| 8. Dalik Sebi      | Local council III leader               |

## REFERENCES

### Books

Amin, M. E. (2005). *Social Science Research: Conception, Methodology and Analysis*. Kampala, Uganda.

Amnesty Act (2000). Laws of the Republic of Uganda.

Anderlini, S. N. (2001). *Women, Peace and Security: A Policy Audit*. From the Beijing Platform for Action to UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and Beyond, London: International Alert.

Batchelor, P. & Kingma, K. (2004). *Demilitarization and peace building in Southern Africa Vol II*. National and regional experiences. Aldershot: Ashgate. ISBN 0754633152.

Barth, E (2003). *The Reintegration of Female Soldiers in Post Conflict Societies*, Aid Workers Exchange (URL: <http://aidworkers.net/exchange/20030820.html>. Accessed on 12th January, 2009).

Braithwaite, J. (1989). *Crime, Shame and Reintegration*, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne.

Civil Society Organizations for Peace in Northern Uganda (CSOPNU, 2008). *Learning from Past Experience, Designing a better future*. Towards a successful Disarmament, Demobilization and Resettlement in Northern Uganda, May 2008.

Creswell, J.W (2003). *Research design, qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods approach* 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed), New Delhi, Sage Publication, pg 156.

Gertzel, C. (1990). *Uganda's continuing search for Peace*. Current History, 89, No. 547, May 1990.

- Heinemann-Grüder and Tobias P (2003). *Turning Soldiers into a Work Force. Demobilization and Reintegration in Post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina*, BICC brief 27, Bonn: BICC.
- Kanyehamba, G.W (2002). *Constitutional and Political History of Uganda*, Centenary Publishing House, Kampala.
- Karugire, S. M. (2003). *Roots of instability in Uganda*. Fountain Publishers, Kampala.
- Katebire, A, D. (2007). *Social Research Methodology: An introduction*. Printed and published by Makerere University printery, Kampala, Uganda.
- Kingma, K. (2001). *Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Post-war and Transition Countries*, Eschborn: GTZ.
- Kingma, K. (1996). *The Role of Demobilization in the Peace and Development Process in Sub-Saharan Africa: conditions for success*. Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC). Published in African Security Review Vol. 5 No. 6, 1996
- Klingebiel, S., Gärke, I., Kreidler, C., Lobner, S and Schütte, H (1995). *Promoting the Reintegration of Former Female and Male Combatants in Eritrea*. German Development Institute, Berlin.
- Lawson, D., Mackay, A. and Okidi, J (2003). *Poverty in Uganda – Basic Dynamic Trends*. McMillan publishers, Kampala, Uganda.
- Massimo, F (2003). *Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants*. Available at; <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/demobilization/?nid=1376>. Accessed: January, 2, 2009.
- Meredith, M. (2006). *The State of Africa: A history of fifty years of independence*. Free Press, Great Britain.

Mudola, D, (1991). “*Institution Building: The case of NRM and the Military 1986 – 1989*” in “*Changing Uganda*”, B. Hansen and M. Twaddle (Eds), Fountain Publishers, Kampala.

Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MFPED, 2004). Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Case of Northern Uganda, Discussion Paper 8, July 2004. The Republic of Uganda.

Museveni, Y.K, (1997) *Sowing the Mustard Seed: The struggle for Freedom and democracy in Uganda*, Macmillan Educational Limited, London.

Mutengesa, S (2006). *From Pearl to Pariah: The Origin, Unfolding and Termination of State-Inspired Genocidal Persecution in Uganda, 1980-85*. Published on: Dec 21, 2006, Kampala, Uganda.

Nsibambi, A (1998). “Solving Uganda’s food problem” in Holger Bernt Hansen and Micheal Twaddle, Eds. *Uganda Now: Between Decay and Development*, James Currey Ltd, London.

Ondoga, A, (1998), *Museveni’s Long Match from Guerrilla to Statesman*, Fountain Publishers, Kampala, Uganda.

Omara-Otunnu, A. (1987). *Politics and the Military in Uganda, 1890-1985*. London: Macmillan.

Pugh, M. (ed.) (2000). Regeneration of war-torn societies, *Global Issues Series*, London: Macmillan Press, New York; St. Martin’s Press.

Rubongoya, J. B. (2007). *Regime Hegemony in Museveni’s Uganda*. Pax Musevenica. Palgrave Macmillan, USA.



Schroeder, E. (2005). *Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP)*. Gender Desk Study, World Bank.

Strass, J et al (1990). *Basics of Qualitative Research Techniques and Procedures for developing grounded theory*. Prentice Hall, New York.

The Uganda Peoples' Defence Forces Act (2005).

United Nations (2006), *Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards*, New York.

United Nations (2000). *Harnessing Institutional Capacities in Support of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of former Combatants*, the Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA), July 2000.

United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPO) (2000). *DDR of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment: Principles and Guidelines*. United Nations, 2000. (accessed December 2, 2008).

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2002). *Demobilization and Reintegration of Combatants. Some Lessons from Global Experience*. Arab States Sub regional Facility.

### **Journals**

Kimberly, T. (2007), Transitional Subjects: The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of former combatants in Colombia, *International journal of Transitional Justice, Vol. 1 NO. 1 OUP*.

Knight, M. (2008), Expanding the DDR model: Politics and Organizations, *Journal of Security Sector management, Vol. 6 No. 1, March 2008*.

Matwili, J. M. (1998). Command and control during combined peace-support operations and lessons to be learned by the SANDF. *Armed Forces Journal*, August: 30-34.

Mazarire, G. & Rupiya, M. (2000). Two wrongs do not make a right: A critical assessment of Zimbabwe's demobilization and reintegration programs, 1980 - 2000. *Journal of Peace, Conflict and Military Studies*, 1 (1 March).

### **Paper presentations**

Boutros, B. G. (1995). *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations*, A/50/60, United Nations, New York, 1995, para. 50.

Lomo, Z., Hovil, L. (2005). *Whose Justice; Perception of Uganda's Amnesty Act 2000*. Refugee Law Project Working Paper No. 15, Kampala, 2005.

Muwonge, M. J (2007). *Community Based Reintegration of Ex-Combatants: A Case Study of the Lords Resistance Army in Northern Uganda*. A Paper Submitted For Presentation and Discussion during the 4th International Institute for Peace through Tourism African Conference: Educators Forum at Serena Hotel –Kampala, Uganda 20th May 2007.

Northern Uganda Peace Initiative (NUPI, 2006). *Issues paper on the Development of a Conflict Resolution and Peace Building Policy for the Government of Uganda*, Republic of Uganda, Kampala, Uganda.

Nubler, I., (1997), “*Human Resources Development and Utilization in Demobilization and Reintegration Programs*”, paper 7: Paper prepared for BICC research project”

Refugee Law Project (2004) *Negotiating Peace; Resolution of Conflicts in Uganda's West Nile Region*. Refugee Law Project. Working Paper No. 12, June

2004.

Spenser, D (1997). “*Demobilization and Reintegration in Central Africa*, BICC Paper 8, February 1997”.

## **Reports**

Ali, M (forthcoming). The struggle for UNRF 1 in Uganda.

Amnesty Commission Reports (2000 – 2003; 2004 - 2005). Abacus Printers and Stationers, Kampala, Uganda.

Boutros, B. G. (1994). *An Agenda for Development: Report of the Secretary-General*, A/48/935. United Nations, New York, 1994, p. 7.

Gersony, R. (1997). *The Anguish of Northern Uganda. Results of a Field-Based Assessment of the Civil Conflicts in Northern Uganda*. A report submitted to USAID Mission, Kampala.

International Crisis Group (ICG, 2004). *Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict*. ICG Africa Report N°77, 14 April 2004

Mamdani, M. (1976). *Politics and Class Formation in Uganda* (New York: Monthly Review Press).

Ministry of Defense records, Bombo Barracks.

Muzaale, P., (1997). *Evaluation of the Third and Final Phase of the Veterans Assistance Program*. Report of the Implementation of the Institutional Capacity of the Uganda Veterans Assistance Program (UVAP), Kampala.

Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF) Disbursements Report for August 2008.

Office of the Prime Minister (2007). *Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda*. The Republic of Uganda, Kampala, Uganda.

US Department of State, (1994). *Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis*. Report to the US Congress on the Problem with Un cleared Landmines and the United States Strategy for Demining and Landmine Control, Office of International Security and Peacekeeping Operations, Washington DC, 1994.

### **Unpublished Dissertations**

Kayunga, S.S (2001), *The No Party System of Democracy and the Management of Ethnic Conflicts in Uganda*, PhD Dissertation submitted to Roskilde University, Graduate School of International Development Studies, 2001.

Makumi, M. (1994). *The International Management of Internal Conflict in Africa: The Uganda Mediation, 1985*. Ph.D Dissertation, University of Kent at Canterbury, October, 1994.

Mulongo, S (2008). *Crisis of armed forces management in a post-conflict state reconstitution: A case study of Uganda (1992 – 1995)*. Unpublished Masters dissertation, Nairobi University.

### **Newspapers**

Africa Confidential, 14 April 1995.

Allio, E. (1996) "N.R.A and UNRF I negotiate", The New Vision, Thursday December 24<sup>th</sup> 1996.

Mugerwa, Y, (2009). Suspension of the Shs 1.1 trillion PRDP for Northern Uganda. Daily Monitor reporter (Friday, January 2009).

Press Release by State House Entebbe of 27 July, 1986.

### **Websites**

Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives (Published by Conciliation Resources)

URL: <http://www.c-r.org/accord/index.htm> (Accessed on 2nd January 2009)

Africa Peace Forum (APFO). URL: <http://www.amaniafrika.org/> (Accessed on 2<sup>nd</sup> January 2009)

Centre for Conflict Resolutions. (University of Cape Town) URL: <http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/> (Accessed on 16<sup>th</sup> December 2008).

Journal of Conflict Resolution. URL: <http://www.library.yale.edu/un/un2f1a1.htm> (Accessed on 11th November 2008)

Nairobi Peace Initiative – Africa (NPI-Africa). <http://www.npi-africa.org> (Accessed on 12<sup>th</sup> January 2009)

Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution. URL: <http://www.trinstitute.org/ojpcr/> (Accessed on 16<sup>th</sup> December 2008)



Any other (specify it \_\_\_\_\_)

---

A9. How long had you served UNLF?

1. Less than a year  2. 1- 2 years  3. 3-4 years

4. 5-6 years  5. Above six years

A10. Do you posses a demobilization certificate?

Yes

No

A11. Reason for demobilization:

---

---

**SECTION B: UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN UNRF 1 AND NRM**

B1. Do you have any knowledge of the understanding that was arrived at between UNRF 1 and NRM government that eventually led to reintegration of UNRF forces?

Yes

No

B2. If YES, please state some of the commitments that were agreed on by both parties

---

---

---

**SECTION C: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO DELIVER ON COMMITMENTS**

C1. Which of the two parties (UNRF 1 and NRM) failed to deliver on its commitments?

UNRF I

NRM

C2. Which commitments did NRM fail to meet?

---

---

---

C3. Which commitments did UNRF1 fail to meet?

---

---

---

C4. What were causes of the failure to deliver on commitments on the side of NRM?

---

---

---

C5. What were causes of the failure to deliver on commitments on the side of UNRF 1?

---

---

---

C6. What were the consequences of failure by the NRM government to deliver on commitments on the following:

a) Welfare of reintegrated UNRF combatants

---

---

---

---

b) Local community members

---

---

---

---

c) Government

---

---

---

---



C7. Apart from failure of the government to live up to commitments of the peace deal, please indicate other factors that have led to emergence of new rebel movements in West Nile?

---



---



---

**SECTION D: PEOPLE, FRAMEWORKS AND PROGRAMES**

D1. This section contains a number of statements about people, frameworks and programs. Kindly express your opinion by ticking one of the given responses (*Yes, No, I don't know*).

Statement	Yes (1)	No (2)	Undecided (3)
<b>i) FRAMEWORKS</b>			
1. The objective of integration of ex-combatants is well known to me			
2. Stakeholder involvement was adequate			
3. Government communicated policy regarding reintegration			
4. Assessments of local conditions and economic opportunities were made before reintegration efforts.			
5. The economic environment in which ex-combatants operate creates confidence			
6. Speed of handling reintegration exercise was fast.			
7. Identification procedure for the beneficiaries of reintegration was clear			
8. Contingency plans for ex-combatants were in place			
<b>ii). PROGRAMES</b>	Yes (1)	No (2)	Undecided (3)
9. A longer term disarmament and weapons management project is in place			
11. The hopes and expectations of the ex-combatants are taken care of.			
12. Ex-combatants who cannot read and write are offered pre-vocational skills			
<b>iii) PEOPLE</b>	Yes (1)	No (2)	Undecided (3)
13. Objective of reintegration was known to all stake holders			
14. Reintegration goals were set by advisors			
15. The goals had UN backing			
16. There was special staff for reintegration operations			
17. I Worked closely with other organizations to ensure reintegration work was a success			
18. There was criteria for choosing people who were involved in reintegration			

**SECTION E: SOCIAL COHESION, CAPACITY ENHANCEMENT AND RECONCILIATION**

E1. This section contains a number of statements about social cohesion, capacity enhancement and reconciliation. Kindly express your opinion by ticking one of the given responses (*Yes, No, I don't know*).

<b>Statement</b>	<b>Yes (1)</b>	<b>No (2)</b>	<b>Undecided (3)</b>
<b>iv) SOCIAL COHESION</b>			
19. Reintegration opportunities for ex-combatants were equitable and sustainable			
20. Ex-combatants are safe in host communities.			
21. The perception of ex-combatants by host community is positive.			
22. Reporting ex-combatants are received with welcome.			
23. Many ex-combatants see themselves as social rejects.			
<b>v) CAPACITY ENHANCEMENT</b>	<b>Yes (1)</b>	<b>No (2)</b>	<b>Undecided (3)</b>
24. Insecurity and lawlessness have reduced in the last 20 years			
25. Social services to ex-combatants are availed			
26. Assistance strategies are beneficial to ex-combatants and host communities			
28. Transparency in reintegration efforts prevails.			
29. The specific needs of women and child combatants were addressed.			
30. Reintegration courses were conducted.			
31. The course content was designed to the interest of the ex-combatants.			
32. Ex-combatants get some employment.			
33. The implementers of the programs know the local language.			
34. Reintegration was designed to reduce armed violence.			
<b>vi) RECONCILIATION</b>	<b>Yes (1)</b>	<b>No (2)</b>	<b>Undecided (3)</b>
35. Reintegration assists in restoring the rule of law, improving human security and achieving reconciliation			
36. There is broad representation of stakeholders to peace negotiations.			
37. Ex-combatants' wishes are taken care of.			
38. Impartiality by programme implementers was guaranteed.			
39. The identification procedure for beneficiaries of reintegration was clear.			
40. The entitlements to beneficiaries are made known to the public.			
41. There is transparency by Amnesty Commission officials.			

**SECTION F: GENERAL** *(Please write your responses in the spaces provided).*

F1. Why do you think reintegration of ex-combatants in West Nile Region has not achieved sustainable peace?

---

---

---

---

F2. Please suggest ways in which successful reintegration of ex-combatants into the community can be done.

---

---

---

---

F3. How can peace be ensured between ex-combatants and community members?

---

---

---

---

**End**

**Thanks for your cooperation**

## APPENDIX II

### GUIDING QUESTIONS FOR KEY INFORMANTS

#### For key actors of the peace deal on the side of UNRF and NRM government

---

---

This interview guide is for the purpose of collecting data to be used to write a dissertation that is a partial fulfillment for a Master of Arts in Peace and Conflict Studies degree of Makerere University. The information provided herein will be kept with utmost confidentiality. You are therefore kindly requested to cooperate in answering the questions honestly to provide the required information. The topic of study is “**Reintegration of Ex-Combatants and Peace building in Uganda: A case study of the Uganda National Rescue Front I (1981 – 2008)**”. Thank you for your time.

#### QUESTIONS

1. What are the circumstances that led to an understanding between UNRF 1 and the NRM government that led to reintegration of UNRF 1 forces in 1986?

---

---

---

---

---

---

2. What were the contents of the peace deal between UNRF 1 with the NRM government?

---

---

---

---

---

---

3. Do you think the NRM government fulfilled its commitments?

---

---

---

---

4. What were the commitments that were fulfilled on the side of NRM ?

---

---

---

---

---

5. What were the commitments that were fulfilled on the side of UNRF 1?

---

---

---

---

6. What were the commitments that were not fulfilled on the side of NRM ?

---

---

---

---

---

7. What were the commitments that were not fulfilled on the side of UNRF 1?

---

---

---

---

---

8. What could have caused the failure of the government to deliver on the commitments in the peace agreement?

---

---

---

---

---

9. What could have caused the failure of UNRF 1 to deliver on the commitments in the peace agreement?

---

---

---

---

---

10. What were the consequences of the failure of the government to deliver on its commitments on ex-combatants?

---

---

---

---

11. Apart from failure of the government to live up to commitments of the peace deal, what are other factors that have led to emergence of new rebel movements in West Nile? *Let the informant highlight the new rebel movements in West Nile since 1986.*

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

12. How many UNRF 1 ex-combatants were:

a) Reintegrated into the community?

---

b) Reintegrated into the public service?

---

c) Reintegrated into the NRA?

---

13. What resettlement package did NRM government give the UNRF 1 ex-combatants reintegrated into the community?

---

---

---

14. Do you think the UNRF 1 ex-combatants were fully reintegrated into the community? Support your answer?

---

---

---

15. Indicate the extent to which the following International Reintegration Standards were observed by the NRM government during the reintegration of UNRF 1 ex-combatants

<b>International Reintegration Standards</b>	<b>Fill in your responses adjacent to each standard</b>
1. A credible and authoritative national institution to plan, implement, and oversee the program at the national level	
2. Peacekeeping forces and military personnel to implement disarmament	
3. Civilian organizations and institutions to provide food, education, and health care to demobilized ex-combatants	
4. Sensitization and directly involving local communities in the social and economic integration of demobilized ex-combatants	
5. Accountability and transparency to ensure legitimacy of the reintegration exercise	
6. Inclusivity: ex-combatants should not be discriminated on the basis of sex, age, race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political opinion.	

16. Suggest ways in which successful reintegration of ex-combatants into the community can be done.

---

---

---

**Thanks for your cooperation**



## **APPENDIX III**

### **GUIDING QUESTIONS FOR KEY INFORMANTS**

**The key informants include Amnesty Commission staff, RDCs, UVAB staff, staff of the OPM and SKIPI staff.**

---

---

**Responses to be recorded in the note book provided.**

#### **QUESTIONS**

1. What were the contents of the peace deal between UNRF 1 with the NRM government?
2. Do you think the NRM government fulfilled its commitments? What were the commitments that were fulfilled and not fulfilled?
3. What could have caused the failure of the government to deliver on the commitments in the peace agreement?
4. What were the consequences of the failure of the government to deliver on its commitments?
5. Apart from failure of the government to live up to commitments of the peace deal, what are other factors that have led to emergence of new rebel movements in West Nile? *Let the informant highlight the new rebel movements in West Nile since 1986.*
6. Does the community offer support to ex-combatants to manage challenges of civilian life?
7. Would you say that the majority of ex-combatants population is well reintegrated in the community?
8. What are the contributions the ex-combatants have made to the community?
9. What is the effect of the return of ex-combatants on peace in the community?
10. Do you know of any programs of assistance to the ex-combatants and their families to enable them adopt to civilian life?
11. How would you describe the welfare conditions of the ex-combatants in your community?

12. Why do you think reintegration of ex-combatants in West Nile Region has not achieved sustainable peace?
13. Suggest ways in which successful reintegration of ex-combatants into the community can be done.
14. How can peace be ensured between ex-combatants and community members?

END .

## APPENDIX IV

### GUIDING QUESTIONS FOR FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS WITH OPINION LEADERS

(The opinion leaders include LC leaders, retired civil servants, elderly men and women in society, religious leaders and members of civil society organizations)

---

#### Period for discussion: 1 to 2hours

- [1] How would you describe the relationship between ex-combatants and members of the community?
- [2] Would you say that the relationship between ex-combatants and members of the community provides peace in local community, in any way?
- [3] What problems would you say ex-combatants do experience in your community?
- [4] How are the problems resolved?
- [5] Would you say you feel at ease while interacting with the ex-combatants in your community?
- [6] The History of Uganda is full of bad memories of Uganda armies. Does this influence your attitude towards the ex-combatants? Explain
- [7] Would you say the rest of the members of the community feel the same? Explain
- [8] How would you rate contributions the ex-combatants have made to the community?
- [9] In your view, what contribution did the return of the ex-combatants have on peace in your community?
- [10] What ways do you think, in order to promote sustainable peace, can be used to reintegrate ex-combatants better in the community?

END


## APPENDIX V

### OBSERVATION GUIDE

<b>Variables to be observed</b>	<b>Observations</b>
Living conditions of ex-combatants in terms of housing, dressing, personal hygiene employment ,	
Nutrition in terms of number of meals per day, type of food consumed, quantity	
Social services in the area like schools, roads, electricity	
Income generating activities like gardens, shops, carpentry workshops etc	

**APPENDIX VI**

**A SAMPLE COPY OF THE AMNESTY CERTIFICATE**

 <p>THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA</p>	who is ordinarily a resident of..... ..... Village, ..... Sub County in ..... County of ..... District.
<p><b>THE AMNESTY ACT 2000</b> <b>(ACT No.2 of 2000)</b></p>	Issued under my hand this .....day of ..... year 200.....
<p><b><u>CERTIFICATE OF AMNESTY</u></b></p>	<p><b>CHAIRPERSON</b> <b>Amnesty Commission</b></p>
<p>In accordance with section 4 of the Amnesty Act, 2000 and Statutory Instrument No.9</p>	
<p>This certificate of Amnesty is issued to ..... .....</p>	

**APPENDIX VII**

**LETTER OF INTRODUCTION TO RESPONDENTS**